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AN INVESTIGATION INTO T H E EVOLUTION OF M A L T E S E 
G E O P O L I T I C A L THOUGHT: 
Its heritage, renaissance and rejuvenation ? 
Ian Robert Baggett, December 1998 
ABSTRACT: An increasing number of theorists are involving themselves in the historical 
evolution of geopolitical thought, although most are concerned only with the development 
of conventional western thinking* This thesis derives from the idea that il may be 
interesting and useful to investigate the evolution of geopolitical thought from a non-
western or non-mainstream perspective. Given the current demands by the new 
generation of "critical" political geographers for alternative research and more viable 
historical perspectives on the evolution of geopolitics** ,it was intended that such an 
investigation would also prove to be a useful contribution to wider geopolitical knowledge 
and thinking. Malta was deemed to be the perfect case study from which to conduct such 
an investigation 
The thrust of the thesis can be explained in terms of three sub-aims It aims to conduct a 
thorough investigation into the heritage of geopolitical thought in Malta. It then aims 
to utilize this investigation to propose a viable and thorough historical perspective on the 
current modes of geopolitical thinking in Malta. Third, by keeping current thinking in 
its historical context, it then aims instead to generate a number of insights and ideas for 
future geopolitical thinking in Malta. 
The three sub-aims introduced above are contrived to satisfy the single overriding aim of 
the thesis, which is; to highlight and substantiate the insights that new and alternative 
research into the history of geopolitical thought can bring about, not at the conventional 
global level of the mainstream meta-theorists but instead at the less-grandiose and more 
practicable levels. It is in this respect that the thesis sets out to make a new and 
alternative contribution to wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking. 
* Most nolably Parker 1985, bul also sec Agnew and Corbridgc 1989. and O'Loughlin and Heske 1991. 
For more on the demands that this new generation of "critical" political geographers make with regard 
lo the fulurc nature of the discipline of geopolitics see the introduction to this thesis. Also see the 
literature on "critical geopolitics"; Dalby 1990, 1991, 1994, Dodds and Sidaway 1994, OTuathail 1994a, 
OTuathail 1994b, Luke and OTuathail 1994, and OTuathail 1997. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The iast two centuries have witnessed more fundamental changes than any of those 
previously recorded in history To anyone concerned with politics or geography, the 
extent of these changes is most readily apparent in the complete metamorphosis of the 
world's geopolitical surface. This surface has transformed from the Euro-centric world of 
colonial times, through the anarchic world of the two World Wars, to the bipolar order of 
the Cold War which, despite proclamations to the contrary', has recently given way to a 
more complex and unpredictable labyrinth of geopolitical forms. 
Throughout this transformation a rich heritage of geopolitical thinking evolved as 
geopoliticians attempted to describe, explain, predict and even influence the world's 
geopolitical surface. Nevertheless, both their intellectual credibility and their subject's 
investigative objectivity were often in question Following three decades, at least, in the 
academic wilderness the subject of geopolitics has recently undergone a renaissance based 
mainly on traditional western oriented modes of thought and out-dated global meta-
theories. Such a bias has drawn attention to the large question mark that continues to 
linger over the subject's investigative objectivity. 
This thesis is based on the premis that any classical renaissance in geopolitics is not only of 
limited use to those who are genuinely concerned with understanding the vagaries of the 
modern world but also imprudent, since by definition it can only be based on the same 
biased modes of geopolitical thought as those used to justify some of history's less savoury 
acts of state-craft. Its point of departure is that the majority of those engaged in 
geopolitical thought would benefit more from a rejuvenation of geopolitics, based on new 
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but less grandiose ideas generated from more viable historical perspectives, than they 
would from a renaissance, based on the old subjective ideas of western meta-theorists 
In the case of Malta, one of the oldest and best known geopolitical victims/subordinates, 
the above point holds particularly true Malta is located in one of the most strategically 
sought-after locations in the world and the Maltese, whether knowingly or not, have long 
been engaged in geopolitical thought The recent world-wide renaissance in geopolitical 
thinking, although having a profound influence on Malta's post-Cold War foreign policy, 
has failed to address the vagaries of Malta's contemporary regional geopolitical 
environment. In short, Malta represents an ideal case study through which to explore the 
issues highlighted thus far 
This thesis conducts an investigation into the historical evolution of geopolitical thought in 
Malta between 1800 and 2000 The investigation provides a coherent and thorough 
historical perspective on the heritage of geopolitical thought in Malta. I f the Maltese are 
to draw on the lessons of history it is important for them to see the way they think about 
their current geopolitical circumstances in an historical context. As it turns out, Malta has 
experienced its own mini-renaissance in geopolitics with contemporary thinking being 
heavily influenced by a concoction of classical-style western meta-theories and historically-
biased modes of thought deriving from Malta's heritage as a geopolitical outpost This 
concoction, despite having triggered a heated and emotive domestic debate, has done little 
to instigate pragmatic discourse on the vagaries of Malta's current regional geopolitical 
environment. I f such a discourse is to occur, it is a rejuvenation of geopolitical thinking in 
Malta that is required. Or in other words, a renewed willingness for those Maltese 
engaged in geopolitical thought to drop their quest for the ultimate and all-answering 
foreign policy solution to possible future conflict scenarios, discard their apparent pre-
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occupation with policy decisions at the ideological level (see for example the attention 
devoted to the alignment/non-alignment debate), and instead begin to address the first-
order geopolitical issues that are already threatening Malta's stability 
In summary the thrust of this thesis can be explained in terms of one overriding main aim 
and three sub-aims. 1) it aims to conduct a thorough investigation into the heritage of 
geopolitical thought in Malta. 2) it aims to utilize this investigation to cast a viable and 
thorough historical perspective on the current modes of thinking which constitute the 
renaissance of geopolitics in Malta. 3) by keeping current thinking in its historical context, 
it aims instead to generate insights and ideas for future geopolitical thinking in Malta 
Finally, the three sub-aims introduced above are mobilised to satisfy the single overriding 
aim of this thesis, which is, to highlight and substantiate the insights that new and 
alternative research into the evolution of geopolitical thought can bring about, not at the 
conventional global level of the global meta-theorists but instead at the less-grandiose and 
more practicable levels. It is in this respect that this thesis intends to make a new and 
alternative contribution to the required rejuvenation in wider geopolitical knowledge and 
thinking. 
I DEFINITIONS: GEOPOLITICS, G E O P O L I T I C A L CHANGE 
G E O P O L I T I C A L THOUGHT AND G E O P O L I T I C A L THINKERS 
One of the main difficulties with attempting a thesis on geopolitics is that the term 
'geopolitics' itself is prone to a range of differing interpretations and definitions. 
Furthermore, as a search on any database confirms, its adjective 'geopolitical' has an even 
greater range of usage. The confusion regarding the exact sense in which both terms are 
used, although undoubtedly more acute today than before, is no new predicament. Since 
4 
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its accouchement, the term 'geopolitics' has been attributed a multitude of different 
meanings which on occasions has given rise to controversy Perhaps most famously, 
Kjellen bemoaned the Germans for misusing the very; term he himself had coined2 Later 
another geopolitical theorist, Thermaenius, felt compelled to conclude that in 1938 the 
term "geopolitics" had at least five different meanings and it was therefore not surprising 
that, "a certain amount of obscurity has accompanied its use"3 Such obscurity has stuck 
with geopolitics since 1938, leading Schmidt to muse more recently that a term with such 
a wide variety of uses can have little meaning at all 4. Around the same time, Haglund who 
was concerned primarily with the geopolitics of minerals propagated his very own lengthy 
and specific meaning of the term and responding in advance to the criticism he anticipated 
was moved to write that; 
"the difficulty with geopolitics is that it is conceptually so broad that it can and does mean 
all things to all people"5. 
It therefore follows that in choosing to study geopolitics one is also consenting to grapple 
with the problem of definition at some stage or other. In this thesis the term 'geopolitics' 
is defined quite simply as being the study of the international political scene in a geo-
centric or spatial context. It follows that the adjective 'geopolitical' is used to refer to 
anything which relates to the spatial or geographical aspects of the international political 
scene Or as East and Prescott saw it, the geopolitical world is "a delicately interlocking 
mechanism", and geopolitics is the study of how and to what end this mechanism 
operates6. 'Geopolitical change' therefore refers to the changing spatial aspects of this 
delicately interlocking mechanism as opposed to say the changing technical aspects of it. 
Finally the term 'geopolitical thought' alludes to the perceptions or interpretations we may 
harbour on the political space which hosts this mechanism. A wide range of actors can be 
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said to be engaged in geopolitical thinking at any one time. For instance, political and 
military leaders along with their policy-makers, advisors and decision-makers, as well as 
theorists, academics and even informed observers or commentators engaged in any 
remotely related intellectual activity These actors are defined as being 'geopolitical 
thinkers'. 
The above definitions may appear very broad-based but it has to be remembered that this 
thesis is concerned with the panorama of geopolitical thinking since 1800 rather than the 
dominant mode of thought at any one snap-shot in time For this reason, a working 
definition more implicit than explicit is preferable since it must be applicable to the variety 
of modes that Maltese geopolitical thinking has taken on at a number of different phases in 
the country's political history Such a preference for uninhibitory working definitions can 
also be justified from previous studies into the history of geopolitical thought7 and is 
understandable since, after all, geopoliticians that take on such studies are in the 
unenviable position of having to examine phenomena which have been and are 
continuously liable to sudden and largely unforeseen changes. 
II INVESTIGATING T H E HISTORY OF G E O P O L I T I C A L THOUGHT: 
APPROACHES AND CONCEPTS 
Equipped with a working definition of geopolitics, it is now possible to explore some of 
the approaches and concepts which have been employed to investigate the evolution or 
history of geopolitical thinking. Two approaches, involving four quite different concepts 
need elucidating here. The first approach is used by theorists to compare and contrast the 
changing forms that the subject of geopolitical thinking, the geopolitical surface of the 
globe, has taken on at each of the various stages in history. This approach involves the 
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concepts 'order' and 'disorder' and all of the ambiguities that go hand in hand with their 
usage The second approach is used by theorists to differentiate between the way that the 
geopolitical thinkers of the various stages in history have reacted to and interpreted the 
particular geopolitical situations of their day, be they relatively ordered or disordered 
situations. This approach involves using the contrasting concepts of 'realism' and 'idealism' 
to depict the dominant mindset or mode of thinking behind a given interpretation, reaction 
or policy response 
By utilizing the concepts of order and disorder, parallels can be drawn between the 
different geographical and political conditions that the world has experienced throughout 
the various phases in its history On a cautionary note, however, the concepts of order 
and disorder are somewhat ambiguous Painter has warned that as descriptions of the 
world they are not neutral, value-free terms and that although they are used by theorists 
they feature heavily in the discourse of practical politics too 8. An ordered world helps 
people, but probably more specifically governments, feel secure, simply because things 
seem more predictable and altogether easier to deal with. Contrastingly, throughout 
political history the notion of disorder has gone hand in hand with fear and the prospect of 
threatened futures. Quite simply, the problems of ambiguity arise when one group's order 
either depends upon or is oblivious to another group's disorder. 
Heeding the above cautionary note, throughout this thesis the contrasting concepts of 
order and disorder are used only to shed light on the various stages of geopolitical change 
that Malta has passed through For instance, the nineteenth century is represented as 
having been a period of relative geopolitical order, since for the most part the relationship 
between colonial powers and their colonies, unjust though it was, had the effect of 
stabilising the majority of the globe and injecting an element of predictability into most 
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conflicts. As the process of colonialism faltered, anarchy in the form of the two World 
Wars took over and so the concept of disorder best represents the geopolitics of the 
wider-world throughout this phase in history Following on from this, the Cold War 
which came after the 'Hot Wars' can best be represented by the concept of order This is 
because the two sides in the bipolar equation at least seemed to know where they stood in 
relation to the other, even i f this was only because of a balance of terror which resulted 
from the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation. Despite talk of new world order based on 
either US leadership, UN supervision or a new geo-economic hierarchy, the phase which 
followed the Cold War was relatively disordered and most certainly offered less 
predictability than bipolarism had The demise of the Warsaw Pact, the ongoing 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the success of the US-led coalition in the Gulf War 
(1991) bred a new confidence within the West. It was this confidence that led many 
commentators there to herald the dawning of a new peaceful era and some even talked of 
the coming of a "boring phase"9 in political history Their smugness, however, was only 
short-lived as their proclamations of new world order were proven to be at best premature 
but more probably flawed for all time The triumphant troops did not return from their 
futuristic and mechanised battlefield to bask in a period of US-led global geopolitical 
order, UN-style universal security, or an economically contained world, but in 1993 were 
instead re-deployed on their second major global policing mission to the Balkans quagmire 
in which they faced a completely different set of circumstances Rugged mountain ranges 
and near-Arctic conditions had replaced flat desert plains but also, and most significantly, 
there was no easily identifiable enemy in the web of conflicts which accompanied the 
break-up of the former Yugoslavia These conflicts and others elsewhere in the world 1 0, 
which had been contained for decades by the bipolar confrontation, flared up around the 
globe and in doing so brought to an end to any hopes of a new geopolitical world order. 
The models and meta-theories that had been proposed to instigate a new world order were 
INTRODUCTION 
more imagined than real and it was not long before the true facts emerged for all to see 
In 1993 alone, two years after the Cold War had ended, twenty-two hot wars were still 
being fought around the world; about twenty-five million refugees were fleeing from these 
wars and at least four million had died as a direct or indirect result of them, two-hundred 
thousand in 1993"; taking internal turmoil into account the world went on to suffer 
seventy conflicts in 1994 and then a record seventy-one in 199512. The above facts point 
to the most recent and ongoing phase in the history of global geopolitical change in which 
the disorder, which has been denied so vehemently since the end of the Cold War1 3, has 
finally been acknowledged by the majority of theorists This phase is defined by the wide 
range of different interests, states, social movements and individuals that are attempting to 
pursue strategies and exert influence in the international arena. Straight forward 
geopolitical order appears to be a dated concept as issues such as the environment, 
economics, religion, nationalism and transnational crime have all come to the fore, making 
the world a far less predictable place Commenting on the above issues, Alexander 
Kennaway has stated; 
"Did you ever believe that the Warsaw Pact was going to attack NATO, or vice versa? I 
didn't, and I think the world is a more dangerous place now because of the absence of 
coherent policy in the former Soviet Union"14 
Having established the validity of the approach which uses the concepts of order and 
disorder to shed light on the vacillating process of global geopolitical change outlined 
above, it is now possible to turn to the other approach which is used to explain the way 
we interpret and react to different geopolitical situations, be they relatively ordered or 
disordered situations. As mentioned, the two concepts most commonly used to describe 
the way geopolitical thinkers respond to a particular set of geopolitical circumstances at a 
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given time are realism and idealism. Once again, rather like the concepts of order and 
disorder, these twin concepts contrast directly with each other. There follows a brief 
outline of them both 
Fundamental to realism (the political variant, as there is another form of realism15) is the 
idea of the nation-state, which is seen as the building block and main subject of 
international politics16. The role of other international actors, be they multi-national firms 
or inter-governmental organizations, is played down and in this respect the realist reaction 
or interpretation of geopolitical circumstances can be said to be state-centric17 In fact, so 
much so that even some of the most pervasive and influential non-state actors tend to be 
considered as instruments of the state rather than as international actors f?er .w1* In terms 
of their motivations, all nation-states are assumed to be primarily concerned with survival 
and self interest19. Hence, the realist sees the globe as a mosaic of individual and 
autonomous units, which interact and compete with other units2 0 Wars and conflicts are 
seen as the inevitable culmination of this interaction or competition and realism focuses in 
on such potentialities21. Put otherwise, the object of realism is the power politics 
developed by each state in pursuit of its interests, including, above all else, war and 
preparation for war. The realist approach therefore accepts that it is legitimate for states 
to monopolize the means of violence and that this provides one of the key means through 
which states pursue their interests22. Realist interpretations of geopolitical situations are 
thus tantamount to a tendency to view international politics in terms of a power hierarchy, 
leading certain adherents to use various forms of game theory to model state behaviour 
and the outcomes of potential international conflicts23 
The concept which scholars of political geography and international relations have 
repeatedly utilised to express their embarrassment and disdain with the realism inherent in 
10 
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both theoretical and practical geopolitics has traditionally been referred to as idealism. 
The concept of idealism grew up in the respite after the First World War as a response to 
the widespread perception that everything should be done to prevent a recurrence. 
Mackinder was the first to draw the distinction in his celebrated paper, "Democratic Ideals 
and Reality"2"1 At the outset idealism was based on the conviction that international 
conflicts could be resolved peacefully and indeed prevented i f new international 
institutions and legal processes were developed. Hence, the appellation 'idealism' arose 
because adherents sought to change the world for the better, rather than merely react to 
and interpret it as it was In the inter-war period (1918-1939) idealism matured as an 
intellectual approach and evolved into a critique of what was perceived as a reverie in 
geopolitics with the concept of the nation-state. An assumption implicit in this concept is 
that states are unified and that their governments speak and act in the national interest. 
Idealism holds that, even if there were such an interest, it is by no means certain that 
governments have the capacity to identify it, and even then they frequently lack the desire 
or capacity to pursue it The extent of the devastation during the 1914-1918 war and the 
widespread dismay as to its overall purpose meant that the idealists, with their 
characteristic optimism, were received relatively well. Nevertheless, their first innings was 
short-lived since their opener, the League of Nations, failed to prevent the Second World 
War which was paralleled with a resurgence of realist geopolitics. All the same, idealism 
as a means of reacting to and interpreting geopolitical situations never died and its 
theoretical underpinnings were never buried. First, it resurfaced in the period immediately 
after the Second World War but prior to the onset of the Cold War and, since then, 
although in a less obvious guise, it has done so once again in the post-Cold War era. This, 
the latest and most vociferous in a series of idealist revivals, has been subsumed under the 
aibric of 'critical geopolitics'25. Advocates of critical geopolitics26 are representative of 
the new generation of modern political geographers and, although they may make 
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extravagant claims to the contrary, their interpretations are essentially based on a form of 
idealism, i f for no other reason than their typical point of departure is a critique of the 
realism at the heart of traditional state-centred geopolitics. 
The intellectual rivalry between realists and idealists has been described as the first 'great 
debate' in the study of international relations27. As the outlines in the above two 
paragraphs suggest, it is a debate which has gone on for several decades. For the duration 
the basic theoretical underpinnings of both the concepts of realism and idealism have 
remained fundamentally unaltered, with the realists portraying a world dominated by an 
inevitable continuity and dogged with incessant conflict and dispute and the idealists 
pushing unrelentingly for change for the better Along the way, however, the basic 
theories and ideas of members of both academic camps have been modified so as to reflect 
changing global geopolitical circumstances. The relative state of order or disorder that the 
world found itself in has tended to determine the way in which thinkers have reacted to 
prevailing geopolitical circumstances and so support has veered between realism and 
idealism as the preferred conceptual tool for geopolitical interpretation. For instance, in 
the colonial phase prior to World War \ the world was characterised by a form of order 
based on European domination of the periphery. Throughout this phase, although it had 
not yet been conceptualised as an intellectual mindset, the dominant method of reacting to 
and interpreting geopolitical circumstances was realism28. The sweeping process of global 
colonisation had served to convince most observers that the nation-state was the main 
building block in international relations. In addition to this, the obvious readiness of the 
European colonial powers to utilise force in the fulfilment of their expansionist desires 
meant that realist world-views became established as the norm throughout this phase in 
history As the colonial order broke down into World War I , the support for the realism 
that had dominated geopolitical thinking for at least the previous century intensified. 
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Despite increasing calls for idealist reactions and interpretations to world-wide 
geopolitical circumstances in the inter-war years, such thinking continued to dominate the 
practical strategies of governments throughout World War II also29. Once again, the brief 
respite after World War II witnessed a resurgence of idealism30 but this resurgence was 
only short-lived and soon subsided as the realist driven balance of terror which constituted 
the Cold War set in. Since then the great debate between realists and idealists has 
continued with as much vigour as ever but it has to be concluded that in recent years the 
extreme versions of both concepts have lost most of their support to some of the more 
moderate variants. The concept of "neo-realism"3! has gained credence as a softer form of 
realism which takes into account the contemporary relevance of a whole host of new 
factors, such as the so called 'institutional' inputs from the international system which were 
no where to be seen on orthodox realist agendas It is the representatives from the neo-
realist school of thought who are currently advocating a renaissance of geopolitics which 
is essentially based on a revival of classical models and classical modes of thought. On the 
other hand the notion of "critical geopolitics" accepts that geopolitics, traditionally the 
realist sub-discipline within political geography or international relations, is a relevant 
approach but encourages the more civilised and receptive geopolitical discourses32. More 
than a renaissance, proponents of this notion are calling for a rejuvenation of geopolitics 
based on new ideas which are essentially less realist. In short, few people now see the 
geopolitical face of the globe in either solely realist or idealist terms33. 
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I I I TH E CASE STUDY: M A L T A AND GEOPOL8TBCAL THOUGHT IN 
MALTA 
The previous paragraph contains a brief description of the evolution of the so called great 
debate; or in other words the way that the dominant method of reaction and interpretation 
within mainstream geopolitical thought to global circumstances has shifted between 
variations of realism and idealism depending on the relative state of order or disorder 
which the globe finds itself in. But it has already been suggested that one man's order is 
another man's disorder and vice-versa It follows that the dominant method of reaction or 
interpretation to geopolitical circumstances at any one stage in history is not necessarily 
the right method of reaction or interpretation for all international actors. The history of 
geopolitical thought in Malta is demonstrative of this fact To begin to understand why 
geopolitical thought in Malta has not always served the best interests of the Maltese or of 
Malta's integrity we must consider Malta's location On this Luke wrote: 
"If anything shaped as differently from a circle as the Mediterranean can be said to have a 
centre, that centre is Malta. The Maltese archipelago is equidistant from the 
Mediterranean's western and eastern extremities, it is its half-way house between Occident 
and Orient, historically no less than geographically; it has been its nerve-centre - and more 
than its nerve-centre, its magnet - from the time whereof the memory of man runneth not to 
the contrary"34. 
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Figure 1: Malta's geopolitical centrality in the Mediterranean basin 
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Malta's geopolitical centrality articulated by Sir Harry Luke and illustrated in figure 1 
meant that for a great many years the Maltese archipelago was a sought-after strategic 
possession. The main European powers were all motivated by a similar classical 
interpretation of the geopolitical surface of the globe which was not indifferent to the one 
spelled out by Parker: 
"Just as the giant Antaeus, offspring of Ge and Poseidon, the gods of Earth and Sea, drew 
his mighty strength from contact with the ground on which he stood, so the power of the 
modem state is derived from the territory which it occupies."35 
Although in recent years the clear-cut interaction between geography and power 
succinctly captured in Parker's deduction has become increasingly dishevelled, Malta has 
remained in the eyes of most international actors a worthwhile confederate36 Moreover, 
whether we talk in terms of centuries or more recent decades, there have been few major 
international political developments which have not implicated Malta in some way or 
another. Or as Blouet has put it, 
"ever since the archipelago was first colonised it has never been very far from the centre of 
events and has often played a critical part in the making of history"37 
Blouet wrote of Malta's involvement in the major events of history in a positive light and 
certainly most Maltese are proud of their country's coveted history. In fact it is difficult to 
find an account of Malta's colonial history which is anything but praising of the overall role 
that the succession of colonisers have played in facilitating all aspects of Malta's 
development. Such a situation would appear to be somewhat atypical, with the majority 
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of native historians of former colonies opting instead to pour scorn on their former rulers 
through blatantly subjective accounts Nevertheless, a truly objective assessment of 
Malta's colonial history would also draw attention to some more negative aspects and in 
all probability conclude that the history of Malta is the history of pawn in power games of 
the world's major political players. Furthermore, and of more relevance to this thesis, the 
history of geopolitical thought in Malta has been the history of concession to outside 
impositions or the history of concession to dominant mainstream interpretations of 
geopolitical circumstances and developments. Certainly, with the exception of one phase 
in the Cold War, when Maltese geopolitical thinkers generated their own ideas on the 
political space which Malta found itself in, geopolitical thinking in Malta has rarely 
deviated from the course followed by mainstream western geopolitical thought, regardless 
of whether or not concession to such an interpretation was in Malta's best interests at a 
given time. In effect, such unquestioning concession to mainstream western geopolitical 
thought has contributed to Malta's seemingly permanent state of geopolitical subordination 
and all the hardships that have come with this. Even since the end of the Cold War, 
despite having the benefits of hindsight over a history of geopolitical subordination and 
having other tried and tested courses of thought readily available to them, Maltese 
geopolitical thinkers have in many ways toed the line with the realist inspired renaissance 
in geopolitics. It is for this reason that Malta makes such an intriguing and worthwhile 
case-study from which to conduct an investigation into the history of geopolitical thought. 
Whilst it is difficult to be critical of the geopolitical thinking which has dictated the policy 
responses of the main international players who have for centuries been unavoidably 
caught up in the world's major power games, it is easy to be critical of the thinking behind 
Malta's policy responses to the changes which have occurred in the configuration of her 
political space. In addition to this, whereas the history of global geopolitical change and 
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mainstream western thought on it is the focus of a number of well known texts38 and is 
covered in some way or another in most introductory publications on political geography, 
histories of geopolitical change and thoughts on it from the perspective of smaller 
international actors are not well documented at all. By making a new and alternative 
contribution to the required rejuvenation in wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking this 
thesis goes some way to redressing this imbalance. What is more, such a contribution can 
also be used to highlight and substantiate the insights that non-conventional research into 
the history of geopolitical thought can generate at the smaller more practicable and useful 
levels, thus satisfying the main aim of the thesis. 
IV R E S E A R C H 
Much of the preliminary and secondary research for this thesis was carried out in the 
former library of the Joint Services Defence College, Greenwich. It was here that I first 
delved into disciplines such as international relations and international politics and 
acquired an understanding of the historical evolution of geopolitical thought. This period 
of prefatory research was crucial since it allowed me to combine my newly acquired 
understanding of these more 'hard-line' disciplines with my grounding in geography; a 
combination which I now believe to have been this undertaking's main catalyst. 
A more general overview of the contemporary regional geopolitical situation was obtained 
whilst on a Mediterranean deployment in HMS BATTLEAXE. This entire deployment 
proved a most invaluable experience and I am particularly grateful to my appointer for the 
foresight he showed in presenting me with this opportunity to serve in my study area. As 
a relatively junior officer I felt privileged to be part of what was, courtesy of Saddam 
Hussein and his seemingly unrelenting provocative stance towards the West, a particularly 
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challenging and interesting deployment Aside from the operational aspects of the 
deployment, a number of official visits to embassies, naval academies and NATO bases, as 
well as a number of multi-national exercises in the months of September, October and 
November of 1996, all served as invaluable experiences at the practical level39. 
Furthermore, such visits enabled me to discuss in detail with learned professionals many of 
the wider issues incorporated in the thesis, particular those more recent issues relating to 
the regional situation that are incorporated in the concluding chapter. 
The primary research for this thesis took place on a six week long field trip to Malta which 
commenced in April of 1995; an eventful period in the sphere of Maltese foreign and 
security policy, which witnessed the signing of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme by the then Prune Minister, Dr Edward Fenech-Adami The heated domestic 
debate which ensued polemized, but also clarified, the contrasting political arguments. 
Commentators, both those in support and those against this policy initiative, were only to 
willing to talk in depth about Malta's contemporary foreign policy and so reveal the 
thinking behind the main post-Cold War policy courses available to them. In addition to 
this, the national newspapers were full of articles and commentaries on many of the issues 
I had elected to study. Hence, 1 was left to adopt the research methods which would best 
take advantage of this exciting climate of openness in the limited time I had available to 
me. 
Since it was imperative that 1 spoke to as many people as possible about the way they 
perceived Malta's international relations or indeed the way they thought about Malta 
geopolitically, 1 embarked on an intensive programme of both formal and informal 
interviews, which incorporated interviews with senior ministers, decision-makers, political 
lobbyists, journalists, academics as well as informed members of the public. In order to 
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make contact with the diverse range of interviewees it was necessary to attend 
conferences and symposiums on a variety of issues, even though often they were not 
strictly related to my particular field of research 
In addition to these interviews, I also deemed it important to take advantage of the 
plethora of articles and commentaries on geopolitically related issues appearing in Malta's 
national newspapers at this time Although the independence of Malta's main newspapers 
can be, and indeed frequently is, called into question, the standard of reporting in them is 
generally of a very high level, especially when one considers the relatively minute scale of 
their operations. A thorough examination of all of the main newspapers was conducted 
throughout the research period and any relevant articles were filed. In addition to this, 
back-copies of Malta's rwo main serious newspapers {The Times and the Malta 
Independent) covering the period between 1990-1995 were examined in the main library 
in Valletta and any relevant articles were also photocopied and filed Finally, since the 
main research period in 1995 I have managed to ensure that this file has been continually 
updated with the many relevant articles 1 have had sent to me by contacts working for the 
Malta Independent*®. It is the discourse from the many articles in this file that is drawn on 
and analysed throughout the thesis. 
As well as the more general articles that have appeared in the Maltese press in recent 
years, throughout the research period I tracked down a number of more specialised texts 
on some of the wider issues relating to current geopolitical considerations in Malta. For 
instance, I managed to obtain a draft copy of the Labour Party's foreign and security 
policy document which proved to be especially important in establishing the kind of 
geopolitical thinking behind their approach to policy in recent years. In addition to this, I 
collated various datum and information pertaining to the many wider issues that currently 
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affect geopolitical considerations in Malta. This material was used in a paper 1 wrote on 
the macropolitical threats currently facing Malta and is further analysed and drawn on in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis. For instance, international criminal activity, although 
previously not typically thought of as a high priority issue, is shown to be one of the wider 
issues now affecting geopolitical considerations in Malta To aid my appreciation of the 
extent of Malta's involvement in international criminal activity, or more specifically the 
laundering of the proceeds of international crime, I conducted a unique examination of the 
government's own record of property transactions which is available in the main library in 
Valetta. Information about other issues which currently exert influence on geopolitical 
considerations in Malta was also sought throughout the research period and every effort 
has been made to update this information in the time that has elapsed since then. This 
information includes a range of commentaries (written and spoken, published and 
unpublished) by specialists in environmental, boundary, economic and religious issues as 
well as from experts on illegal immigration and terrorism. 
Finally, a large part of the thesis is devoted to establishing a coherent perspective on 
Maltese geopolitical thought over the last two hundred years. For this reason it was 
necessary to conduct a thorough investigation of the archives in both the main library in 
Valletta and the university's library. Although there was little information which related 
directly to historical geopolitical thinking in Malta, closer examination of the policies 
through which Malta's past leaders reacted to world developments meant that it was 
possible to establish the particular modes of geopolitical thinking they adhered to. The 
extensive and detailed archives investigated in the research period provided more than 
enough material for the sections of this thesis which are devoted to Malta's policy 
responses to the geopolitical changes that have occurred throughout history. 
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V F O R M A T 
The main body of this thesis comprises four chapters which are arranged around four 
phases in the history of global geopolitical change. Each of these four chapters covers a 
particular and distinct phase in the history of global geopolitical change As a result of 
Malta's geopolitical centrality, or more specifically her long-standing record of 
involvement or entanglement in the process of global geopolitical change which has 
resulted from this, these four phases in world history also correspond with four easily 
distinguishable phases in the history of geopolitical thinking in Malta 
So that the phases can eventually be compared and contrasted, and for purposes of clarity 
and consistency, each of the chapters is split along the same lines into three separate 
sections. The first of these sections is devoted to an examination of the major geopolitical 
changes that were effecting the wider world throughout that phase. This section not only-
serves to paint a picture of the wider-world which Malta was a part of but also to 
introduce the global geopolitical setting of the day, be it one of relative order or disorder. 
Building on this, the second section of each chapter assesses Malta's place or role in this 
wider-world geopolitical setting, outlining the various policy responses through which 
Malta's rulers or leaders reacted to their particular situation. Finally, a third and 
concluding section in each chapter is devoted to an investigation into the specific 
interpretations or modes of geopolitical thinking behind these policy responses to wider 
world geopolitical change. It assesses whether the dominant mode of geopolitical thinking 
in Malta at that stage in history erred more towards realist or idealist interpretations of the 
geopolitical surface of the globe. In addition to this it considers what the main influencing 
factors behind the particular mode of geopolitical thinking were, be they external factors 
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derived from mainstream geopolitical thought and imposed on Malta or internal factors 
generated from within by native geopolitical thinkers. 
The structure outlined above is devised to enable a number of more esoterical conclusions 
about the history of geopolitical thought to be drawn in the final chapter. This concluding 
chapter is obviously devoted to drawing together the findings of the entire study. Having 
conducted the investigation into the history of geopolitical thought in Malta in the main 
body of the thesis the final chapter sets out to utilze this investigation to cast a coherent 
and thorough historical perspective on the current modes of geopolitical thinking in Malta 
Such an historical perspective enables me to introduce a number of hitherto overlooked 
issues and ideas on Malta's contemporary geopolitical circumstances. Crucially, however, 
in addition to this it presented me with the opportunity to contribute some alternative 
research to the required rejuvenation of geopolitics. The extent to which I can be said to 
have grasped this opportunity is for the reader to decide over the course of the remaining 
chapters. 
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Endnotes 
1 1 refer here lo the numerous and varied proclamations of new world order which accompanied the end of 
the Cold War (see sec. 3, ch. 4). 
2 Thermaenius 1938, p. 166. 
3 Ibid. p. 165. 
4 E.g. Schmidt 1985. 
3 Haglund 1986, p. 223. 
6 East and Prescott 1975. p. 8. 
' See for e.g. 
8 Painter 1996, p. 135. 
9 Most notably Fukuyama 1992. 
1 0 Outlined in sec. 1, ch. 4. 
1 1 Gurr and Harff J 994 detail these statistics and more to make the point that the world is less ordered in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. 
1 2 These two statistics were provided by an American group that opposes military spending cuts in the 
United Stales. The tally for 1994 was double the number logged by the National Defence Council 
Foundation in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down. They draw a now familiar conclusion; that the 
world is a far more unpredictable place than it was in the Cold War (See Prentice 1995, p. 12). 
, 3 I refer here to the proponents of new world order who have tried everything possible since the end of 
the Cold War to portray and even instigate a new world order of some sought (their attempts are covered 
in sec. 3 of ch. 4). 
1 4 Professor Alexander Kennaway (senior lecturer at the Conflict Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst) 
made these comments in a lecture I attended as an officer cadet in May 19%. 
1 5 It should be noted at the outset that the use of the terms realism and idealism may be particularly 
confusing for those versed in philosophy. As Caedel notes, in philosophy, realism and idealism have 
somewhat crude designated meanings regarding material (matter) and ideational (mind), respectively, as 
conceptions of reality (Caedel 1987, p. 15.). 
1 6 Realism has been present within, and in fact constituted, geopolitics since its inception as an academic 
discipline at the turn of this century. Today, it lives on in the work of a number of theorists of geopolitics 
and international relations (See for e.g. Art 1983, Keohane 1984, Gaddis 1987, Nye and Keohane 1989, 
Keohane 1989, Mearshcimer 1990, Krauthammer 1990-91, Art 1991, Gaddis 1991, Russet and Sutterlin 
1991, Nye and Keohane 1992, Nye 1992, Gaddis 1992). It is the crux of their work that is portrayed in 
the following summary. 
1 7 Although there are those that acknowledge that the state-centricity of realism overlooks the 
increasingly significant 'institutional' and industrial inputs to the international system (see the recent work 
from the so called Harvard School of neo-realism, in particular Keohane and Nye who specifically 
acknowledged the role that institutions such as the EC, the OECD and GATT now play in international 
affairs), the idea of uninhibited pursuit of power- political national interest still forms the bedrock of most 
realist geopolitical thinking (Art 1991) 
1 8 See Art op. cit. 
1 9 This assumption was made more confidently in the past when states adhered to starkly contrasting 
ideologies but even now realists such as Mearsheimer (op. cit.) point to the continuing primacy of survival 
and self interest to democracies, rubbishing claims that democracies 'don't or won't fight each other1 
(p.55). 
2 0 Ibid, p. 55. Realists tend to hold that this is still the case, even in an increasingly democratic world. 
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2 1 See the work of Mearsheimer op. cil. which is based mainly on pessimistic interpretations of the post-
Cold War world and its anticipated wars and conflicts. 
2 2 Krauthammer takes this one step further and argues that it is in fact more legitimate for developed 
states to monopolize the means of violence than say "Third World Weapon States" (p. 31). 
2 3 For an introduction into the priciplcs behind the zero-sum game and a comprehensive bibliography of 
its early usage by geopolitical theorists as well as its more recent usage by theorists concerned with 
economics and business see Amin 1992. 
2 4 Mackinder 1919, title of paper. 
2 5 Dalby 1991, is usually judged to have coined this term. 
2 6 See for e.g. Ibid, Dalby 1990, Dalby 1994, Dodds 1994, Dodds and Sidaway 1994, OTuathail 1994a, 
OTuathail 1994b, Luke and O'Tuathail 1994, and OTuathail 1997. 
2 7 Painter op. cit., p. 140. 
2 8 As will be shown in chapter 2, realism, although it was not known as such, formed the basis of all 
geographical thinking about the international political scene in colonial times. See for example the work 
ofMahan^ Ratzel-and Mackinder (all referenced in chapter 2). 
2 9 This wartime intensification of realism in geopolitical thinking is most readily apparent in the work of 
Haushofer, but also in the theories of his predecessor, Kjellen, and his US 'counterpart', Spyckman (all 
referenced in chapter 3). 
3 0 For one of the most radical idealist viewpoints in the closing years of W.W.II see Edmund Walsh 
(194.1); also see Whittlesey (1942), Lauimore (1943) and Weigert (1942). 
3 1 Neo-realism was conceptualised by the Harvard lecturers of International Relations, Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye (see Keohane 1986, and Keohane and Nye 1989, 1992). Other less realist versions of 
realism which might also be called neo-realism have been proposed by Art 1991, Russett and Sutterlin 
1991, Gaddis 1991, Mearsheimer 1990 and Krauthammer 1990-91. 
3 2 See endnote 24, particularly the work of Dalby. 
3 3 For further discussion on the declining support for the most polemical of realist and idealist stances see 
Stern 1995 w hich contains, amongst other things, a convincing inditement into the not so realist attributes 
of the thinking of supposed contemporary arch-realists such as Kenan and Kissinger. 
3 4 Luke 1949, p. 19. 
3 5 Parker 1985, p. I. 
3 6 Witness for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) efforts in the wake of Labour 
Party election victory to retain Malta in its Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme (The Times [Malta] 2 
November 1996, p. 6., see also sec. 2 of ch. 4 for more details). 
"Blouet 1992, p. 11. 
3 8 Most notably Parker op. cit. 
3 9 I participated in official visits to the British embassies in Lisbon (Portugal), Tunis (Tunisia) Valletta 
(Malta), naval academies in Brest (France) and Tunisia, and led a three day educational visit to the high 
security base of NATO's Commander in Chief Iberian Atlantic Area (CINCIBERLANT) which is located 
in Oeiras, Portugal. I was also involved in a number of multi-national exercises with the various arms of 
the US, French, Spanish and Portuguese armed forces. These exercises also incorporated 'officer 
exchanges' which proved most useful for exchanging ideas and opinions on a number of the more 
contemporary issues covered in litis thesis. 
4 0 I thank one journalist in particular, Raymond Cassar, who has worked for the Malta Independent and 
has been most useful in keeping me updated with relevant articles in the Maltese Press since 1985. I must 
also thank my initial contact at the Malta Independent, Nathalino Fenech (Durham PhD, 1998). 
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PHASE 1: 
MALTA AS A SUBORDINATE IN THE 
COLONIAL GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER 
PHASE 1 WIDER WORLD GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE 
L 
M A L T A AS A S U B O R D I N A T E I N T H E C O L O N I A L 
G E O P O L I T I C A L W O R L D O R D E R 
Malta's dependent identity can literally be measured in millennia1 because she has existed 
as a subordinate in some form or another since at least Roman times and probably long 
before that Nevertheless, this thesis is concerned with Malta's historical development as 
seen in the context of the wider-world geopolitical change which began with the age of 
global discovery and colonialism As such, the onset of this age is therefore taken as the 
start date for the first phase of this study. At the outset of this modem colonial age, Malta 
assumed a role in the colonial geopolitical world order when in July 1800 British troops 
succeeded in taking her capital, Valletta, from the French The end of phase one is taken 
as being 1914, the outbreak of the First World War, since it is in this year that the colonial 
world order can be said to have been on the verge of disintegration. 
The forthcoming chapter is devoted to this time-period (1800-1914) which was in many 
ways a formative phase in Malta's geopolitical development. In keeping with the structure 
outlined in the introduction, the chapter is split into three different sections. Initially, it is 
necessary to outline the international scene which Malta was a part throughout the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. The first section is concerned with this 
wider-world scene and presents an investigation into the colonial geopolitical world order. 
Following on from this, the second section traces the details of Malta's role in this world 
order. It is shown that, just as it had become utilized for the various causes of countless 
previous colonizers, Malta became a most important outpost for British colonial interests. 
Section three turns to the geopolitical thinking which dominated British interpretations 
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and reactions to wider-world geopolitical change on Malta's behalf Since it was based on 
the assumption that there was no perceived alternative to the continuity of colonization or 
expansionism by whatever means necessary, it was most definitely realist in nature. In 
addition to this, however, a degree of perceptiveness to the wants and needs of the 
Maltese is also discernible within this general mode of realism. For this reason the label 
"perceptive realism" is propounded. 
1.1 T H E WIDER WORLD 1800-1914: 
COLONIAL G E O P O L I T I C A L WORLD ORDER. 
Throughout phase I of Malta's political history the international scene was dominated by 
the phenomenon of colonialism This section investigates the reasons and motives behind 
this phenomenon before going on to present a thorough overview of the policies which 
were ultimately responsible for the consolidating colonial geopolitical world order which 
Malta found itself very much a part of between the years 1800 and 1914 At the outset, 
however, two explanations are necessary. 
First, the following paragraphs are concerned with colonization as a phenomenon related 
to the emergence of the so called colonial geopolitical world order. Hence, the focus of 
this section and this chapter is the European scramble for colonial possessions. It should, 
however, be remembered that expansionism and territorial acquisitiveness are not unique 
to the modern European states of the past two or three centuries; a fact that any 
comprehensive study of Malta's long history as a dependent territory verifies2. 
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Second, as with many terms in geopolitics, colonialism is not well defined and is often 
misconstrued as being synonymous with the term imperialism On this matter, Cohen's 
definition is worth citing: 
"Colonialism, as a process, involves the settlement from a mother country, generally into 
empty lands and bringing into these lands the previous culture and organization of the 
parent society Imperialism, as distinct from colonialism, refers to rule over indigenous 
people, transferring their ideas, institutions and goods."3 
The distinction Cohen makes between the terms colonialism and imperialism is not 
particularly relevant to the phase of world history we are concerned with here This is 
because in the international scene between 1800 and 1914 colonialism and imperialism 
tended to go hand in hand. Nevertheless, for reasons that will become clear, when 
considering Malta's experiences at the hands of their British colonisers, colonialism would 
appear to be the most fitting of the two terms since Malta was undoubtedly colonised as 
opposed to merely being subjected to imperial rule. Technicalities and semantics aside, 
this section now turns to its main focus, investigating the reasons for and motives behind 
the policies which were ultimately responsible for the colonial geopolitical world order 
A number of reasons have been put forward to explain why a few relatively small 
European states were able to establish ascendancy over a huge area of the globe4. 
Contrasting explanations have alluded to the higher levels of technological development in 
Europe than elsewhere, political rivalry between European states, western Europe's naval 
traditions and expertise and the triumph of capitalism. Rather than any one particular 
explanation it is probable that a combination of the above gave rise to the phenomenon 
known as colonization. Certainly, the escalation of capitalism cannot stand alone as a 
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reason for European expansionism as certain theorists would have us believe5. Closer 
attention to European colonial expansionism reveals that it was rarely practised for solely 
economic reasons, even though one of its products was unquestionably the colonial 
economy A far more plausible explanation is the rivalry and political conflict that 
undoubtedly existed between the main European world powers. During the nineteenth 
century there was great and continual competition between the major European states 
(and later others also) for colonies as bases and trading posts as well as for spheres of 
influence around the world. The frequent changes of territorial ownership, boundaries and 
alliances stand as testimony to the significance of such rivalries as a factor in the process 
of colonialism. In addition to this, the significance of the "industrial revolution" as a 
reason for colonization is also often overlooked. By increasing demands for commodities 
(foods, fuels and raw materials) and generating surplus population in Europe as well as 
efficient transport, communications and weapons, the role of the "industrial revolution" in 
explaining European expansionism cannot be overstated 
Just as the reasons for the success of European domination were manifold and complex, 
so too were the motives behind colonialism. Undoubtedly, geostrategjc motives played 
their part, with the main strategic theorists of the day inspiring and encouraging the rapid 
acquisition of colonial possessions as a means of enhancing or retaining their country's 
international standing. While the British achieved success on all continents, establishing 
the greatest colonial empire ever to exist, the French acquired a vast contiguous colonial 
territory in Africa and another in south-east Asia. Germany's colonial activity was for the 
most part representative of a strategically motivated attempt to thwart the designs of 
Britain and France6. In addition to this, as European overseas expansion progressed, 
Russia felt compelled to expand eastwards and the United States westwards. Neither was 
deterred by the barrier created by the Pacific Ocean, with the Russians establishing 
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communities as far away as San Francisco and the Americans as distant as the Philippines. 
Such expansions were essentially fuelled by the same strategic motives as the European 
expansions, although in both cases there were other stimuli7 
As well as the geostrategic aspect, religion can be thought of as having been another great 
inducement Considering the Spanish penetration of the Americas, for instance, Glassner 
acknowledged "God, glory and gold" as having been the main motivating factors8. Through 
this statement, Glassner implied that the Spanish were not only there to gain wealth but 
also, with a typically imperialist condascension, to make a contribution to the spirituality 
of their subordinates. Such a self-righteous approach was not unique to the Spanish in 
America. Indeed, 'reconnaissance missionaries' were often used to establish the initial 
stations from which colonial control was eventually executed9 The most obvious example 
were the German missionaries in south-west Africa who paved the way for a German 
occupation of the area10. 
Man's will to explore has also been cited as a motive for colonization11. Such will, 
coupled with want of national honour and approval, led a relatively small number of 
European explorers to make an enormous impact on the process of European 
expansionism. Most famously, Cecil Rhodes and his small party of adventurers who 
charted the region around the Zambezi River on behalf of the British Crown in the late 
nineteenth century. In doing so, he strongly influenced the course of events in southern 
Africa, so much so that in Northern and Southern 'Rhodesia', his name was reflected in 
the world political map'2. Similarly, F.A.E. Luderitz, a wealthy German merchant, helped 
initiate the German thrust in south-west Africa in a similar way, whilst Karl Peters did the 
same in east Africa 1 3. In a similar fashion Pierre de Brazza represented France in the area 
of the lower Congo River, although his exploits are less well recounted14. 
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Finally, no account of the motives behind imperialism can ignore the influence of trade-
Throughout the colonized world the major motive that drove the colonial power to 
control was more often than not an economic one. For example, the Netherlands East 
Indies generated huge revenues for the Dutch government for almost three centuries from 
the sale of rubber, coffee and petroleum, amongst other things15. However, as mentioned, 
the economic reasons for colonialism did not always transpire and as a motivating factor, 
economic considerations alone rarely sustained the colonial impetus. In a very short time 
some colonies even became liabilities rather than assets; Surinam, Laos, New Guinea, 
Somalia, iMauritania and Chad yielded net economic losses for their colonial powers over 
the duration of the colonial era16 
Having summarized briefly the reasons for the European colonial expansion and the 
motives behind it, we now turn to the resulting policies which shaped the international 
scene; or the colonial geopolitical world order. Between 1800 and 1914 there were just 
eight European colonizing states but only five of these can be said to have adopted 
policies which resulted in major colonization. The main colonizers were Portugal, France, 
Netherlands, Spain and Britain/England. To these we can add three more colonizing 
states whose policies had a later and less significant impact on the colonial geopolitical 
world order; Belgium, Germany and Italy. The following examination of the colonial 
policies of these eight states shows clearly the nature and extent of the dominance that 
they came to exert over the rest of the world at this stage in history. 
Portugal's vast empire was reduced by the granting of Brazilian independence in 1822. 
This move was unique in the history of Portugal's colonial empire since traditionally 
Portugal had adopted a policy of holding on to its colonies at virtually any cost. Indeed, 
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for almost a century and a half after this unique act of retribution, Portugal superintended 
its empire through war, revolution and nationalisms without any concessions to the native 
populations whatsoever Its rule was autocratic and based on rigid economic, political and 
social policies In short, economic policies were of a mercantilist nature and for much of 
the twentieth century sought to boost the slave trade; political policies sought to transform 
the colonies into overseas provinces of Portugal, and social policies bestowed the status of 
'assimdados' on a small native elite, effectively conferring on them Portuguese citizenship 
and representation by the Portuguese government17. 
France's colonial policy in the early years was one of assimilating a France d'Outre Mer 
(Overseas France) but that idea was discarded with the demise of the Fourth Republic 
towards the end of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, like the Portuguese, the French 
continued to impose rigorously their culture on their acquired territories. Socially, at 
least, such policies tended to be particularly divisive since efforts at instilling levels of 
patriotism towards the colonising powers typically focussed on the educated elite. To this 
day, many of the leaders of ex-French colonies in south-east Asia are products of this 
educated elite and the policies that helped shape it. It was, however, the dependencies in 
Africa that emerged from the colonial era with the greatest similarities to the French 
culture. To understand why we must look at the policies used to effect rule over these 
colonies. 
Algeria was always administered with great attention from Paris because of its large 
French settler population and its proximity to mainland France18. The rest of French 
Africa was divided into two main areas, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. 
Within both of them a number of separate administrative units were formed and capitals 
were established in each. The headquarters of French West Africa were in Dakar. In 
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addition to this, however, each individual territory was delimited and had its own 
administrative capital. Hence, the four territories of the former French West Africa, now 
the Republics of Senegal, South-Eastern Cote de'lvoire. Guinea and Benin, each obtained 
close representation in Paris through their capitals Dakar, Abidjan, Conakry and Porto 
Novo-Cotonou, respectively Similarly, French Equatorial Africa consisted of Gabon, 
Congo, Ubangi-Shari and Moyen, with their respective capitals of Banqui, Libreville, Fort 
Lamy and Brazzaville. Although Brazzaville was the regional headquarters, and its 
present day size reflects this, decisions regarding each individual territory were 
implemented directly through local capitals 
In summary, French colonial policy, although somewhat aggressive in the sense that it 
sought to impose French cultural values on the indigenous populations, was far more 
meticulous than Portugal's and as a result of this their dominions can be said to have been 
managed with a great deal more circumspection19 
Belgian colonial policy can best be defined through the word "paternalism" Decisions 
regarding the Congo, Belgian's only colonial possession, were made solely in Brussels. 
Such decisions were relayed through six lieutenant-governors to their provinces and then 
on to a number of districts where lesser officials were in charge. Thus, neither the 
representatives of the Belgian government, the settlers, nor the local inhabitants were 
entitled to any say or political representation in Brussels. Furthermore, while the 
Portuguese enabled Africans to attain assimilado status and the French sought the quick 
development of an educated cultured elite, the Belgian subjects could never aspire to 
Belgian nationality or equality. 
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The colonial policies of both the Netherlands and Spain, two of the most active colonisers, 
bore much resemblance to both Portuguese exploitation and Belgium's utilization o f the 
Congo. Neither the Netherlands in the East Indies or Spain in South America paid much 
respect to indigenous cultures or uneven and unfavourable trade balances between their 
colonies and themselves Economic and strategic considerations took precedence over all 
other matters and autocratic rule was the order o f the day 2 u. 
Both Italy and Germany entered the scramble for territory relatively late in the nineteenth 
century. Through competition with other colonial powers, Germany managed to acquire a 
number o f Spanish and other islands in the Pacific, north-east New Guinea and a dozen or 
so territories in west, south-west and east Africa Italy, on the other hand, was rather less 
successful, claiming only some of the less desirable remaining areas of Africa. Even with 
these, Italy encountered a number o f difficulties. Most notable amongst these difficulties 
were the problems the Italians encountered in the conquest of Libya and in the subjugation 
of Ethiopia2 1. Both Germany and Italy commanded their territories autocratically and 
were exploitative of and largely indifferent towards indigenous cultures. Italy had 
considerable success in promoting migration to the colonies but compared with Belgian 
and French colonies settler numbers were still not particularly large. Nevertheless 
migration to the territories was not an intended part of colonial policy since both Germany 
and Italy were primarily interested in the colonies for reasons of strategic prestige. 
British colonial policy makers were confronted with a greater diversity of territories and 
indigenous cultures than any other colonial power. As a result, they were often forced to 
adapt their policies to the specific requirements of individual dependencies. However, one 
common policy theme was discernible throughout the whole of Britain's colonial empire. 
This theme was based on the concept of indirect rule, which was intended to impart a level 
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of protection to indigenous cultures and organizations In areas such as law and education 
the British typically recognised local conventions and more often than not allowed them to 
continue, initially barring those customs which they judged problematic. This said, 
however, the extent to which policies of indirect rule prevailed depended on the size and 
character of the European settler population The policy of indirect rule was designed 
specifically for territories with a small immigrant European population and little land 
alienation. However, in territories where the settler population was large, powerful and 
confrontational with London, more direct forms of rule had to be imposed from time to 
time2 2. 
Historical factors also influenced British colonial policies. Any territory invaded, 
conquered or settled by an immigrant population became a colony. However, those 
territories whose indigenous leaders had requested and been granted Crown 'protection' 
became protectorates Although the settler populations in a colony were conceded a 
considerable amount of self-determination, the principle of indirect rule from London was 
adhered to quite strictly in any territory that had been granted the status of protectorate. 
Finally, in addition to colonies and protectorates, the British administered a few territories 
in co-operation with other colonial and non-colonial powers (see for e.g. 
French/British/German Zanzibar, Italian/British Somaliland and earlier in this century 
Anglo/Egyptian Sudan). Such joint administered territories were referred to as 
condominiums and the policies applied to them obviously depended on the particulars of 
the arrangement23. 
In summary, although British colonial policy in the Middle East, Southern Rhodesia and 
Ireland was a conspicuous failure, it is now widely acknowledged as having been relatively 
successful elsewhere, at least by the standards set by other colonial powers. Taking into 
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account the extent, duration and diversity of their empire, it is commendable that British 
colonial policy retained a sense of fairness. Demonstrative of this fairness is the fact that, 
of all the British territories within the colonial geopolitical world order, only Burma and 
those in the Middle East chose not to join the Commonwealth on attaining independence. 
Thus, contrary to what some of the more simplistic connotations of the term 'order' might 
imply, the world order that prevailed in the colonial era was diverse in nature. The 
diversity which existed within these empires and the differences which existed between the 
policies through which they were governed should not be overlooked when interpreting 
figure 2 2 4 . 
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In addition to this and once again contrary to what the term 'order' might imply, the 
colonial geopolitical world order was dynamic in nature. The world at this phase in 
history was. through continual competition and conflict, subject to an ongoing process o f 
change This process, colonialism, gradually gathered pace and eventually culminated in 
all-oui world war; as can be seen in figure 3: 
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Figures 2 and 3 attempt to show the nature and extent of the colonial geopolitical world 
order As mentioned, even though by historical comparisons the world can be said to have 
been in relative order at this stage in history, the diversity and dynamism that were 
characteristic of this order must be borne in mind. Motives and policies varied between 
colonizers and often depended on the unique attributes o f the sought after territory. 
Nevertheless, bearing the above caveats in mind, a number of generalisations about the 
colonial geopolitical world order can be made: 
The main powers all sought to expand for reasons relating to economics, strategy and 
political competition. Expansion was facilitated by advances in transport, 
communications, weapons and increasing knowledge about the wider world. Religion, 
patriotism and capitalism were the prime motivating factors, all of which transposed into 
relationships and policies which were heavily biased towards the interests of the expanding 
power. Although some colonizers implemented fairer arrangements than others, in 
summary, it is fair to state that the benefits derived by colonies from their rulers rarely 
compensated for their troubles. 
It was against this backdrop that the first phase in Malta's geopolitical development took 
place. We now turn to investigate Malta's place in the wider international scene at this 
phase in her geopolitical development. 
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1.2 F R O M P R O T E C T O R A T E T O C O L O N Y (1800-1914): 
M A L T A ' S F A L L I B L E D E P E N D E N C Y ON D I S O R D E R IN T H E 
C O L O N I A L G E O P O L I T I C A L W O R L D O R D E R . 
This section examines the role that Malta played in the wider world throughout phase one 
in her geopolitical development. It is worth noting that this role was not one taken 
entirely by choice but more as a result of British expansionist and colonial policies. As 
suggested in the last section, however, the policies of the Crown were considerably less 
austere than those of most other colonial powers Perhaps it is for this reason that the 
Maltese welcomed and indeed ushered the British colonizers onto their territory in 1800 to 
replace the French after their short rule over Malta, hence Malta's status following the 
arrival of the British as a de facto protectorate. Nevertheless, Malta was still ruled from 
outside and remained very much a dependent subordinate within the colonial geopolitical 
world order In this section, the story of Malta's vacillating fortunes as a British 
possession in the global colonial system is told. It is the story of a pawn in the geopolitical 
power games of the world's major players. Thus, in the sense that it traces Malta's 
experiences in the wider world it is, according to our working definition, representative of 
an examination of Malta's geopolitics in the period 1800-1914. 
Britain acquired Malta from the French in September 1800 It was by no means a forceful 
acquisition, indeed, the British were reacting to earlier pleas for help from messengers sent 
to Sicily representing the Maltese National Assembly25. In making such pleas the Maltese 
were merely exhibiting a geopolitical prefernce to be ruled by Britain rather than France. 
One must remember that at this stage in history it was somewhat desireable to be a part of 
the most powerful colonial empire in the world and few of the alternatives available to 
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Malta were any where near as attractive In order to understand the circumstances which 
gave rise to such pleas we must consider the policies with which the French ruled their 
colony and also appreciate the consequent level of Maltese discontentment. 
Unlike Algeria and their other colonies in Western and Equatorial Africa outlined in the 
last section, Malta bore few fruits for the French colonial economy As such. Napoleon 
viewed the territory as little more than a strategic stronghold and this was reflected in 
France's colonial policies towards Malta 2 6. Paying little attention to Maltese interests he 
implemented a programme of large-scale re-organization, with the sole intention of 
making the island a more efficient and robust naval and military base. 
At the outset he ousted the Order of the Knights of St. John who had overseen what was 
probably the richest two and a half centuries of Malta's historical development. Granted, 
that as the French Revolution had progressed Napoleon had been left with little choice but 
to eject the Order, which was after all precisely the kind of aristocratic and religious body 
that the revolutionaries were objecting to in the homeland. Nevertheless, having disposed 
of the Order, he then proceeded to implement further radical re-organization. He 
abolished the local nobility, defaced escutcheons on buildings and pillaged many precious 
objects and materials from the establishments of the Knights. Following this, in a 
sweeping mis-calculation, he launched a direct assault on the position of the Catholic 
Church in Maltese society. Foreign clerics were ordered to leave, he restricted religious 
orders to one convent each and closed any additional establishments. The acceptances of 
Holy Orders before the age of thirty was forbidden and the ordination of new clerics was 
banned until all existing priests had been found employment27. 
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This attack on the Catholic Church was politically imprudent, since the Church was the 
only body capable of mobilizing wide-scale resistance to the French colonizers Not for 
the first time, and certainly not for the last, external geopolitical factors had led to 
interference with the very social fabric that constituted Maltese society 
Such attempts at undermining the position of the Catholic Church, coupled with careless 
administration and financial management eventually provoked a rebellion at the close of 
the century General Vaubois, who had been placed in command of the four-thousand 
troops on the island was forced to concede defeat in the countryside. He concentrated his 
troops around the fortifications of the Grand Harbour, confident that the Maltese would 
be unable to evict him. He was, however, under-prepared for forthcoming events: At the 
request of the newly formed National Assembly, the British came to the assistance of the 
Maltese. Following a protracted but effective naval blockade and a short battle in which 
the brunt of the fighting was borne by the Maltese, the French were forced to surrender 
the islands on 5 September 18002*. 
The circumstances in which Britain came to acquire Malta, in other words the prevailing 
feeling of Maltese discontentment with the French, is vital to understanding the formation 
of the special relationship between the Maltese and the British, which remains in many 
forms to this day 2 9. Initially, this relationship was best understood in terms of the status 
Malta acquired as a de facto British protectorate. Thus, at this formative phase in Malta's 
historical political development, this relationship and more specifically Malta's experiences 
in the wider colonial world system as a British protectorate represent the crux of Maltese 
geopolitics, and hence the focus of the remainder of this section. 
50 
PHASE 1 POLICY RESPONSES IN MALTA 
It was only after initial hesitation as to the usefulness of their new acquisition that the 
British decided to assign Malta the status o f a de facto protectorate. As alluded to in the 
previous section, this status entitled the Maltese to certain privileges over the 
condominiums and more orthodox colonies that constituted the major part of the British 
Empire Via their National Assembly the Maltese had requested British protection and so 
consented to the requisite level of British occupation Crucially, however, in terms o f 
international law, this meant that that Malta was not strictly the possession of the 
Crown 3 0 Upon formal agreement, the islands were therefore entitled to British protection 
without, initially at least, having to succumb to absolute British colonial rule. 
From the point of view of the British, by establishing a protectorate rather than a formal 
colony they sought to achieve the specific objective o f excluding the French from this 
strategic location without making a full commitment to perpetual responsibility. However, 
as will be shown in this section, the British commitment to Malta changed fundamentally 
throughout phase one of her geopolitical development Even if the original aim had been 
negative - to exclude the French - and there was no expectation that Malta would 
eventually be administered by imperial agents, British officials soon expanded their 
functions and encroached on the powers of the Maltese leaders. Indeed, by 1803, the 
British government had come to realise how Malta could be important to Mediterranean 
affairs in more ways than just excluding the French. Thus, at this early stage the signs that 
the British would come to exert a more direct influence over the Maltese were already 
there. Demonstrative of such increased recognition of Malta's strategic significance was 
Nelson's refutal of his own earlier dismissal of the islands' strategic worth: 
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"1 now declare that I consider Malta as a most important outwork to India, that it will give 
us great influence in the Levant and indeed ail the southern parts of Italy. In this view I 
hope we shall never give it up " 3 I 
Admiral Keith also reflected on Malta's changing geopolitical place in the Mediterranean in 
1805; when asked for his opinion on the utility of the region's naval stations, he replied: 
"Malta has the advantage over all other ports I have mentioned (Mahan, Elba and 
Sardinia), that the whole harbour is covered by its wonderful fortifications, and that in the 
hands of Great Britain no enemy would presume to land upon it, because the number of 
men required to besiege it could not be maintained by the island, and on the appearance of 
a superior fleet, that besieging army would find itself obliged to surrender ... or starve."32 
This rekindled strategic interest in the Maltese islands was paralleled with a resurgence of 
commercial interest. This strategic/economic connection had been apparent as a recurring 
theme throughout Malta's longer term history and was set to continue to be so for many 
decades33. In addition to becoming an important Royal Naval base, the islands were 
increasingly being used as a storehouse for commodities being sold on to eastern 
Mediterranean countries and Italy. Malta's role as a break-of-bulk point intensified in 
1806 when Napoleon issued the Berlin decree This effectively closed European ports to 
British shipping. Consequently, Malta experienced a commercial boom since she was 
perfectly placed to serve as a base for vessels trading with Europe by indirect routes. Not 
for the first time, nor the last, Malta was experiencing an economic boom based on short-
term, wider geopolitical circumstances. In this particular case, although Malta was a 
convenient base for traders in the eastern and central Mediterranean, the major proportion 
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of early nineteenth century trade passing through the harbours was fuelled by the war in 
Europe. 
As the war in Europe drew to a ciose in 1815 and Mediterranean trade routes began to 
normalise, and so increasingly preclude Malta, the islands were hit with another blow; a 
virulent epidemic of the plague. In addition to killing four-thousand people, the plague 
had the effect of crippling Malta's maritime dependent economy since the harbours were 
obliged to close and all trade and most naval activities ceased34. These events were 
perhaps an early indicator that military attack was not all that Malta was exposed to and 
that Malta's geopolitical circumstances had the potential to become a great deal more 
complicated than strategic and even economic considerations alone might suggest. 
A combination of the plague and the renewed economic hardships that the Maltese had 
been subject to triggered complaints from small sections of the local population Since 
Malta had only been part of the British colonial system for just over a decade, such 
complaints were taken seriously. In response, a commission of inquiry was sent out from 
Britain in 1812. Rejecting most of the demands for extra privileges and powers made by 
the Maltese complainants35, the commission instead recommended that a Crown colony 
government be established. In so far as this section is concerned, this meant that Malta's 
place in the wider colonial geopolitical world order had shifted from being that of a British 
protectorate to that of a Crown colony. Although clearly discernible in terms of Malta's 
shifting legal status, this development had less of an effect on Maltese political affairs than 
is often suggested and was certainly not, as is sometimes portrayed, a retrograde step. 
Nevertheless, it stands out clearly as a noteworthy event in Malta's political history and, 
more importantly for the purpose of this thesis, a significant policy response to wider 
world geopolitical change 
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In short, the shift towards Crown colony status effectively meant that full administrative 
responsibility was in the hands of a British governor who was appointed by the Crown on 
recommendation from the British Prime Minister For the remainder of this phase in 
Malta's political history, the British government was able to exact laws for Malta, either 
directly or through the issue of an order in council3 6 On this point, however, it is worth 
citing Blouet: 
"To state the situation in [a] legalistic manner ... is to oversimplify the situation, for in 
practice numerous local considerations operated upon the Governor and resulted in a larger 
Maltese input than the stark legalities might suggest."3' 
Soon after his arrival. Sir Thomas Maitland, Malta's first governor and Commander in 
Chief, managed to negotiate recognition of British presence in Malta with the European 
powers3 8. Such recognition culminated in the 1814 Declaration of Peace, which had 
immediate and obvious implications for military expenditure on the islands. As history had 
taught the Maltese, and the forthcoming phases of their political history would re-
emphasize, peace generally brought little in the way of economic prosperity. Between 
1814 and 1840 British defence spending, with a garrison which normally numbered less 
than two-thousand men, was, by the standards of earlier periods, relatively low In 
addition to this, the same period was characterised by a depression in world maritime 
trade. Once again, the period of economic distress gave rise to a level of local 
discontentment, which was expressed mainly through a series of petitions in 1836, and, 
once again, the British response involved sending out a commission of inquiry. This time, 
however, they were more responsive to Maltese demands. In response to the peace-time 
economic hardships that they had documented and confirmed, the commission 
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recommended that more top administrative positions be given to the Maltese. This was 
not only intended to create more rewarding and profitable careers for capable Maltese, but 
also to free considerable British funds for use elsewhere Furthermore, but more, as a 
gesture of good will than concession to demands, the British facilitated the establishment 
of a free press, primary education and certain other legal and tariff reforms39. Above all 
else, such developments were demonstrative o f Britain's long term interests in Malta and 
indicative of the perceptive policies of 'indirect rule' which Britain had adopted and then 
adapted (as outlined in the previous section) to suit the various territories which made up 
its vast colonial empire For the remainder of this phase in Malta's political history such 
perceptiveness was set to continue and was indeed vital to the success of the relationship 
between Malta and Britain. 
By the mid-nineteenth century Republican movements in Italy, Hungary, France and 
Germany were already threatening to undermine the colonial geopolitical world order. 
Given Malta's geopolitical location and circumstances it is understandable that the Maltese 
were aware of such wider-world developments. Furthermore, the island came to harbour 
a number of influential Italian political refugees who served to further propagate such 
ideas. Characteristically however, the British were alive to the potential ramifications for 
Malta's geopolitics and indeed their own colonial strategies. In response, the Governor of 
the day, Richard More O'Ferrall, introduced the 1849 constitution and his successor, 
William Reid ensured that over the following decade the Maltese became more involved in 
the running of their own affairs, declaring that; 
"the defence of Malta depends most on good civil government, by which I mean giving the 
Maltese, as far as discretion will permit, the management of their own aflfeirs There are 
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50,000 inhabitants within, or close to the fortifications, who would do nothing to help us, 
unless they had privileges worth fighting for" 4 1 1 
With convictions such as these it is easy to understand why Reid became such a popular 
and effective colonial governor. He had made numerous attempts at enhancing Maltese 
living standards although in hindsight most were o f only limited avail Neither his 
attempts at introducing the American plough, 'Angus' cattle, a new breed o f pig or even 
Indian silk worms contributed to any meaningful economic diversification and the Maltese 
remained heavily dependent on flare-ups in the colonial geopolitical world order as their 
only effective form o f income. 
The next such flare-up came in the form o f the Crimean War (1854-1856) With the onset 
o f the campaign against Russia, spending by the British War Office and the Admiralty 
increased As the war progressed, however, and Britain came to offer direct protection to 
Turkey from the incessant Russian attacks, Malta became vital in British strategy and 
experienced another economic boom. In addition to the increased spending by the 
Admiralty and the War Office, one must also take into account the significant contribution 
that the well paid sailors and soldiers made to the economy in their rest and recuperation 
periods As stated by the war correspondent W.H. Russell: 
"Money was circulated in profusion ... Every tradesman was busy, morning, noon, and 
night and the intense pressure of demand raised the cost of supply enormously. Saddlers, 
tinmen, outfitters, tailors, shoemakers, cutters, and all the followers of the more useful and 
practical arts, were in great request, and their charges increased t i l l they attained the West 
End (London) scale."41 
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Once again, the immediate post-war years witnessed increasing levels o f Maltese 
discontentment This time, however, it was less to do with economic decline, since Malta 
was experiencing unprecedented levels o f prosperity, but more to do with a series o f rift s 
between certain eminent Maltese figures and the British Army. The most notable amongst 
these was the dispute that developed between the Archbishop o f Malta and the local army-
commander. Although the Governor o f the day, Gaspard le Marchant, did manage to 
smooth over this dispute, he himself proceeded to provoke further discontentment with his 
autocratic style o f leadership Indeed, so much so that by the end o f his rule the official 
majority was block voting in opposition and the 1849 constitution had for all intents and 
purposes ceased to function 4 2 . Ln the same way that the Maltese had felt the need to 
petition in the depression following the war in Europe, they did so in the period 
immediately following the Crimean War. In 1887, as a somewhat belated response to this 
petition, a new constitution was introduced which gave the elected members o f the 
Council a majority Henceforth, they had the power to legislate on almost all matters 
relating to internal affairs and crucially internal finance. The British, however, retained the 
right to intervene i f circumstances dictated so. Nevertheless whatever bones o f contention 
there may have been between certain sections o f the Maltese population and the British 
Army or even the Governor, Malta was at this stage in the midst o f another economic 
boom. This time it was not driven directly by a war or a specific flare-up but more by the 
prevailing climate o f strategic fervour and the growing perception amongst the European 
powers that the colonial geopolitical world order, or the world as they knew it, may well 
be on the verge o f sweeping change. 
By the time of the opening o f the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic fervour that had been 
anticipated was undoubtedly concentrated around the Mediterranean. Along with Aden, 
which was acquired in 1830, Cyprus, which was leased f rom the Turks in 1878, and 
57 
PHASE I POLICY RESPONSES IN MALTA 
Egypt, which was occupied in 1882, Malta held a crucial place in the Crown's strategy 
towards the Mediterranean, as one o f the vital links in the chain from Britain to India. 
Britain's wider navai strategy at this time was simply to maintain a fleet twice the size o f 
the combination o f the next two largest fleets. Malta, with its vast and deep natural 
harbour, understandably featured heavily in this strategy and resultingly experienced 
another economic boom through strategic led development4'. This boom was dependent 
on the impending disorder in the colonial world system and it resulted in Malta's resources 
being pushed to the limit In response to aggressive French policies in the Mediterranean 
and particularly the Middle East, the British spent heavily on Malta's fortifications and 
defence. The garrison was increased in size, new armaments were installed, and the 
fortifications were repaired and modernised. Furthermore, in an effort to expand the 
strained harbour facilities, the Royal Navy spent heavily on new commercial port facilities 
and either took over or constructed a number o f new dockyards. 
Almost as soon as these modifications had been completed and the Mediterranean route 
secured, a naval threat began to build up near England. As Germany took up a 
threatening posture in the North Sea, Britain transferred her Atlantic fleet to home shores, 
leaving the Mediterranean to be defended by the French fleet. By the turn o f the century 
the Royal Navy's six Mediterranean Dreadnought class battleships had been moved from 
Malta to Gibraltar to cover both the Mediterranean and western approaches to England 4 4. 
In this time o f widespread geopolitical uncertainty the islands were once again rendered 
almost redundant, albeit temporarily so. Thus, ended the four boom-bust cycles which 
were undoubtedly the essential defining characteristics o f this phase in Malta's political 
history Throughout this formative phase o f war-driven booms and peace-driven busts the 
one thing that had become an established certainty about policy responses in Malta to 
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wider world geopolitical change was that they were ultimately determined by a fallible and 
dangerous dependency on disorder in what had been a relatively ordered colonial 
geopolitical world system 
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1.3 B R I T I S H IMPOSED " P E R C E P T I V E R E A L I S M " 
So far, this chapter has investigated the nature and extent o f the wider world coloniaJ 
order together with the place or role that British colonial policy makers afforded Malta 
within this wider world order. British interpretations o f the international scene determined 
the policy framework through which they reacted to international developments on 
Malta's behalf. This section investigates this policy framework, suggesting a number o f 
theoretical interpretations o f British policy in Malta 
Between 1800 and 1914 Malta's position in the international scene was one o f a British 
colonial outpost in the wider colonial world-system It has been implied throughout this 
chapter that this system was characterised by a certain order, albeit a diverse and dynamic 
order, at least in relation to other geopolitical situations that have existed throughout 
history. As explained in the introduction, however, such a view fosters certain 
ambiguities. First o f all, the expression 'colonial geopolitical world order' is value-loaded. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the colonial geopolitical world order was not all-
pervasive. Through examining the case o f Malta alone we have seen that, whilst the 
governments o f the main European powers might have felt the world was relatively 
predictable, secure and indeed 'ordered' throughout this period in history, the Maltese 
leaders did not enjoy the same peace o f mind. In fact, it can even be argued that the 
Maltese actually developed a seemingly paradoxical dependency on the elements o f 
disorder in the wider-world order for their prosperity, advancement and ultimately their 
survival. Fortuitously for them, such elements were commonplace and Malta itself was 
caught up in four wars between 1800 and 1914 
60 
PHASE 1: GEOPOLITICAL THINKING BEHIND POLICY RESPONSES 
Hence, it is onJy the fact that these wars were effectively local flare-ups which enables us 
to refer to the world scene at this particular phase in history as one o f order. Such 
categorisation is further justified in historical terms when compared to the next period in 
history, which was o f course host to the two greatest wars ever known to mankind. By-
comparison, the colonial wars that Malta had been caught up in over the previous century 
or so were mere side-shows fought far from the homelands o f the European colonial 
powers, skirmishes that were part and parcel o f their power games but were nevertheless 
unlikely to disturb their domestic repose. It was this fact, that soldiers and sailors were 
the only real players in these power games, that led to the widespread acceptance o f these 
skirmishes as an inevitable and unavoidable component o f the dynamic global colonial 
system 
Those engaged in geopolitical thinking accepted the contitmity inherent in this dynamic 
global colonial system and, rather than seeking to change it in any fundamental way, 
sought only more efficient ways o f swinging its evolution in their favour. By accepting the 
importance o f continuity above all else, rather than striving for change for the better, these 
geopolitical thinkers were subscribing to realist interpretations o f the global situation and 
prescribing realist reactions to global geopolitical developments. In other words, the 
policy frameworks which they advocated were realist in nature. But, as explained in the 
first section o f this chapter, despite the oft-talked-of commonalties, there were a number 
of underlying differences between the policy frameworks o f the various European 
colonizers. For instance, the framework through which the Portuguese empire was 
governed was not only strictly autocratic but also promoted the use o f violence as a 
legitimate means o f acquisition and governance. Hence, in present day geopolitical terms 
it can, without hesitation, be referred to as a particularly rigid policy framework o f 
realism. The framework through which the British governed their empire was, on the 
61 
PHASE 1: GEOPOLITICAL THINKING BEHIND POLICY RESPONSES 
other hand, although consenting o f a level o f violence, more perceptive to the 
requirements o f indigenous populations Despite this crucial fact, in as much as it was 
based on a Eurocentric interpretation o f the international scene which envisaged the 
geopolitical face o f the globe as a mosaic o f colonial powers and possessions, it was also 
unequivocally realist in nature. Nevertheless, when talking o f underlying differences, it did 
lack the rigidity o f say the Portuguese realist policy framework 
Just as there were differences between the policies through which the chief colonizers 
governed their empires there were also differences between the policy frameworks 
imposed on the various colonies by any one ruler These differences were particularly 
discernible within the British Empire. As mentioned in the earlier sections o f this chapter, 
the British customised their general realist colonial policy to fit the needs o f specific 
territories. Whereas some o f the territories with large confrontational settler populations 
and high land alienation demanded firmer rule, others, especially the protectorates and 
condominiums, required a less direct form o f rule For reasons that wi l l become clear, I 
have labelled the specific policy framework through which the British governed Malta 
perceptive realism. In order to investigate this policy framework it is necessary to tackle 
its two constituent parts, realism and then perceptiveness, in turn: 
Realism can be said to sum up the more general policy framework imposed on ail o f 
Britain's empires since, in their decision making, policy makers were governed by a certain 
set o f realist assumptions about the world which existed in colonial times. Fundamentally, 
within their policy framework o f realism it was assumed that the British nation-state 
accurately represented, and acted in the best interests of, its population. Indeed similar 
assumptions were made about the entire British empire. Thus with an arrogance that was 
typical o f all colonial powers, the British genuinely believed that they served the best 
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interests o f their colonies, even when this was most definitely not the case Furthermore, 
it was assumed that by providing a level o f physical security for the British population and 
the population o f the British Empire they were adequately providing for the best interests 
o f their people In other words, factors such as economic well being took second place to 
the maintenance o f territorial security, and interconnections between the two were given 
only passing consideration. Hence, through the general British policy framework o f 
realism, and indeed those frameworks o f other colonial powers, the colonial world was 
assumed to be a mosaic o f individual and autonomous units, which were in continual and 
aggressive military competition with each other. Wars and conflicts were assumed to be 
the inevitable culmination o f this competition and the realist policy framework thus 
focused in on such potentialities. Above all else, the policies imposed on British colonies 
were influenced by war and the preparation for war. This general policy framework o f 
realism was therefore based on the overall assumption that it was legitimate for the British 
state to monopolise the means o f violence and that this indeed provided the main means 
through which it could pursue its interests and the supposed interests o f its empire 
Such a policy framework, although distinguishable in detail from those o f other colonial 
powers, was not strictly unique to the British empire. The other great European empires, 
and the minor ones as well, were also administered through policy frameworks which 
would now be referred to as being realist in nature. The genesis o f this pervading realist 
outlook on the globe was the Eurocentric and expansionist gaze45 that the main colonial 
powers adopted towards the rest o f the world. Such a gaze was justified, given credence 
and eventually even perpetuated by the geopolitical theorists and strategists o f the day. In 
terms o f influence, three such geopolitical theorists in particular were outstanding: 
Mahan, Ratzel and Mackinder. 
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Towards the end o f the nineteenth century Alfred Thayer Mahan enunciated the view that 
sea power had been the primary influencing factor upon the history o f the world. He 
justified the role that Britain's naval supremacy had played in shaping the colonial world 
order and advocated the continued strengthening o f Western navies; particularly the navy 
o f his native U S A 4 6 Although approaching the subject from a less nautical tack than 
Mahan, Friedrich Ratzel was another illustrious colonial explicator. Through his "laws o f 
the spatial growth o f states" he cultivated the geopolitical perception that the expansion o f 
a state through war was a natural progressive tendency4 7. Ratzel likened states to 
biological organisms in a competitive struggle for existence and reasoned that every state 
with a growing population needed 'living space' (or "lebemrautn"4*) in order to sustain its 
civilization. Finally, in Halford Mackinder, Britain had its very own exonerator o f 
colonialism Although he later became involved in the geo-strategy o f his celebrated 
'heartland', his early work stressed the important role that geography had played in the 
development o f the world's political history 4 9. This envisaged interaction between what is 
effectively physical geography and political history has meant that his work, and the work 
o f others like him, has since been referred to as being determinist in nature. It is also, 
however, important to stress the significance o f the realist attributes o f his work 
Mackinder, like the British colonial administrators whom he sought to influence, saw the 
world in terms o f conflict and competition. He talked in terms o f recurring conflict 
between 'landsmen' and 'seamen' and warned that unless his strategy was heeded the 
landsmen may have the ultimate advantage. As any analysis o f his discourse reveals, 
Mackinder was undoubtedly a staunch realist. For the purposes o f this section it suffices 
to quote his famous dictum which summarises his main strategic propositions: 
"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. 
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Who rules the World-Island commands the World." 
In this statement alone, the realism built into his thinking reveals itself in the repeated use 
of the terms 'rule' and 'command' 
The prevalence o f realism in the general policy framework adhered to by the British in 
colonial times is thus indubitable. Not only is realist thinking apparent in the policies 
imposed on the British Empire, and indeed for that matter all colonial empires, but also in 
the thinking which initially gave credence to these policies and eventually helped promote 
them. However, we must be wary o f generalisations since British colonial policy, 
although essentially realist, has been shown in this chapter to have been apparently more 
perceptive towards the needs o f the colonized than the policies o f other European powers 
were Furthermore, this chapter has also explained that variation existed between the 
specific policies imposed on the diverse range o f colonies which existed in the British 
empire. In particular, the policies towards the protectorates tended to be more perceptive 
towards the needs o f the native populations who had after all, in the majority o f cases 
requested British protection. Having investigated the realism that was inherent in the 
policy framework through which Malta and, all other colonial territories were governed, 
we can now turn to the perceptiveness which it is argued was peculiar to British colonial 
administration and especially unique to the specific policy framework imposed on Malta 
As the second section o f this chapter elucidated, the assertiveness that the British colonial 
policy makers displayed towards Malta increased between 1800 and 1914 as the islands 
relinquished their protectorate status and transformed into the colonial fortress o f a nation 
on the verge o f war One common theme did, nevertheless, remain throughout. This was 
the theme o f perceptiveness which resulted from the British policy o f indirect rule outlined 
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earlier In other words, as Malta's geopolitical status shifted from being a de facto 
protectorate to a Crown colony the policy o f perceptiveness and indirect rule remained 
unchanged Certainly, at no stage was a strictly direct or authoritarian policy adopted 
towards Malta Even though the various governors clearly adopted their own styles o f 
leadership, some being more assertive than others, the Maltese view, whether it be 
represented in the form o f a petition or the results o f a commission o f inquiry, was 
invariably heeded. Not even the prospect o f widespread revolt led by the mid-century 
Republican movement distracted the colonial administrators from their policy o f sensitivity 
to t he needs o f Maltese society. Indeed, faced by this prospect the British administrators 
opted to grant the Maltese their first constitution rather than increase the assertiveness 
with which they ruled. 
Nowhere else was the perceptiveness with which the British governed Malta more readily 
apparent than in the policies adopted towards the Catholic Church by the islands' 
Protestant colonizers In fact these policies rarely resulted in any friction. Although the 
early decisions to introduce laws to limit mortmain (1822), define the jurisdiction o f 
ecclesiastical courts and curtail sanctuary (1828) may have given rise to some concern in 
the Catholic Church, it soon became apparent that the British colonial administrators had 
no intention o f implementing policies which would undermine the position o f the Church 
in Malta 3 0 . In fact the contrary was more true, and the colonial administrators were keen 
to raise Malta's ecclesiastical status to a one comparable, at least, with Sicily. To this end, 
in 1831 the diocese o f Malta was separated from the see o f Palermo. The bishopric o f 
Gozo was created in 1863 and in 1889 a British mission to Rome insisted that the Bishop 
o f Malta always be Maltese 5 1. 
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In summary, despite the fact that London had the ultimate say in all policy matters, the 
wants and needs o f the Maltese were rarely overlooked In comparison to many of the 
other colonial territories around the world, the Maltese were relatively fortunate in this 
respect. The British administrators had ushered in a series o f key policy developments 
which, unbeknown to the Maltese at this stage, would prepare them well for their future 
political maturation The most notable o f these have been outlined in this chapter; the 
declaration o f Je facia protectorate status (1800); the establishment o f a Crown Colony 
Government (1812); European recognition o f British presence in Malta and the 
subsequent declaration o f Peace (1814); the introduction o f a free press, primary 
education and certain legal and tariff reforms (around 1840); the 1849 constitution and 
finally the 1887 constitutional reforms which gave elected members o f the Maltese Council 
a majority for the first time 
Al l such developments had been introduced as responses to the periods o f depression 
which had followed wars, some as gestures o f good will but some more schemingly as part 
o f the overall effort to mould a level o f patriotism and gratitude within the Maltese 
population. Whilst a level o f perceptiveness was always apparent in the way Britain 
administered Malta, colonial policy makers consistently ensured that they retained an aura 
o f authority Crucially, for instance, the idea o f a Maltese National Assembly made up o f 
a mixture o f local religious and political leaders was never conceded. Such an ideal was 
deemed inappropriate to the geopolitical realities in which the Maltese colony functioned. 
These were the realities o f a pawn caught up in the power games o f the world's main 
political players And so, although the above investigation has illustrated the strong 
undercurrent o f sympathy which existed in the policies imposed on Malta, it is important 
to realise that the framework from which these policies emanated remained 
uncompromising enough to reflect such geopolitical realities Hence the label perceptive 
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realism^ which concurrently portrays both the perceptiveness o f the policy framework 
through which the British governed Malta, yet also the realism which persisted throughout 
all acts policy making. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to severely criticise the policy framework through which the 
British governed Malta at this phase in her political history or the geopolitical thinking 
behind it. Obviously the perceptiveness built into it was a major plus-point but even the 
inherent realism is difficult to criticise To a certain extent, this is because at this stage in 
history there were no viable alternatives to realist interpretations o f the political world and 
realist reactions to global developments In addition to this however, Malta's strategically 
sought after location could only truly have been interpreted through realism and, 
furthermore, realist reactions provided the only plausible retorts to the various competitive 
geopolitical circumstances in which Malta found herself throughout the colonial era. 
Perhaps the fact that it is difficult to criticise this policy framework, even with the benefit 
o f hindsight and the experience derived from many more years o f geopolitical change, 
helps to explain why the policies imposed on the Maltese by the British were invariably 
accepted without prevarication. Certainly there is little present day resentment and the 
very fact that Malta continues to enjoy membership o f the Commonwealth would seem to 
suggest that the policy framework through which Britain exercised colonial rule over 
Malta was a relatively successful one; therefore rendering this phase in Malta's geopolitical 
development also a successful one. 
This phase was also formative in Malta's international political development, in the sense 
that it witnessed Malta's projection into the wider world. Although Malta had been 
involved in many previous great empires, they were all on a relatively local scale or 
perhaps, as in the case o f the Romans, a regional scale. Between 1800 and 1914 Malta 
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had participated in the most expansive empire that the world has ever known, enjoying 
British protection for over a century. The Maltese seemed to appreciate that the 
continued power and indeed supremacy of the British colonial empire was vital i f Malta 
was to retain her respectable position in the wider world colonial system and relished a 
modicum of stability and security. Hence the realist policies imposed on Malta in response 
to the continually evolving colonial world order were accepted as a small price to pay for 
British protection In the next phase o f her international political history, however, Malta 
was to repay her debt for this protection ten times over 
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The list of demands included the restitution of the Consigtio Populare (The Maltese Parliament), trial 
by jury and the right to appeal and 10 a free press, see Lee 1972. 
5* Ibid. 
1 Blouet op en , p. 147 
For further details on the negotiations which led (o the recognition of British presence in Malta by the 
European powers sec the biography of Sir Thomas MaillandL Willis-Dixon 1939. 
V } See Blouet op. cit.. p. 150. 
4 U Although this communique is taken from Blouet op cit.. p. 151, there are a number of original letters 
relaling to the concessions that both OTerral and Reid made to the Maltese, see Grey Papers, Palace 
Green Library. Durham University. 
4 ' VV. H. Russell, taken from Blouel op. cit.. p. 157. 
4~ Lec op. cit. 
4 1 For a thorough account of this strategic-led development see Lee 1972. 
4 4 Grenville 1994, p. 4.1 
A 5 OTuathail uses the term "gaze" to refer to the vision the mam European colonizing powers had of the 
rest of (he world al this stage in history. OTuathail 1997 (throughout introduction). 
Sec for eg. Mahan 1892 and 1898. 
A 1 Ratzei 1896. p. 31. 
-** Ibid. 
^ Forc.g.s of his early work sec Mackindcr 1890 and 1904. His later work also draws on many of his 
original principles, see for e.g. Mackinder 1919. 
™ Callus 1961. 
3 1 Blouel op. cit.. p. 163. 
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2. 
M A L T A AS AN ISLAND F O R T R E S S IN A W O R L D R E -
O R D E R I N G T H R O U G H A N A R C H Y 
In classifying the period between 1914 and 1945 as phase two o f Malta's international 
political history, this chapter lumps the two greatest wars ever known to mankind 
together By doing so is not to imply that the Second World War was a mere continuation 
o f the First, which followed a temporary' interruption created by the armistice o f 1918. 
Such an approach is not uncommon with certain historians; indeed Hobsbawm refers to 
the entire period from 1919 to 1945 as the "Age of Catastrophe"1. From a strictly 
historical perspective it is easy to criticise this approach not least because it ignores the 
differing origins and natures of the two wars. Nevertheless, from a geopolitical 
perspective it is not only acceptable but preferable to lump the two world wars together 
into a single phase since between them they brought about a complete re-ordering o f the 
globe as it had come to be known Furthermore, f rom Malta's point o f view, as a British 
colony, the difference in the origin and nature o f the two wars mattered little. Britain and, 
by virtue o f this, Britain's colonies were unavoidably implicated in the global anarchy 
which was the main characteristic o f both wars and characterised this critical phase in the 
history o f the world 
This chapter is concerned with Maltese geopolitical thought throughout this phase o f 
global anarchy Put otherwise, it is involved with the interpretations behind Malta's 
changing place in the geopolitical disorder which existed throughout the world at this 
unprecedented and still unsurpassed stage in history. So that comparisons can eventually 
be drawn between the various phases, this chapter adopts the same format as the previous 
chapter. It is split into three separate sections, the first o f which examines the wider world 
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.scene between 1914 and 1945, detailing how it was dominated by the two world wars, the 
second investigates the policy responses which determined Malta's small but significant 
role in these wider world wars, and the third draws together a number of more theoretical 
conclusions which relate to the geopolitical thinking behind these policy responses. 
This chapter is not subject to the ambiguity that typically accompanies the usage of the 
concepts o f order and disorder in interpreting geopolitical change This is because, no 
matter what benchmarks are used, it is difficult to interpret this phase in history as being 
anything other than one characterised by global geopolitical disorder. In fact the term 
'disorder' is arguably too reserved and, as the evidence in the next section wil l show, the 
term 'anarchy' may be more fitting. 
2.1 T H E W I D E R W O R L D : R E - O R D E R I N G T H R O U G H A N A R C H Y 
Whereas power, technological ability and expansionist desires had shaped the world in the 
phase outlined in the previous chapter, the shape o f the world between August 1914 and 
May 1945 was to be decided almost entirely by a concoction o f anarchy, force and 
desperation. The two great wars that occurred between these dates ended not simply by 
defeats o f armies in the field alone, as in the colonial wars o f the nineteenth century, but 
instead with the breakdown o f the political, economic and societal structures o f the 
defeated. Such absolute breakdowns were first and foremost to alter the relative order 
that had developed amongst the European powers. Further to this however, as China, 
Japan and the USA themselves became involved, the entire geopolitical surface o f the 
globe was to undergo a complete restructuring The following paragraphs examine the 
various breakdowns which led to this complete restructuring. In so doing they share the 
same focus as many great works on the world wars but it should be borne in mind that 
their scope is necessarily limited to what is o f relevance to this thesis. Nevertheless, an 
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attempt is made 10 cover in turn the critical events o f the two world wars. This attempt is 
made from the hybrid perspective o f geography and politics and is thus specifically 
interested in the geopolitical restructuring that the anarchy brought about. In addition to 
this, particular attention is devoted to the events that implicated Malta so that reference 
can be made to them in the second section of this chapter. 
2.11 The First World War 
By the end o f the colonial era a number o f rivalries between the European powers had 
become apparent2 The main ones were between Britain and Russia in Asia and Britain 
and France in Africa. Britain remained isolated from Europe, while France and Russia 
signed an alliance in 1894 as a counterweight to the strength o f the alliance bloc which had 
developed around Germany3. This situation had arisen around the turn o f the century 
when Germany had erred increasingly towards expansionist policies. Such policies were 
not wholly dissimilar to those that other European powers had adhered to for at least a 
century. However, as outlined in the last chapter, most o f the world's uninhabited 
territories had already been allocated, [t was therefore not surprising that the building o f a 
high seas fleet by Germany to rival that o f Britain was judged to constitute a threat to the 
established colonial world geopolitical order. Responding to this threat, Britain resolved 
its differences with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907, and France settled its long-
standing dispute with Italy in 1902 Following on from this, the so called Triple Entente 
between Britain, France and Russia was orchestrated to form the only f i rm bulwark 
against this German threat. Germany, on the other hand, became concerned with the 
danger o f encirclement by a hostile ring which it feared was being constructed by Great 
Britain 4 . 
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Germany reacted to this perceived encirclement by strengthening her alliances with Italy, 
and more importantly Austria, her only truly dependable ally. Demonst rative o f Germany's 
alliance with Austria was the support she gave to the Austrian annexation o f Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1908 The Austro-German alliance (or the l>ual Alliance*) remained 
intact throughout the Balkans war which witnessed a Russia-sponsored Balkan League 
(consisting o f Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria) attempt to drive the Turks out o f Europe. The 
consequent enlargement o f Serbia, which almost doubled in size, was unacceptable to the 
Austrians, who feared above all else the prospect o f Serb agitation for an independent 
south Slav state6 
The assassination o f the heir to the Austrian throne in Sarajevo in June 1914 is cited in 
many of the most thorough works on the First World War as having signalled the start o f 
violence7. This event had at last presented the Austrian government with an opportunity 
to contain Serbia before it grew too powerful, and Germany did not hesitate in backing its 
ally. Russia opted not to withdraw its sponsorship o f Serbia and instead chose to mobilize 
against Austria. Germany perceived this as a direct threat and also began to mobilize. 
However, fearing attack from Russia's allies in the West, the German Schlieffen Plan 
called for an early attack on northern France through Belgium, with the intention o f 
dismantling the French government before Russia had time to mobilise8. 
The SchliefFen Plan was almost a success. At roughly the time when the Russian armies 
invaded East Prussia the Germans were within forty miles o f Paris. They were forced to 
divert important reserves from the Western front just as a spirited counter-attack by 
French and British troops began at Marne in September 19149. The two sides dispersed 
and dug in, their trenches extending from the Channel coast to Switzerland. The trench 
wars fought on Germany's western front degenerated into a war o f attrition. Continual 
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offensives were launched by both sides and the efficiency with which reinforcements 
reached the front line by railway meant that there were heavy casualties throughout 1 0 
The Battle o f the Somme typified the unwinnable trench stalemate which had evolved On 
the first day o f this battle there were 60 000 British casualties. Four months later the 
battle continued, yet despite pursuing a range o f alternative strategies neither side had 
made any substantial progress1 1 In an attempt to break the deadlock the British and 
French attempted a series o f offensives from the rear First, in the Dardanelles and 
Mesopotamia against the Ottoman empire, which entered the war in November 1914 on 
the side o f the Dual Alliance; then on Austria's southern frontier after Italy declared war in 
May 1915; and also at Salonika in Greece in support o f Serbia 1 2. Ai l such efforts were in 
vain and, what is more, the Germans countered by constructing a fleet o f submarines with 
the expressed intention o f enforcing a food embargo on the British Isles Nevertheless, by 
1917 this ploy had failed to reduce Britain's food supply in any significant way and 
succeeded in provoking the United States into war with Germany 1 3. 
On the eastern front the Austro-German alliance enjoyed far greater success. The 
battlefront stretched for twice the distance o f that in the west and as a result o f this mobile 
combat replaced the trench stalemate14. In such theatres the supremely equipped armies 
o f the Dual Alliance scored a number o f major successes. In 1915 Germany routed a huge 
area o f Poland and set about a wholesale exploitation o f its resources15 and in that same 
year Austria overwhelmed most o f Serbia1 6. Two years later, by 1917, a combination o f 
huge losses and economic catastrophe had diminished the morale o f the Russian forces 
and provoked military collapse and in turn revolution. Ultimately, however, the above 
gains were to contribute to Germany's eventual downfall, since in what has now become 
known as a famous tactical blunder 1 7 Germany sent its troops to occupy these new 
territories whilst simultaneously launching an all-out offensive in the west. Once again it 
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came close to success but the allied line held strong in July 1918. Aided by tanks and 
American reinforcements and money, the counter-attack not only pushed the German 
army back towards the German frontier but soon won the war By October o f that year, 
with Austria close to disintegration and with Germany facing political turmoil at home, the 
Berlin government sued for an armistice This was finally granted on 1 I November 
I 9 I 8 1 8 . 
At the peace conferences held in and around Paris in 1919 1 9, the victors imposed upon 
Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria (the Central Powers) considerable losses o f 
territory, huge reparations, and strict reductions in their armed forces The draconian 
nature o f the peace settlement made it inevitable that, although over eight million men had 
died, the resulting re-ordered geopolitical map was unlikely to be accepted in the long 
term by the capitulators This phase in history, which was characterised by the re-ordering 
of the world's geopolitical surface was by no means yet over. 
2 .12 The Second World War 
The collapse o f the Central Powers in 1918 and the subsequent peace treaties had brought 
about major changes to the geopolitical map o f Europe. In addition to the obvious 
frontier changes, several new states had emerged whilst other states on the winning side 
expanded considerably. Nevertheless, such changes were minor in relation to the pending 
global geopolitical developments. The demise o f the Austro-Hungarian empire, the 
disarmament and imposition o f reparation payments on Germany and her allies and the 
effects o f the Russian Revolution and civil war had left a climate that was conducive to the 
most colossal and uncontrollable geopolitical changes the world had ever witnessed. 
These were the changes which occurred during and in the aftermath o f the Second World 
War. They are the focus o f the latter paragraphs o f this section but first it is important to 
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examine some of the factors which brought about the Second World War and so provided 
the catalyst for such massive changes in the wider world. 
In terms o f population and industrial strength, although weakened, Germany still had no 
rival in central Europe following the First World War 2 0 This factor meant that the 
victorious European powers were compelled to maintain an overwhelming collective 
military strength against any possible revival o f German strength. Such commitments 
placed further strain on the already war damaged economies which in turn translated into 
widespread political instability Italy, for example, which had amassed huge debts and lost 
over half-a-million men in the war but acquired only 14 400 k m 2 in the peace, rapidly 
became ungovernable Civil war between left- and right-wing extremists prevailed in 
many cities until in 1922 the Fascist party, led by Benito Mussolini, seized power 2 1 . 
Elsewhere, the costs o f war and the inadequacies o f the peace settlements fuelled anti-
parliamentary and revolutionary movements o f both the left and right, the most notable 
example being the Russian Revolution and subsequent civil war in which over thirty 
million people are believed to have died and the foundations for the next geopolitical 
phase in history (the Cold War) were laid 2 2 . Wi th the onset o f the "Great Western 
Depression"2 3 in 1929 the Communist descendants o f the Russian Bolsheviks also found 
fertile breeding ground for their philosophies in Europe and particularly in Germany which 
was perhaps hardest hit by the economic depression24. Although they undoubtedly 
contributed to the downfall o f the German Parliament it was the anti-parliamentary 
movement o f the right, not the left, which eventually took power. The German Nationalist 
Socialist Worker's Party (Nazi Party) had been enjoying rapidly increasing support when in 
1933 their leader, Adolf Hitler became National Chancellor and proceeded to absorb or 
abolish all other parties. Hitlers meteoric rise to power 2 5 combined with the economic 
weakening o f Britain and the political instability o f France irretrievably damaged the 
precarious geopolitical balance in Europe. 
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The League o f Nations, created in 1920 to protect member states from aggression and 
regulate international disputes, was only as effective as long as its member states were 
stable Furthermore, its failure to prevent Italy's annexation of Ethiopia in 1935 2 6, or 
Germany's remilitarization o f the Rhineland in 1936 2 7 did little to discourage further 
aggression. Hitler, who immediately set about remilitarizing the German war machine, 
annexed Austria and parts o f Czechoslovakia in 193 8, then Bohemia and Memel in spring 
1939, whilst, in that same year, Italy invaded and occupied Albania 2 8. Whether an early 
alliance between the western democracies and the Soviet Union would have halted such 
aggression remains a topic o f debate. However, fearing that his country, which was still in 
the wake o f the civil war, may be next in line and since he was already engaged in open 
hostilities with Japan (Hitler's ally), Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in 
August 1939 2 9 A further cataclysmic re-ordering through force and anarchy o f the 
unstable geopolitical system created after the First World War had, as a result o f a 
combination o f the above mentioned factors, become an unavoidable inevitability. 
Hitler's accession to power in 1933 had added a new dimension to international 
geopolitics. As Germany's economic recovery took hold his expansionist designs became 
unrestrainable. His essentially unopposed annexation o f Austria and Czechoslovakia 
(1938-39) and the Nazi-Soviet Pact o f August 1939 led him to expect comparable 
acquiescence when, he invaded Poland in September o f that year. This offensive, 
however, was a miscalculation as it presented the western democracies with little 
alternative but to declare war 3 0 . Undeterred by this, over the next two years Germany 
overran Denmark, Norway 3 1 , France, Yugoslavia and Greece, in that order. As 
mentioned, Italy had already secured Albania, but she also went on to invade Egypt in 
1940 Despite the Nazi-Soviet pact, however, it is now widely acknowledged that Hitler's 
ultimate goal was the conquest o f Russia3 2. In a similar way to the SchliefFen Plan in 
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1914. Germany's plans in 1939 sought initially to eliminate their foreseen obstacles in the 
west before the main struggle began in the east. Also similar to the Schlieffen Plan, 
Hitler's underlying strategy in the Second World War was doomed in failure 
Three fundamental strategic oversights can now be identified as having been made by-
Hitler 3 3 . First, he overlooked the political robustness o f Britain which, despite being 
defeated on the continent and being subjected to sustained aerial bombing, refused to 
concede defeat 3 4 Second, though he took over three million prisoners o f war and made 
rapid progress into Russia, Hitler's army over-stretched their logistical support and tens o f 
thousands were stranded outside Rostov, Leningrad and Moscow throughout the winter 
o f 1941 3 5 . Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Hitler elected to back Japan following 
the Pearl Harbour bombing and himself declared war on the U S A 3 6 This final mistake 
sounded the death knell for the Nazis. US troops not only supported Soviet forces in 
defeating the Germans at the Volga in Stalingrad in 1942 but also served as vital 
reinforcements to the Brit ish 3 7 . In battles which implicated Malta and were to prove 
decisive in ending the war, Anglo-American troops cleared Axis forces first from Africa 
and then from Sicily (1942-1943). Following on from this Yugoslavia and then France 
and Belgium were liberated before allied forces moved into Germany, meeting the Soviets 
on the Elbe in May 1945 3 8. 
Destruction on the scale o f the Second World War had never been witnessed before. Over 
fifty million people had perished within the space o f six years and the Germans had 
murdered prisoners o f war, all captured partisans and communist party members as well as 
more than six million Jews in mass shootings and special extermination camps3 9. 
In addition to the human costs o f the war, by 1945 almost all major European cities lay in 
ruins and their economies in a state o f devastation. Furthermore, the destruction which 
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spread throughout the Asia-Pacific region must also be recalled. Japan's expansionist 
ambitions over the empires o f the European colonial powers and her goal o f expelling the 
USA from East Asia had resulted in a war theatre every bit as destructive as the one on 
the reverse side o f the globe 1 0. In the atomic bombing o f Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
August 1945, the conflict here concluded with an act o f annihilation which thankfully has 
yet to be surpassed41. 
In conclusion, although difficult to encapsulate in a few words, this section has examined 
briefly the geopolitical developments associated with the two world wars. Despite the 
obvious and significant omissions it serves the purpose o f setting the wider world scene in 
which Malta became entangled throughout this phase in her history. This wider world 
scene can now be seen to have been characterised above all else by the most spontaneous 
and all-pervading geopolitical re-ordering that has ever occurred. As far as Europe was 
concerned, as the Allied forces began to occupy Axis territory, the extent o f the re-
ordering that the anarchy had invoked could be comprehended 
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PHASE 2: WIDER WORLD GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE 
As will be seen in the third chapter the re-ordering through anarchy of the world depicted 
in the previous map sowed the seeds for the next phase in global geopolitical change, 
which also revolved around events in Europe. And finally, as the fourth chapter will 
show, not even the cataclysmic geopolitical transformations which resulted from the end 
of the Cold War were to supersede this phase of re-ordering through anarchy. 
The next section (2.2) investigates Malta's role, and the policy responses which influenced 
this role, in this wider world scene. Although the role may not be readily apparent and at 
the outset even doubted, the following paragraphs will argue that the minor events which 
Malta was involved in were not only extremely significant to her own political 
development but were also reasonably instrumental on a larger scale. 
2.2 F R O M B R I T I S H D Y A R C H Y T O B R I T I S H F O R T R E S S : 
M A L T A IN A W O R L D A T A R M S (1914-1945) 
Just as Malta's role in the colonial world system of phase one developed through a series 
of policy responses to wider geopolitical changes from being one of a British protectorate 
into being a Crown colony, her role in the rapidly changing anarchical world of phase two 
shifted from being one of a British dyarchy to an out-and-out British fortress. The 
transition was not smooth, however, and was only completed following a number of 
uncertainties regarding Malta's allegiances to the Crown. 
The islanders effectively inherited their role as a British dyarchy from the events covered 
in the first chapter. However, the role they took on as an island fortress in the Second 
World War drew many parallels with the role they had acquired almost four centuries 
earlier in 1565, when, under the Knights of St. John and with European backing, Malta's 
fortifications withstood military bombardment and the Great Siege at the hands of the 
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Turkish armada4 2 Hence, in many respects, throughout the latter stages of phase two 
Malta had experienced a reversion to a bygone era in which she was afforded the role of a 
military outpost by the major waning powers of the day. This is not to say that the 
Maltese were capable of affecting this reversion In fact the contrary is more true; given 
the dangerous dependency Malta had built up on the colonial skirmishes of the nineteenth 
century, it was inevitable that, as anarchy spawned the globe, Malta would be unwittingly 
forced to revert back to this historical role as an island fortress 
Whereas Malta's role as an island fortress in inhibiting the westward progress of the 
Turkish advance (in 1565) is well recounted and often even embellished43, the role that the 
fortress played as a key British base in the Second World War as the linch-pin in the battle 
for North Africa (1942) has not always been apportioned its due weight; particularly 
outside Malta 4 4. This section contributes towards redressing this imbalance by presenting 
an objective investigation into how, in a world at arms, Malta developed into a British 
fortress of the utmost importance Along the way, it covers the hardships, the uncertainty-
over allegiances and finally the glory that the islanders encountered in the fulfilment of this 
key geopolitical role in the wider world anarchy. Thus, in as much as it details Malta's 
experiences in the wider world, in accordance with our working definition it covers 
Malta's geopolitics between 1914 and 1945. 
Although the Maltese islands were not directly involved in any of the conflicts of the early 
twentieth century, they were certainly implicated in many of the most significant 
developments of the First World War. Unlike in the previous wars in Malta's history (see 
section 1.2), from which Malta nearly always benefited in a round-about-way, the First 
World War had a definite de-stabilising effect on the islands. Given that their colonial 
ruler was one of the main players and casualties of the war this is not at all surprising. 
British resources were necessarily devoted to the war effort, particularly to the costly 
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campaigns in the western trenches that were discussed in the last section, and colonial 
territories not directly implicated in the conflict were understandably neglected'15 Ln 
addition to this, a number of other wider factors combined lo have a de-stabilising effect 
on Malta. In particular, the disruption of trade had reduced government revenue, created 
food shortages and higher freight rates, with the result that the cost of living in Malta rose 
dramatically, as it did elsewhere Obviously this affected different sections of the 
population in different ways, to the extent that certain working communities were forced 
to strike4 6. Most notably, in 1917, the dockyard workers were left with no option but to 
strike following a series of inadequate wage increases. Still, one has to conclude that 
despite these economic hardships, the Maltese were relatively well off, at least in relation 
to those countries and colonies directly involved in the fighting. Indeed, it would seem 
that the Maltese themselves had drawn such a conclusion and certainly less pressure than 
might have been expected was put on the British government, which was already facing up 
to the more serious burdens of the war However, their tolerance to such economic 
hardships only lasted until the war was over when, being colonial citizens of the victorious 
power, the Maltese began demanding amelioration. On 7 June 1919, rioting broke out Ln 
Valletta, resulting in a number of fatal clashes between British troops and Maltese 
workers 4 7. During the riots flour mills were broken up in a protest against bread prices 
and the offices of the pro-British 'Malta Daily Chronicle' were destroyed48. 
By the time Lord Plumer had arrived to take up his appointment as post-war Governor the 
situation in Malta was rapidly de-generating into a microcosm of the political and 
economic turmoil which, as outlined in the previous section, was facing the wider world, 
and most particularly the European powers. Through a range of financial grants and 
concessions the new Governor ushered in the long requested Maltese National 
Assembly49. The National Assembly was largely responsible for drafting a constitution 
which provided for two houses: A Legislative Assembly of elected members and a Senate 
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of nominated members50. In addition to this the constitution drafted by the National 
Assembly under the guidance of L S Amery, who was under-secretary of State for the 
Colonies, also provided for and indeed formalised Malta's relationship with its British 
colonizers. This was done through the system of 'dyarchy', which was similar to that 
which had just been adopted for India 5 1 It represented the third formal geopolitical role 
that had been imposed on Malta by the British as they reacted to changing wider world 
circumstances. As will be shown in the following paragraphs there were considerable 
differences between this role and the ones which had preceded it (i.e. Malta's role as a 
British Protectorate and then as a Crown Colony). 
The shift to a dyarchal system of government was basically representative of a substantial 
concession to the Maltese by the British Effectively, the Maltese were given a say in the 
ainning of local affairs whilst the British retained control over foreign affairs and defence 
Obviously there was a degree of altercation over how and where the line between the two 
forms of government was drawn but the system of dyarchy did, nevertheless, ensure that 
Anglo/Maltese relations were relatively smooth throughout the immediate post-war 
years 5 2 The Maltese were satisfied with the concessions that had been made whilst the 
British were content in the knowledge that they still had a means of controlling the 
legislative process and preserved ultimate authority over the foreign affai rs of the islands. 
The system of dyarchy, or more specifically the additional power it had conferred on the 
Maltese, had paved the way for the emergence of political parties Given the nature of 
Maltese society this process was unlikely to be anything other than volatile, on a domestic 
scale at least Maltese society retained many of the traditional attributes that were typical 
of other dependent British colonies53. As discussed in section 1.1, through their policy of 
indirect rule the Crown had intentionally exerted little influence over the more traditional 
aspects of indigenous societies. In the case of Malta this meant that, well into the 
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twentieth century the majority of the work-force were still employed in agriculture, the 
manufacturing industry remained insignificant and most of the wealth was concentrated in 
the hands of a relatively small number of rich land-owners54 Moreover, beyond this 
wealthy core, literacy levels and general educational standards were low In addition to 
this the continuing authority and dominance of the Church had almost been encouraged by 
British colonial administrators (as outlined in section 1.2) Decades later this had the 
effect of inhibiting modern secular change since many of the political leaders repeatedly 
incurred the mistrust and subsequent hostilities of the Church authorities55 Finally, one 
further attribute of Maltese society, which ensured that the emergence of political parties 
and alliances was a volatile process, was the minuteness of the island society Propinquity 
continues to this day to affect the islands' geopolitics in as much as it affects the efficient 
functioning of Malta in the wider international scene5 6 However, in the early days of 
Maltese domestic politics the problems which derived from the smallness of the islands' 
society were more acute Even with the primitive communications and mediums of the 
early twentieth century Malta's overall population was sufficiently low and her population 
density sufficiently high for everyone to know everyone else's business. In such a situation 
the likelihood of public policy remaining distinct from personal interest is slim and as a 
result of this Malta's early aspiring politicians were faced with an uphill struggle in winning 
over the trust of the electorate 
The above paragraphs have suggested some of the internal characteristics of Maltese 
society which dictated that the development of political parties was a stormy process. 
This thesis, however, is not solely concerned with domestic developments within Malta 
but more with how they fit into the wider geopolitical scene. Bearing this in mind, it is 
necessary to consider the developments in Europe which undoubtedly influenced Malta's 
early political development and were, and still are, in many ways conducive to the 
volatility which appears to be inherent in the islands' political set up. The developments 
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which dogged politics in Europe prior to the Second World War were examined in the last 
section hut the situations in the two countries which exerted the greatest influence over 
Maliese affairs at this stage in her geopolitical development (Britain and increasingly Italy) 
were not specifically tackled It was the political influences from these two countries 
combined with ihe unfavourable attributes of Maltese society outlined above that brought 
about the political crisis which spoiled Malta's period of respite in between the two World 
Wars 5 7 The events which led up to, and specifically the influences from both Britain and 
Italy which contributed to this crisis are thus worthy of further consideration 
Malta's first organized political parties emerged when elections were called under the 1921 
constitution58 The first party to be formed was the Labour Party (founded 12 April 1921) 
which was led by Lieutenant Colonel Savona 5 9 Following on from this, Sir G Strickland 
launched the Anglo-Maltese party and Dr Bartolo launched the Maltese Constitutional 
Party Both of these parties sought to st rengthen the British connection and, as a result of 
this, formed an alliance prior to the election which was named the Constitutional Party 6 0 
The Partito Nazionalista Democratico was formed on 10 May 1921 by Mr. A. Magri and 
Mr G Micallef, intended as a pro-Italian counterweight to the anglophile Constitutional 
Party Portending future volatilities, was the fact that its first leader, Dr. E Mizzi, had 
been court-martialled for sedition in the First World War and also been excluded from the 
Unione Politica6 1 The Unione Politica was led by Monsignor Panzavecchia and sought to 
offer a compromise between the contrasting pro/anti British and Italian stances It was 
this compromise that the electorate opted for in the 1921 elections and for five years the 
Unione Politica served Malta well In 1926, however, the Unione Politica merged with 
the Partito Nazionalista Democratico to form the Nationalist Party 6 2. Malta's domestic 
political scene was then dominated by two parties with increasingly polemical stances, and 
political crisis was not long in coming 
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In 1927 the electorate rejected the newly formed alliance, returning the Constitutionalists 
to office Their leader, Lord G Strickland; was a member of an influential Anglo-Maltese 
family A graduate of Cambridge University where he was President of the Union, 
Strickland's British connections were reflected in his strong leanings towards policies of 
modernization and educational development63 Such declinations (as they were seen) were 
not appreciated by the traditional interest groups which made up the majority of the upper 
house In particular, representatives of the Church frequently used their powers to hinder 
Lord Strickland's attempts to promote change Eventually the inevitable conflict occurred, 
when Lord Strickland made a series of statements which were disdainful towards the 
Church The relationship between the political leader and the Church authorities 
deteriorated to the extent that when the next general election was called for May 1930 the 
Archbishop of Malta and the Bishop of Gozo issued a pastoral letter imposing spiritual 
penalties on those members of t he Church who voted for Lord Strickland In short, those 
who disobeyed were to be denied sacraments64 Such a situation was clearly unacceptable 
to the British administrators and the decision was taken to cancel the election and suspend 
the constitution65 The seeds of Malta's interwar political volatility had been sown. 
The radically pro-Italian Dr E Mizzi rose to prominence in the Nationalist Party, offering 
a political viewpoint approved by the Catholic Church Strickland portrayed the new 
breed of Nationalist as being anti-British and disloyal and in doing so he received the 
approval of the British Governor Responding to this, some Nationalists accused 
Strickland of anti-Catholic sentiments, thus exploiting religious issues for political gain 6 6 
Exchanges such as these had reached unprecedented levels of intensity when in 1931 the 
British established a Royal Commission to examine Malta's constitutional problems 
Following this, the constitution was restored67 and the Nationalist Party, with the approval 
of the Church, won the 1932 election Under the instruction of their leader Dr. E Mizzi, 
the Nationalists immediately began to implement a policy of rigorous promotion of the 
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Italian language This policy was in direct contrast to the recommendations o f the 
Commission of the previous year, which had expressly stipulated that Maltese be the 
language of ihe courts and ihat Italian should be laughl only in secondary schools and not 
in elementary schools In addition to this blatant promotion of the Italian language, other 
policies were adopted which the Governor, Sir D Campbell judged to be pro-Italian and 
in many respects anti-British. Obviously a situation had developed that was wholly 
unacceptable to the colonial authorities, explaining why late in 1933 the constitution was 
once again suspended68 Care was taken not to implicate the Church in the proceedings 
since the language question had become agonisingly synonymous with the matter of 
loyalty to the Church. Italian was also the language of the nobility and the educated and 
wealthy elite, and once again the colonial administrators were compelled to tread carefully 
in these areas A scenario in which an assault by Protestant Britain on the islands' Catholic 
institutions was perceived by the Maltese as a dangerous yet highly possible prospect69. 
By 1935, the period of political volatility in Malta was being replaced in significance by 
threats of war, just as it was being in the wider European scene Perhaps somewhat 
ironically, it was the threat of conflict between the two great powers that had inadvertently 
caused a decade of political volatility to the islands which eventually forced a cooling of 
the domestic animosities Although the forthcoming conflict was not in any way over 
Malta, the split allegiances within Maltese society and the islands' geopolitical location 
would have ensured that they would have featured heavily in any conflict between the 
British and the Italians If such a war, between the two most influential wider European 
powers in the islands' affairs, had occurred at this stage it would almost undoubtedly have 
resulted in Maltese civil war. Fortunately, this time, the anticipated conflict between the 
Italians and the British never materialised However, the mere fact that the Admiralty had 
felt it necessary to inform the Commander-in-Chief in Malta of the naval measures to be 
taken in the event of war with Italy was enough to awaken the islanders to the potentially 
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severe consequences o f such a prospect70 Therefore, in all probability, it was no 
coincidence that in the wake o f this scare there followed a period o f relative political calm 
in which moderate liberals came to prominence in all political parties71 and the cultural 
polarisation o f (he previous decade or so took a back-seat, at least for the time being 
The relative tranquillity which had followed the incident enabled the then Governor, Sir 
Charles Bonham-Carter, to introduce a constitution in 1936 Although this constitution 
was limited in many respects, it did establish an extremely effective executive council 
which, despite the world depression outlined in the last section, managed to implement a 
number of important progressive social and infrastructural measures Sir Charles also 
succeeded in containing the pro-Italian groups that remained in Maltese society72 Given 
the global anarchy that was to come after his term in office and the role that the Italians 
were to play in instigating and perpetrating this anarchy, this was perhaps the most 
significant of his achievements As well as intercepting espionage activities by the Italian 
Consul he expelled two government employees with strong pro-Italian sympathies73, 
closed what he considered to be the troublesome Institute di Cultura Italiana and played a 
large part in the dismissal of the pro-Italian Chief Justice, Sir Arturo Mercieca 7 4 
Despite the above successes, there remained one area in which the new Governor 
struggled to make much progress. This was in diversifying the island's economy75 
Efforts had been made to encourage small industries, agriculture and tourism as alternative 
forms of economic activity to the services that the dockyard provided However, all such 
efforts recorded only minimal successes and in the period immediately prior to the Second 
World War, from an economic point of view, Malta remained very much an island fortress 
that was effectively employed at the discretion of the British Since the introduction of the 
dyarchal system of government the Maltese had enjoyed increasing political representation 
and freedom. Whether or not this had come too early for the Maltese is debatable but it 
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most certainly had its teething problems Indeed, so much so, that on the eve of the 
Second World War the Maltese political experiment had for all intents and purposes been 
temporarily halted The Maltese were less concerned with the limitations of their 
constitution than the imminent World War Unfortunately for them, however, at this stage 
the British were not overly concerned on their behalf70 
The Crown had squandered earlier opportunities to enhance its colony's preparedness for 
war when they failed to carry out the plans they had proposed in response to the threat of 
war with Italy in 1935 These plans had proposed the distribution of gas masks, the 
establishment of air-raid shelters and the construction of refugee camps in Gozxr measures 
which if taken would undoubtedly have benefited the Maltese throughout the Second 
World War In addition to this, wranglings between the various elements of the British 
armed forces and certain politicians over the strategic worth of the islands meant that 
further opportunities to prepare for the forthcoming World War were missed 
In many ways it was only the Royal Navy that was entirely convinced of Malta's strategic 
worth. To t he First Admiral of the Fleet, Malta was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier"77 that 
possessed large-scale dock-yard facilities which were a prime asset in the Navy's world-
wide armoury He believed that, should the growing Fascist movement in Italy join the 
Axis powers, the islands were ideally placed to sever sea communications between Italy 
and her North African colonies. The Army and the R A F , however, strongly disagreed 
since Malta was only sixty miles and thirty minutes flying time from Sicily and therefore 
likely to be untenable under heavy air attack78 and of limited value anyway so long as 
French territories in North Africa could be used as air staging-points to the east. The final 
decision went against the expressed wishes of the Admiralty, with British politicians 
concluding that retaliating air strikes from France and North African territories would 
counter air raids on Malta from Italian airfields, should Italy become involved7 9. The 
98 
PHASE 2: POLICY RESPONSES IN MALTA 
British had elected not to fulfil their protectional obligations on which the Maltese had 
become hopelessly dependent. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, this was lo 
prove a critical and almost decisive tactical mistake in the wider scheme of things. 
The first bombs fell on the islands on 11 June 1940, the day after Italy entered the war1*0. 
The internal wranglings and indecisiveness by the British meant that only forty anti-aircraft 
guns could be brought into action81 Furthermore, it was never envisaged that France 
would be defeated and that its airfields in Algeria and Tunisia, far from protecting Malta, 
would fall into enemy hands and become an additional threat to the islands. Following 
France's defeat in 1940 the Axis powers occupied the greater part of the North African 
coastline and Greece, leaving Malta practically isolated and its dense population exposed 
to the enemy. Defeat of Malta at this early stage would have given the Axis powers 
control of all but the eastern and western extremities of the Mediterranean82 
By the middle of 1941, the British had acknowledged their tactical error and accepted that 
the forecasts of the First Admiral of the Fleet had proved accurate. Demonstrative of 
Britain's changed geopolitical perspective on the islands was the 1941 communique that 
Winston Churchill wrote to the then Governor of Malta, Lieutenant-General Sir William 
Dobie, which stated: 
"You may be sure that we regard Malta as one of the master keys of the British Empire"83. 
The battle for North Africa had essentially become a battle of logistics. With the eventual 
arrival of British supplies and reinforcements Malta was able to dominate the main 
seaways of the central Mediterranean and cause havoc to the supplies of the Axis armies84. 
However, the islands' inherent geographical vulnerabilities meant that the costs of 
operating from them were high8 5. The main components of their infrastructure were 
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concentrated in a few areas and there was a heavy dependency on imported food and 
industrial materials. Ln short, supply and logistics were just as important to Malta as they 
were to North Africa. The Regia Aeronautica, Luftwaffe and German U-boats squeezed 
the arteries of the fortress just as much as the Allies did the Axis' and during the first half 
of 1942 the islands came very close to starvation and surrender By the summer of 1942, 
flour, rice, olive oil, milk, sugar, jam and beer were practically unobtainable and both 
soldiers and civilians were undernourished86. Also, the lack of natural resources began to 
take its toll. Hospital casualties, a population inflated by military personnel and the 
provision of water for shipping meant that there was barely enough water for basic 
washing and drinking. In addition to this, the main domestic fuel on the islands, kerosene, 
was in acutely short supply87. 
In military terms, by March and April of 1941 the air onslaught had reached a new level of 
intensity. During these two months alone the islands suffered more than twice the weight 
of bombs which fell in London during the whole of its worst year 8 8. In the six months to 
the end of June 1942, with the exception of one twenty-four hour period, air raids on 
Malta were a daily occurrence, the most severe of them involving several hundred 
bombers and escorting fighters89. The award of the George Cross on 15 April 1942, with 
the following citation -
"To honour her brave people, I award the George Cross to the Island Fortress of Malta to 
bear witness to a Heroism and Devotion that will be famous in History"90 
- temporarily lifted the spirits of both the garrison and the Maltese people but new fears 
were soon imparted by reconnaissance reports thai preparations for invasion were being 
made at Sicilian airfields. Although such reports never materialised91, the air attacks 
continued and Malta's position in the summer of 1942 was, 
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"a microcosm of the desperate global situation facing the Allies at that time"92. 
It was not until November 1942 that the tide began to turn in favour of the Allies. With 
the landings in French North Africa, allied air power once again came to dominate the sea 
routes and ensured safe passage for the large convoy from Alexandria that is often 
credited with having broken the siege. 
The "Greater Siege", as it has since been referred to 9 3, had united the Maltese and the 
British and victory had ended the chances of the Axis powers. Nevertheless, Malta had 
suffered some of the heaviest bombing of the war and the damage to parts of the island 
had been immense94. By the end of 1942, over 3000 Maltese civilians had been killed or 
seriously injured and 14,000 tons of bombs, during 3000 air raids had destroyed or 
severely damaged 25,000 buildings, including many of historical importance95. 
In the following year the islands were visited by their King, Churchill, Eisenhower and 
finally Roosevelt, who gave Malta a 'Presidential Citation'. In the summer of 1943, 
Valletta was utilised as the main base from which the Allies offensive in Sicily was 
launched and by August 1943 the captured Italian fleet lay at anchor in Malta's harbours. 
Following German and Japanese surrender in the summer of 1945, Malta was rewarded 
with a thirty-million pound war-damage fund by the British Government. Despite the 
hardships that the islanders had been exposed to under the British the war had the effect of 
cementing the relationship between Britain and Malta which had now endured both the 
rise and fall of the colonial world order. Malta's uncertainties over her international 
allegiances had been quashed, even if only temporarily so. 
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In summary, this section has investigated the hardships, uncertainty over allegiances and 
also the glory that the Maltese experienced as a result of the fall of the colonial world 
order. It has identified Malta's place, and later role, in this demise as having shifted from 
being one of a British dyarchy to once again effectively becoming one of a fortress. The 
investigation presented in this section has shown that the shift was not a smooth one. 
Indeed, such was the extent of Maltese discontent at the interwar economic depression 
and political strife that the islands almost failed to make it to the Second World W'ar under 
the British As the dyarchal system of government swayed in favour of Malta's first 
generation of politicians many of them used their new powers to express disdain for their 
British colonizers The main way in which they did this was to proclaim allegiances to the 
Italian culture, frequently utilizing the Roman Catholic Church as justification for their 
enunciations The closing paragraphs of this section have detailed how this interwar 
flirtation with Italian culture and politics faded as the Second World War commenced. In 
short, it has described how, after an initial period of uncertainty by the British 
administrators, Malta was once again utilised for all its strategic worth. Its newly acquired 
international role as a British fortress soon relegated domestic political issues to a 
relatively low priority status. The British/Italian question was finally resolved in favour of 
the British when Italy entered the war on the side of the Nazis and showed no hesitation in 
the commencement of bombing sorties over Malta Finally, the latter stages of this section 
have shown that this troublesome phase in Malta's geopolitical history ended on a 
relatively happy note with Malta basking in the glory of her internationally-recognised but 
hard-earned heroism. 
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2.3 B R I T I S H I M P O S E D " F O R T R E S S R E A L I S M " 
So far this chapter has investigated the geopolitical nature and extent of the global anarchy 
which constituted the two World Wars and caused the major periods of economic 
depression and political instability in between them It has also examined Malta's place in 
the First World War, her uncertain allegiances in between the Wars and her pivotal role in 
the Second World War. Malta's place in these wider world geopolitical developments was 
still largely determined by the British and the policy framework through which they 
governed the islands. This section investigates the geopolitical interpretations and 
reactions behind this distinct policy framework It does so from a theoretical point of 
view, elucidating and then labelling the mode of geopolitical thinking behind the policies 
which were imposed upon Malta throughout the period of global anarchy. 
The second phase in Malta's geopolitical development witnessed a shift away from the 
arrangement which had dominated Maltese/British relationships for the entire previous 
century. With the introduction of the dyarchal system of government, the islanders' affairs 
were no longer entirely in the hands of the British colonial administrators. Strictly 
speaking, two processes (hence the term dyarchy, also spelt di-archy, which means literally 
twice/double leadership/government) were influential in Malta's policy responses to war-
time geopolitical developments. In other words, certain policy responses were 
undoubtedly inspired from within by those Maltese engaged in geopolitical thought, 
whereas others were still imposed on Malta from outside. However, as mentioned in the 
last section, even under the dyarchal system of government the majority of decisions 
regarding the foreign or external affairs of the islands continued to be made by the British. 
Hence, the latter of these two processes remained the most influential with regard to the 
geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses between 1914 and 1945 
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As in the last phase, the Crown's impositions on Malta continued to be realist in nature 
All considerations short o f war were either ignored or discarded or, at best, in peacetime 
took second priority However, since peacetime was a scarcity throughout this phase, the 
former o f these assertions is more representative o f the prevailing geopolitical outlook in 
Malta at this time and political considerations short o f war were for the most part ignored 
or discarded Even in the relative peace o f the interwar years Britain (and by virtue o f this 
her dependencies also) was mainly involved with trying to make a rapid recovery from the 
devastation o f the First World War and regaining military preparedness as a means o f 
confirming her status in the re-ordering world. Such reactions were fundamentally realist 
in nature since they accepted the inevitable continuity o f global conflict and the primacy o f 
war ahead o f all other matters o f state. 
This preoccupation with war and the preparedness for war was in all fairness justified in 
this uncertain period o f global anarchy, as were the other assumptions that defined the 
policy framework o f realism in both this and the preceding phase o f Malta's geopolitical 
development. These assumptions were outlined in the last chapter (section 1.3) but in the 
re-ordering wider world elucidated in this chapter they acquired a slightly modified, more 
rigid form. 
Above all else, the realist conviction that the British nation-state accurately represented 
and acted in the best interests o f all citizens o f its empire was more unreservedly assumed 
between 1914 and 1945 than it had been previously. Whereas in colonial times the 
alternative to representation by the British nation-state, indigenous or self-rule, was not 
unequivocally detrimental to the best interests o f most colonies, in the period o f global 
anarchy the alternative to representation by the British nation-state was without doubt 
detrimental to the best interests o f colonial subjects. I t was this fact that cultivated the 
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more zealously assumed convictions of British self-righteousness which dominated 
colonial policy-making throughout and between the two World Wars For Malta's part, 
she took on the role o f a British fortress or indeed Allied outpost in the most precarious o f 
geopolitical locations. This was assumed to be in the best interests o f all concerned since 
the alternative to this (namely the acquisition o f Malta by the Axis powers) were 
unthinkably bad from the point o f view o f both the British administrators and the Maltese 
themselves. 
In addition to this, the realist assumption that the maintenance o f territorial security is the 
most important o f all a government's tasks, which was discernible but not wholly justified 
in the earlier colonial policy framework of perceptive realism, was no longer in doubt It 
would have been difficult to challenge the high priority1 status that issues o f security and 
territoriality had above all other state and colonial affairs in this period o f global anarchy. 
Certainly the Maltese were under no illusions as to how vital British military support was 
in safeguarding their territorial sovereignty from an Italian or even German encroachment 
In the colonial world order, which was littered with only a few small scale and transitory 
conflicts, the neglect o f social and economic issues in favour o f issues o f military defence 
was not always easy to justify in the face o f criticism. In a world re-ordering through 
anarchy, however, pre-occupation with war and military and territorial security was, 
because o f necessity, not open to dispute or even liable to criticism. This meant that the 
policy framework through which colonial administrators reacted to development in the 
wider world situation was based on response by military rote. In other words, the military 
leaders, both in Malta and in Britain, had taken over the role previously played by the 
governor. In this respect also, the mode o f geopolitical thinking through which Britain 
responded to developments affecting Malta throughout this phase was more rigidly realist 
in nature than the previous one. 
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Malta was not the only country in which more rigidly realist geopolitical thinking was 
influencing policy frameworks in this period. In fact, assumptions similar to those outlined 
above dominated the thinking and policy-making o f other colonial administrators and were 
even more apparent in the world views o f the powers which continued to satisfy their 
expansionist desires into the twentieth century. Most notable amongst this new generation 
o f aspiring colonialists, for obvious reasons, was Germany. As explained in the first 
section o f this chapter, Germany had joined the scramble for imperial possessions too late 
to acquire any satisfactory lebemraum (living space) and resources Geopolitical thinking 
behind German foreign policy in the early decades o f the twentieth century reflected their 
unprecedented and blinkered eagerness to expand by whatever means necessary. It can be 
said that Germany's geopolitics o f war led the way throughout this phase in history since 
all other variations o f geopolitics were essentially designed as responses to it. in addition 
to this, it has been argued that German geopolitical thinking also led the way throughout 
and between the wars since responses to it and almost all other geopolitical theories of this 
era shared the same theoretical underpinnings9 6. Notwithstanding the obvious differences 
in the extent to which German and other war-time geopolitical thoughts were interpreted 
literally by politicians and strategists, they were all derived from deeply realist 
underpinnings. 
Whereas in the last chapter the perpetrators o f such theories were little more than 
authoritative-sounding speculators practising an undefined hybrid discipline, by the time 
that global anarchy set in, geopolitics had become a well established discipline and those 
practising it enjoyed a new academic credibility. Furthermore, the deep-seated political 
realism that is now synonymous with traditional geopolitics had become firmly entrenched 
into their theories. There follows a short investigation into the geopolitical thinking that 
prevailed throughout and in between the wars, and the main exponents o f such thinking. 
Such exponents were the luminaries, obviously some more directly than others, that 
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Influenced the mode o f thinking through which Britain imposed policies on Malta and, for 
that matter, the modes o f thinking through which all o f the major fighting powers 
governed their war-time outposts For this reason the personalities themselves and more 
specifically their iheories are worthy o f further attention 
The work o f Rudolf Kjellen is usually acknowledged as a quintessential point o f departure 
for any investigation into this second generation o f geopolitical theorists, not least because 
he is credited with having first coined the term "geopolitics" in an article on the boundaries 
of Sweden in 1899 9 7. Like his predecessors (Mackinder, Ratzel and Mahan) Kjellen 
emphasized the "natural" and "organic" features o f the state. He talked o f a "new political 
science" which must fill "the legal skeleton with social flesh and blood" He went on to 
argue that his new variant o f political science must treat the state as a living organism, 
acting as a living organism within its own body and in relation to other states as 
organisms 9 8 Indeed, he even went so far as to title his most important book Statem som 
Lifsform (The State as an Organism, 1916). It was in this book that he presented his 
theory that the state was composed o f five 'organs'. Geopolilik was the first o f these and 
this was seen to involve the study o f the territory o f the state. The other attributes were 
Kratopolilik (government-constitutional structure) Demopolilik (population structure), 
Sociopoliiik (social structure) and Oekopolitik (economic structure). Kjellen also 
introduced other aspects o f the state concerned with the quality o f the population and the 
nation, whose aggregate he saw as constituting the body o f the state. He also perceived 
that states were in a condition o f constant competition. Distinguishing between what he 
called first-rank "world-powers" (England, Germany, Russia and the United States) and 
second-rank "great powers" (Austro-Hungary, France, Italy and Japan) he envisioned a 
future world which would be composed o f only a few very large and extremely powerful 
states. Crucially, however, for Europe he predicted a superstate controlled by Germany. 
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This was the cue for the German theorist Karl Haushofer, who took Kjellen's concept o f 
xeopolitik and transformed it into what he promoted as a whole approach to the study o f 
geography and global politics". Rather than being merely one organ o f the study o f the 
state, geopoiiltk in Haushofer's writings became a tool for rebuilding Germany into a 
world power A career officer in the Bavarian army, Haushofer served in Japan between 
1908 and 1910 and rose to the rank o f major-general in the army general staff, sewing 
throughout the First World War. Before the war he completed a PhD in geography, 
geology and history at the University o f Munich, addressing the German influence on the 
development o f Japan10". Haushofer began his academic career at the University o f 
Munich in 1919 at the age o f fif ty. In his previous career, he had been impressed by what 
he had seen o f the power and expansionist ambitions o f Japan, and also by the power o f 
Britain It was this that had interested him in geopolitics, the subject in which he took up 
his lectureship in 1919. Throughout his academic career, he gathered around him a group 
o f admirers, including journalists, all o f whom helped spread his ideas 1 0 1. 
In the 1920s, Haushofer, along with his collaborators, was involved in the founding o f two 
significant institutions. The first was the German Academy, which was formally opened in 
May 1925. The aims o f the organization, as spelled out in its rules and regulations, were 
to, 
"nourish all spiritual expressions of Germandom and to bring together and strengthen the 
unofficial cultural relations of Germany with areas abroad and of the Germans abroad 
with the homeland, in the service of all-German folk-consciousness"' ^ . 
The second was the establishment o f the Zeilschrift fiir Geopolitik (Journal o f 
Geopolitics) in 1924. The aim of Haushofer and his disciples was to create a popular and 
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influential journal that would address contemporary geopolitical issues and problems. In 
1928 the editors of Zeilschri ft outlined their definition of geopolitics: 
"Geopolitics is the science of the conditioning of political process by the earth. It is based 
on the broad foundations of geography, especially political geography, as the science of 
political space organisms and their structure The essence of regions as comprehended 
from the geographical point of view provides the framework for geopolitics within which 
the course of political processes must proceed if they are to succeed ui the long term. 
Though political leaders will occasionally reach beyond this frame, the earth dependency 
will always eventually exert its determining influence As thus conceived, geopolitics aims 
to be equipment for political action and a guide-post in political life ... Geopolitics wants 
to and must become the geographical conscience of state."1 0 1 
As can be seen from the above translation. Geopolitics for Haushofer was seen as being 
inseparable from practical politics Haushofer and his group amalgamated Ratzel's theory 
on the organic state and Kjellen's refinements o f it with the geostrategic principles o f 
Mahan and Mackinder. They then went on to impose a level o f German jingoism on this 
amalgamation and arrived at a practical policy o f expansionism. For instance, a variant o f 
Ratzel's lebensraum was clearly utilised as a rationale for Germany's expansion into its less 
virile neighbours, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Furthermore, an elaborated interpretation 
o f Kjellen's advocacy o f autarky was used, this time at the expense o f other countries in 
south-western Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. Finally, through a revival o f the 
Heartland concept, German geopoliticians argued for the construction o f a continental 
block comprising Germany, Russia and Japan as a counterweight to the sea-based British 
Empire. Haushofer saw elements o f this strategy realised in the Anticomitern Pact o f 
1936 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact o f 1939 1 0 4 However, his influence in German strategic 
circles was short-lived; the implementation o f Operation Barbarossa (Germany's invasion 
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into the Soviei Union) against his expressed wish being demonstrative o f th is 1 0 3 . In the 
immediate aftermath o f the Second World War he was pursued relentlessly by the Office 
of the Chief Counsel o f the United States investigating prominent Germans for 
prosecution in Nuremberg, a pursuit which eventually led him and his wife to take their 
lives in 1945. 
At the forefront o f the Allied response to the theories o f Haushofer was Nicholas John 
Spykman (1893-1943). In 1923 he earned a doctorate from the University o f California, 
where he served as an instructor in political science and sociology (1923-1925), before 
going to Yale. In 1935 he became chair o f Yale's Department o f International Relations 
and director o f their Institute o f International Studies 1 0 6. With support from the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Spykman began research that would result in the publication o f 
America's Strategy in World Politics (1942) and The Geography of the Peace (1944) 1 0 7 . 
Spykman is best remembered within accounts o f geopolitical development for his 
reworking o f Mackinder's heartland theory. He offered two basic critiques. First, he 
believed Mackinder overemphasized the power potential o f the Heartland since its 
importance was in fact reduced by the obstacles to internal transportation which caused 
major problems, as too did the barriers that surrounded the Heartland. Second, he argued 
that the history o f the heartland could not be seen solely in terms o f sea-power/land-power 
opposition. Instead, Spykman stressed the significance o f the "rimland" areas, or what 
Mackinder called the "Inner or Marginal Crescent". This area, he posited, is vulnerable to 
both land and sea power and must therefore operate in both modes. Highlighting the point 
that, historically speaking, alliances have always been made among Rirnland powers or 
between Heartland and Rimland powers, he proposed his own dictum, 
"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; 
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world ." 1 0 8 
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Through such thinking Spykman became inslrumental in promoting American 
interventions in the Second World War. His views, however, were still very much 
expressed in terms o f power geopolitics and in all respects dominated by political realism, 
as can be seen from the following statement in which he clarifies his position quite 
categorically: 
"Neither the self-evident truth of our principles nor die divine basis of our moral values is 
in itself enough to assure a world built in the image of our aspirations Force is 
manifestly an indispensable instrument both for national survival and for the creation of a 
better world" 1 0 9 
The above investigation into the personalities and theories which influenced the 
geopolitical thinking o f all the major warring factions involved in this period o f global 
anarchy is by no means comprehensive but has, however, served to highlight one common 
trend towards political realism. As mentioned, it can be argued that in this respect the 
theories and policy frameworks o f the Axis powers were not dis-similar to those o f the 
Allies, although clearly the former were more attack motivated whereas the latter were 
more driven by the need to defend. In short, a common geopolitical world view had been 
established as a result o f both the practical strategies o f government and the theorizing o f 
geopolitical thinkers, although deep seated interconnections between the two make it 
difficult to distinguish between the relative influence o f each o f these twin factors. The 
geopolitical world-view which derived from the above was one o f a globe composed o f a 
mosaic o f individual and autonomous units, which were in continued and aggressive 
competition with other units. Wars and conflicts were seen as the inevitable culmination 
of such competition and were therefore judged to be the primary concern o f all 
governments. In this respect the geopolitical world-view which prevailed throughout the 
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first half o f the twentieth century differed little from the colonial geopolitical gaze 
elucidated in the last chapter. One crucial modification was, however, discernible. 
Technological advancements in weaponry, communications and transport meant that the 
extent to which force could be used in the re-ordering o f the global geopolitical mosaic 
had been realised. It was not so much a case o f the expansionist desires o f major powers 
being any different or any more zealously pursued than in the colonial phase, but more a 
case o f vastly improved capabilities. In geopolitical terms the world had undergone the 
second in a series o f shrinkages. The first in this series was represented by the discovery 
and subsequent colonization o f the non-European world; this, the second, by the 
realisation that it was within the capabilities o f a single well equipped and motivated 
power to conquer and dominate militarily the majority o f the globe 
This geopolitical shrinkage and the related new world-view are crucial to our 
understanding o f the geopolitical thinking behind British-imposed policy responses at this 
stage in history. For purposes o f comparison and for want o f a less-hackneyed adjective 
this mode o f geopolitical thinking is labelled "fortress realism" (in contrast to the 
"perceptive realism" o f the colonial era). Through "fortress realism" Malta was viewed 
and governed as a strategic military outpost throughout and between the two World Wars. 
Even though in the confusion surrounding technological advancements and geopolitical 
shrinkage referred to earlier 1 1 0 Malta's significance to the British was not always realised, 
by the end o f this phase Malta was being utilised for all its strategic worth. Throughout 
this stage in Malta's international political history, she developed from being a mere stop-
o f f on the way to other large British colonies into an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier" 1" which 
was the linchpin in securing victory in the vital battle for North Africa. Correspondingly, 
policy making, although still in the domain o f the British and still executed through a 
realist policy framework, increasingly became the responsibility o f military commanders as 
opposed to their colonial administrators. As a result o f this, "fortress realism" was not 
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surprisingly more rigidly realist in nature than "colonial realism", since above all else it was 
based on responding to wider world developments by military rote. 
Thus to conclude, this chapter has shown that the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's 
policy responses throughout this phase can be said to have been imposed f rom outside by 
both wider world events, and British responses to them. The particular mode o f thinking 
was based on a set o f assumptions about the nature o f the world and global geopolitical 
change, which have since become synonymous with the approach known as political 
realism. Significantly, the continuity o f the competitive and conflictual world state system 
was assumed and little attempt was made to challenge or change this perceived situation 
The mode o f geopolitical thinking was based on this continuity and tailored to fit Malta's 
unique strategic position and, moreover, it became more rigidly realist as the situation o f 
global anarchy deteriorated. 
In addition to reaching the above conclusions this chapter has achieved its subsidiary aim 
o f highlighting the important role that Malta played in the Second World War. The siege 
that Malta endured at the hands o f the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica mid-way through 
the Second World War is acknowledged by certain Maltese historians as having been even 
more intense and even more significant in terms o f wider world repercussions than the 
much publicised and renowned earlier siege which Malta endured under the Knights o f St 
John at the hands o f the Turks (1565) 1 1 2 . Despite this, except perhaps in the tales o f the 
many US and British ex-servicemen who risked their lives in the defence or supply o f 
Malta, the important role that Malta played in the Second World War is not as well 
recounted as it might be outside o f Mal ta 1 1 3 . 
Clearly, 1914-1945 was a particularly significant phase in Malta's international political 
history; both in terms o f the effect that the wider-world re-ordering through anarchy had 
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on Malta, and also the small but highly significant effect that Malta ultimately managed to 
have on the wider world situation I f the last phase was significant in the sense that it 
marked Malta's projection onto the world stage, this phase was significant because, in the 
prevailing realist world o f clear-cut good and evil, Malta had emerged on the side o f the 
good. However, the Maltese had paid a high price for this and within Malta there was an 
understandable reluctance for them to ever again have to play such a sacrificial role in 
wider world geopolitical developments. Certainly, as the next chapter wi l l show, although 
the wider world soon re-ordered and, arguably, simplified following the Second World 
War, Malta's geopolitics or place in this wider world was never to be as straight-forward 
again. A series o f changes implemented by Maltese leaders, and designed to free the 
Maltese o f what were in their eyes ultimately doomed allegiances, ensured that British 
imposed policy responses based on rigid realist geopolitical thinking were soon to be 
rejected, ushering in a period of drastic change into Malta's international political history. 
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Endnotes 
1 Hobsbawro 1994. p 19. 
: For a fu!! overview of the great power rivalries bcJiind the First World War see the introduction to Koch 
1984. 
I See Kennan 1984. p. 6. 
A The above paragraph summarizes the main causes of the First World War as outlined by Hinsley 1964 in 
his classic work. 
5 The Austro-German Alliance is typically referred to as the Dual Alliance, see for e.g. Herwig 1997, p. 6. 
6 Hinsley op. cit. 
; See for e.g. Hardach 1977; or the immensely detailed account of Albertini 1952-1957 (3 vols.). 
8 There is no better indicator of Germany's aggressive intentions than the rapidity with which the 
Schlieffen Plan was implemented; following the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, 
Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914, and two days later on France 
9Grenville 1994, p. 95. 
1 0 For a detailed account of the protracted war of attrition that developed on the western front see "The 
Short War Illusion", Farrar 1973. 
I I For a concise outline of this critical battle see Grenville op. cit.. p. 105. 
1 2 For an older but still useful and thorough account of British and French strategy on the Western Front 
see Hart 1972 (first published in 1930). 
1 5 Berghahn 1973 provides a critical investigation into Germany's strategic approach to war and discusses 
how (he construction of a massive submarine fleet served mainly to draw the United States into the war. 
1 4 A more detailed assessment of "The Eastern Front" is provided by Stone 1975. 
1 5 Germany's invasion and exploitation of Poland is well recounted Roos 1966 for e.g. discusses the 
significance of the German routing in the overall "History of Modern Poland"; whereas Polonsky 1972 
examines the influence that the war-time exploitation had on Poland in the inlerwar period. 
1 6 Dedijcr 1967 details the Austrian invasion of Serbia from a Serbian point of view in his book entitled 
"The Road to Sarajevo". 
1 7 Hunt and Preston 1977. 
1 8 For further details on the armistice treaty see Grenville op. cit. 
1 9 Ibid 
2 0 For a chilling overview of the military and economic might that Germany had managed to retain 
following the First World War armistice and then consolidate prior to the Second World War see the 
introduction in Rich 1973-1974. 
2 1 Lytlelton 1988 has prepared a thorough study into the rise of "Fascism in Italy" between 1919 and 
1929 In this study he attributes much of the blame for the astonishing post-war rise of popularity in this 
phenomenon to the harsh conditions of the armistice. Gallo's "Mussolini's Italy" also provides a useful 
and critical insight jnto the domestic political turmoil which resulted from the rise of Italian Fascism 
(1973). 
2 2 For a classic account of the Russian Revolution see Chamberlin 1965 (first published 1935). For a 
more contemporary "rethink" on the scale of the event and massive human losses which have frequently 
been overlooked see Acton 1990. 
2 3 Parker op. ciL, p. 130. 
2 4 Tucker 1990 discusses the effect that the 'trickle down effect' that the Bolshevik Revolution ("The 
Revolution from Above") had on the rest of Europe in the interwar years. 
2 5 Pridham 1973 refers to Hitler's rise to power as being meteoric. 
2 6 One recent article that, although it presents a rather favourable view of Italy's military efforts, is 
particularly informative on Italy's annexation of Ethiopia is Sadkovich 1991. 
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Sec Rich op. cit. (introduction). 
; x Ibid. 
2 9 For a more detailed investigation into the reasons which drove Stalin to sign the non-aggression pact 
Willi Russia see Harrison 1985. which discusses "Soviet Planning in Peace and War. 1938-1945". 
3 0 The brutality with whicli Germany invaded Poland is cited by some historians as having pushed the 
Wcsi's tolerance to the lirni! and thus being a turning point in the course of the war, sec for e.g. Parker op 
cit.. p H i 
3 1 For further information on the overrunning of Denmark and Norway and, for thai matter, Germany's 
other military operations in Scandinavia seeZiemke 1960. 
3 2 Cecil 1975 acknowledges this when examining "Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941" and Weinberg 
1972 draws similar conclusions when investigating relations between "Germany and the Soviet Union, 
1939-1941". 
3 3 Obviously there were other blunders but these were the oversights which I believe provide the most 
useful summary of Hitler's faOure. 
3 4 For a thorough account of Britain's stubborn refusal to concede defeat sec Calder 1971. 
3 5 Tw o of the best general surveys of the fighting between Germany and Russia and a thorough 
explanation of how the former overstretched its logistical support see Ziemke 1968 and 1987, and 
Erickson 1975 and 1983. 
3 6 The immediate antecedents of Germany's declaration of war on the USA. specifically the Pearl Harbour 
attack, are illuminated by Ike 1967. 
3 7 Heinrichs 1988 is the authoritative text on "American Entry into World War H" 
3 X These final and resounding successes of the Anglo-American Alliance (A "Very Special Relationship") 
are best recounted by Danchev 1986. 
3 9 Parker op. cit. p. 133. 
4 0 For the Pacific War, Morton 1962 has produced an excellent one volume introduction. 
For further information on this concluding act Giovannitti and Freed 1967 have written an intriguing 
commentary on "The Decision to Drop the Bomb". 
4 2 For further details of this well recounted earlier geopolitical role Malta had taken on see; 
Schcrmerhorn 1929; Bradford 1961, or Porter 1858 for a more romantic account. 
4 3 Ibid. 
4 4 The only obvious exception to this being Gabriele 1965. which is acknowledged as an essential piece of 
work on the central role of Malta in Mediterranean strategy. 
4 5 In the years leading up to the First World War annual defence spending was reduced by around 
£400 000 (Owen 1969, 66). Furthermore, as a result of the impoverished state of the islands and their 
dependency on the British fleet and garrison a Commission was forced to recommend a number of 
practical measures, including lowering the bread lax raising the tobacco and alcohol tax, investigating 
government spending and letting Malta off with its annual military payment of £5 000 (Ibid). 
4 6 Most of the strikes were led by the dockyard workers; see Blouet 1992, p. 180 
4 7 Unemployed workers were mainly responsible for the rioting and looting that broke out in Valletta. 
When the police lost control, troops were called in and three Maltese were killed in the fighting which 
ensued (Owen op. cil., p. 67). 
4 8 Blouet op. cit. 
4 9 Financial grants in the form of a one-off payment of £ 250 000 were used to facilitate the introduction 
of the new National Assembly. In addition to this Britain provided a number of other subsidies, most 
notably bread subsidies which amounted to some £ 4000 per week in 1920. The economic problems and 
other matters relating to the introduction of the National .Assembly are discussed in greater detail in 
Charlton 1960. 
5 0 Nominated members represented the nobility, the clergy , the trade unions, the chamber of commerce 
and university graduates (Ibid.). 
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Anglo/Maltese relationships were to take can be found in Amen 1953. Broadly speaking the terra, which 
can also be spelled di-archy. means literally twice/double leadership/government 
- 2 For an account of this relatively smooth period in .Anglo/Maltese relations in the run up to the Second 
World War see Luke 1954. 
5 3 The authoritative text on Maltese society, past and present, is Sultana 1995 See also Vassallo 1974 
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5 4 Ibid. 
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will be touched on several times throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
5 6 See section 6.2, where it is shown that propinquity not only contributes to Malta's present day 
geopolitical vulnerability but also creates a number of administrative inefficiencies. 
5 7 For a thorough account of the political influences that both Ttaly and (in more detail) Britain exerted on 
Malta after the First World War see Bugeja 1973. 
5 8 The emergence of Malta's first organized political parties is in Austin 1971. pp 7-12 
5 9 Dobie 1967 traced the foundation of the Labour Party to this date. His book is one of the few available 
sources on the origins of political parties in Malta. 
6 0 Ibid. 
6 1 Blouetop. cit.. p. 183. 
6 2 Dobic op. cii. 
6 3 Ibid 
6 4 For a detailed account of this dispute see Blouet op. cit.. p. 185. 
6 5 Dobie op. cii. 
6 6 Ibid. 
6 7 This particular Commission and the subsequent restoration of the Constitution are both discussed in 
Blouet op. cit.. pp. 186-187. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to argue that in this instance the 
Constitution was restored too early. 
6 8 Dobie op. cii. 
6 9 The caution with which the British had to treat this matter and Maltese fears of an assault by Protestant 
Britain on their religious institutions is alluded to by Blouet op. cii., p. 187. 
7 0 In addition to the tactical measures that the Admiralty described, plans were laid to distribute gas 
masks, set up refugee camps in Gozo, establish air-raid shelters and protect art treasures. See Blouet op. 
cii., p. 188. 
7 1 Blouet writes that, following 1936, "there developed a time of relative tranquillity in which moderate 
men on all sides tended to become more influential", op. cit., p. 188. 
7 2 See Dobie op. cit. for a thorough account of the achievements of Sir Charles Bonham-Carter. 
7 3 Blouel op. cit. 
7 4 Although the fact that the Chief Justice was an Italian sympathiser was significant, particularly since 
the British were keen to divide Maltese law from its Italian roots, the real objection was that as well as 
being the Chief of Justice he was also an active political figure; a dangerous dual occupation in any society 
but especially in a one as small as Malta's. Dobie op. cit 
7 5 For Bonham-Carter's failure to diversify the islands' economy see Blouet op. cit. 
7 6 I refer here to the prevarication by senior officers in the British Armed Forces and certain colonial 
administrators, which severely hindered Malta's preparations for war and ultimately her ability to defend 
herself. 
7 7 Taken from Hughes 1969. 
7 8 Heavy air attack was thought an inevitable prospect if Italy were to join the war since Sicily was only 
sixty miles and thirty minutes flying time away. See Dobie op. cit. 
7 9 For a discussion on the debate over Malta's strategic worth on the eve of the Second World War see 
Blouet op. cii.. 
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8 0 Luke op. cit. 
8 1 See Gilchrist 1945; the standard work on Malta's defences at the outset and throughout Hie Second 
World War. 
8 2 Even at Ibis early stage defeat was a distinct possibility and detailed plans for an Axis invasion of Malta 
had been made. Gabrielc op. cit. has examined these plans 
8 3 Thin-chin 1962. 
8 4 Macintyre 1964. 
8 5 The human costs of operating from the islands are well documented. In addition to this, however. 
Busuttil 1965 has provided a useful investigation into the economic costs of Malta's involvement in the 
Second World War. 
8 6 Whereas a soldier on active service was supposed to be fed 4000 calorics a day, he was fortunate to gel 
2000 in Malta. The civil population was even worse off, with adult male workers receiving on average 
1600 calories and women, 1500: See Blouei op. cit.. p. 208. 
8 7 Blouel op. cit 
8 8 Owen op. cit., p. 80. 
^ I b i d 
9 0 Taken from Luke op. cit., p. 191. 
9 1 A plan had been devised whereby German paratroopers and Italian commandos were to invade Malla in 
June 1942. But tl»e Italians, nervous of failure, asserted that the available forces were insufficient and the 
plan was cancelled in favour of an assaull on Crete: See Weinberg 1994, p. 227. 
9 2 Owen op. cit., p. 81. 
9 3 Owen op. cil. p. 73, refers to this episode in Malta's history as the "Greater Siege" and Blouet op. cit. p. 
192, believes that the Siege Malta underwent in W W II was probably more important to the western 
world than the previous siege of 1565. 
9 4 The above paragraphs have covered the details and facts of Malta's experiences throughout the war. 
For a realistic, although fictitious, flavour of the stresses of life in the islands during the war see 
Monsarrat 1973. 
9 5 Owen op. cil. p 92. 
9 6 Haushofer (the main instigator of Germany's war-time geopoliiik) himself argued, in a last ditch 
attempt to exonerate himself, that German geopolitics had "goals quite similar to American geopolitics", 
quoting the work of E. Walsh 194.3 in particular. See OTuathail op. cit.. 
9 7 Holdar 1992. 
9 8 Mattern 1942. 
9 9 Dorpalen 1942 lias provided the best English investigation into Haushofer's most important works. 
1 0 0 Ibid. 
1 0 1 For a more thorough review of I laushofer's academic career see O'Tuathail 1997. 
1 0 2 Ibid, p. 46. 
1 0 3 O'Loughlin 1994, pp. 112-113. 
1 0 4 Ibid. 
1 0 5 See O'Tuathail op. cit. for further details on Operation Barbarossa and how this contradicted the 
wishes of Haushofer 
1 0 6 Parker covers his career more thoroughly than is possible here. See Parker op. cit., pp. 113-115. 
1 0 7 See references. 
l 0 8 Spykman 1945. 
1 0 9 Ibid. 
1 1 0 I refer to the dispute between the various arms of the British military and British politicians over 
Malta's usefulness in the light of advances in air power prior to the Second World War (discussed in 
section 2.2). 
1 1 1 See Hughes op. cil. 
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1 1 2 Owen op. cil. p. 73. refers to this episode in Malta's history as the "Greater Siege" and Blouet op cit. 
p. 192, believes that the Siege Malta underwent in W.W.I I was probably more important to the western 
world than the previous siege of 1565 
1 1 3 Bradford 1962 is the most notable exception to this observation. 
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CASHING IN ON T H E BIPOLAR ORDER: M A L T A 1945-1989 
The bipolar geopolitical world order which dominated world affairs for almost half-a-
cenrury (1945-1989) is more commonly known as the Cold War. The seeds o f the bipolar 
order which constituted the Cold War had already been sown prior to the end o f the 
Second World War at the 1944 conference in Yalta 1. It is the date o f this conference 
which is taken as the starting point o f the third phase o f Malta's international political 
history. Therefore, strictly speaking there is no transition period between phase two and 
phase three On a wider-world scale, the anarchy o f phase two was replaced immediately 
by the antagonism of phase three. To the majority o f those engaged in forms o f 
geopolitical thought, who viewed the world through political realism, this unbroken 
transition from anarchy to antagonism was seen as inevitable since the geopolitical mosaic 
o f competing units which they saw as constituting the globe was in their eyes incapable o f 
producing anything other than variants on a theme o f competition and confrontation. For 
the first time, however, such pessimism was being challenged. A new group o f theorists, 
disenchanted with the cynicism inherent in political realism, were offering an alternative 
way o f interpreting the world's geopolitical space and, more importantly, decision-makers 
from various spheres were receptive to the alternatives that were being put forward 2 . 
Through promoting their alternative world view and developing new international 
institutions and legal processes, this new group o f geopolitical thinkers genuinely believed 
that together they could resolve international conflicts peacefully and prevent future 
world-wide war. Hence, the appellation "idealism" arose because its adherents sought to 
change the world for the better, rather than merely describe and investigate it as it was. 
126 
PHASE 3 
Because o f their relationship with one o f the two superpowers, their geographical 
location, or their world standing, some states were unavoidably subsumed in the realities 
o f the evolving bipolar confrontation For such states idealism hardly offered a viable way 
o f interpreting world affairs. To others, however, idealism did represent a feasible and 
workable alternative to traditional realist approaches to state governance. Whether 
consciously or not, Malta was one o f the states that opted for this alternative. 
This chapter thus investigates the phase in Malta's international political history in which 
she essentially practised idealism in the face o f the realism o f the bipolar geopolitical world 
order. Once again, for the sake o f drawing comparisons, this chapter follows the same 
format as the others. Thus, first o f all it examines the most significant happenings and 
attributes o f the wider-world throughout this stage in history f rom a geopolitical 
perspective. Following on from this, Malta's place in the wider-world bipolarism is probed 
and the policy responses to wider world developments that shaped this place are 
examined. The story o f how Malta gradually worked towards the ideal o f freedom from 
outside impositions or intervention is told, describing along the way how the islanders 
freed themselves o f British involvement in their own affairs and eventually discarded their 
dangerous dependency on British defence spending whilst simultaneously cashing in on 
their new role as a neutral micro-state in the midst o f the bipolar confrontation. Finally, 
the third section draws a number o f more theoretical conclusions about the type o f 
geopolitical thinking which led Maltese leaders to take charge from the British o f their 
own national affairs and then go on to govern their country more or less independently 
throughout this phase in history 
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3.1 T H E W I D E R W O R L D : B A L A N C E A N D ORDER T H R O U G H T E R R O R 
Out o f the three ingredients {anarchy, force and desperation) which it was argued in 
section 2.1 had shaped the world throughout the last phase3 only one continued to be 
relevant in this, the third phase o f global geopolitical development. Anarchy and 
desperation had no place in the strategies o f the two superpowers as they contrived to 
split the world along calculated ideological lines However, further technological 
advances-1 meant that force continued to feature heavily in the strategies that shaped and 
divided the wider-world. Crucially, the force utilized throughout this phase was more 
latent than kinetic since rather than being put to destructive use it was intended only to 
generate an underlying and pervasive sense o f teiTor. Such an air o f terror was easily 
propagated since the technological advances were mainly in the field o f atomic weaponry 
and their destructive potential had already been exhibited to the world when the US 
bombed Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and Nagasaki three days later5. 
This section first describes how this air o f terror came into being. I t then goes on to 
investigate the order that it seemed, perhaps somewhat ironically, to impose on global 
affairs even through varying degrees o f entente and detente. Finally, it ends by examining 
how the resulting "balance o f terror" eventually reached fever pitch before ending, in 
realist terms at least, in victory for the most persistent contender, the US. 
Much o f the literature on the Cold War designates the Soviet blockade o f Berlin in the 
summer o f 1948 as the starting point o f the bipolar confrontation 6. To adopt such an 
approach, however, is to detract f rom the significance o f the role that the now renowned 
Yalta conference had in actuating the Cold War Thus, at the outset the decision to define 
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the starting point o f this phase as being early February 1945, the date o f the conference 
(more precisely 4-1 I February), needs justifying and the significance o f the conference 
needs reiterating 
In short, it was at Yalta that the western Allies made the critical decision, albeit 
reluctantly, to allow Soviet control o f eastern Europe after the end o f the Second World 
War 7. This decision was to prove especially significant to the stand-otf that ensued since, 
amongst other things, it defined the frontier along which the Cold War was eventually 
'fought' 8 Furthermore, it is possible to argue that i f the western Allies had not agreed to 
such concessions the Soviet leaders would have been unable to muster requisite territories, 
resources or manpower to present a credible second super-power in the bipolar 
confrontation which followed. In short, i f there had been no concessions to communism 
at the Yalta conference there probably would not have been a Cold War. Nonetheless, 
there had been a conference and shortly after the defeat o f the Axis powers the spread o f 
communism commenced. The defeat o f Germany, Italy and Japan in the Second World 
War meant that, in ideological terms at least, this spreading communism was pitted against 
western capitalism. Since France and Britain had been severely weakened by their war 
efforts, the major remaining bastions o f the above opposing ideologies, the USSR and 
USA, respectively, soon emerged as the only two 'superpowers'. Hence, in many respects 
the 'Cold War' was an inevitable sequel to the 'Hot War' o f 1941-1945 with the Yalta 
conference representing the most significant break between the two phases. 
From the perspective o f the USSR, they themselves had borne the brunt o f the 'Hot War'. 
Prior to 1944 the Soviets had single-handedly faced the German army in Europe and as a 
result o f this experienced the heaviest losses9 o f any Allied country. For these losses the 
Soviets blamed the strategic delaying tactics adopted by the western Allies, which had 
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meant that a second front was not opened until 1944H ). It is therefore not especially 
surprising that in the aftermath of the Second World War the communist policy makers 
were left both resentful and distrusting o f the West. Such feelings engendered both a 
conviction that the Soviet Union had earned a place amongst the world powers by virtue 
o f its sacrifice and a determination that the new international order would afford the 
USSR access to sea routes, economic resources and, above all else, a substantial defensive 
buffer 1 1 Initially, confrontation with the USA was centred around Eastern Europe. From 
the point o f view of the Soviets the enunciation o f the Truman Doctrine (1947) 1 2 , the 
implementation o f the Marshall Plan (1947) 1 3 and the creation o f the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949) 1 4 were all threatening acts aimed at them 1 5 . The 
Soviets then felt compelled to respond accordingly. 
They did so, first o f all, by setting up the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 
1947 1 6. It was at the inception o f Cominform that the Soviet delegate Zhdanov first 
conceptualised the two-camp interpretation o f the geopolitical world or the bipolar world 
order' 7. He saw the division between the two camps, one being imperialist and anti-
democratic and the other being democratic and anti-imperialist, as being marked by mutual 
hostility and confrontation. Furthermore, with a cynicism that was to dominate Soviet 
geopolitical perceptions until Stalin's death, he viewed the USSR as a besieged camp 
hemmed in by non-communist forces' 8. Zhdanov's oration at the inception o f Cominform 
and the subsequent dissemination o f the two-camp world view led the Soviet Union to 
tighten its grip on Eastern Europe 1 9. It was to this end that the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecom) was set up in 1949 with the stated aim o f hauling the 
satellite states o f Eastern Europe further into the Soviet orbi t 2 0 . Puppet communist 
governments were set up so as to repress any civil unrest, a task which they pursued with 
vigour following the 1948 defection o f Yugoslavia from the communist camp 2 1. 
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Following the formation o f N A T O in 1949, particularly after West Germany elected to 
join, the Soviet Union became aware o f the need to tighten its grip on Eastern Europe in 
more ways than just through the economic terms set out in Comecom. Having ended the 
US monopoly o f nuclear weapons and carried out successful tests on thermo-nuclear 
(hydrogen) bombs 2 2, Stalin was sufficiently equipped to incorporate eastern Europe into 
some kind o f formal military agreement also. This was done in the form o f the Warsaw 
Pact o f 1955 which was set up directly to counter the formation o f NATO in the West. 
By this time confrontation had developed from being primarily over central and eastern 
Europe into being a more global confrontation and in Asia Cold War moved to real war. 
The US interpreted the Korean War (1950-1953) as evidence o f a world-wide communist 
conspiracy, and American policy became almost obsessively concerned with the 
'containment' o f communism by a series o f encircling alliances23. The formation o f N A T O 
was followed by the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 2 4 and the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 195 5 2 5 . Moreover, the US maintained over 
1400 foreign bases, including 275 bases for nuclear bombers, in 31 countries around the 
Soviet perimeter 2 6. 
The early days o f the Cold War, however, were not solely about overt displays o f force. 
British and American archives have revealed some o f the most bizarre schemes ever 
planned by western secret services. One o f the most intriguing was the planned 
restoration o f King Zog to the throne o f Albania 2 7 . O f particular interest, Malta was to be 
utilised heavily in this clandestine manoeuvre, which was intended to trigger a wave o f 
hostility against pro-Russian governments in the Balkans. Although Albanian exiles were 
actually landed they were quickly rounded up and executed and so understandably the 
plans faltered at an early stage 2 8 Several other operations did, nevertheless, pass beyond 
their preparatory stages but generally speaking most fell well short o f achieving their aims. 
131 
PHASE 3: WIDER WORLD GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE 
Other supposed operations were concocted by the Soviets as the confrontation took on a 
petty and propagandist form which was with hindsight especially dangerous when one 
considers what was actually at stake 2 9. The propaganda war was at risk o f escalating into 
more severe confrontation when on 5 March 1953 Stalin's death signalled a new stage in 
this period o f history 
With Stalin's death came a change in Soviet foreign policy. There followed a three-year 
period after which Khrushchev emerged as the leader. With this new appointment came a 
new-look foreign policy, the principles o f which were outlined at the celebrated Twentieth 
Congress o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union in 1956 3 0. Broadly speaking, 
emphasis was to be placed on peaceful co-existence with the West and Zhdanov's two-
camp thesis was for all intents and purposes to be abandoned31. This sweeping change in 
the way that the geopolitics o f the wider-world were interpreted was inspired more by the 
realisation that there would be no survivors following a full-scale atomic war than by any 
sudden compunction 3 2. It was decided to place an emphasis on the periphery and the 
crude dichotomy o f for and against, capitalist and communist, was abandoned3 3. 
Socialism could be expedited by aiding nationalist movements that were not avowedly 
communist 3 4. The entire process o f decolonization was opening up new opportunities for 
change in the balance o f world forces and the Soviet Union hoped to gain from these 
changes. Thus, in many respects, the new look foreign policy was less tantamount to a 
concession than it was to a compromise based on a reassessment o f geopolitical realities. 
The compromise was initially signalled by the setting up o f more equitable economic 
arrangements within Comecom. This thaw in eastern Europe 3 5 had the effect o f giving 
nationalist communists in Poland the chance to gain control in 1956. Their more liberal 
counterparts in Hungary, however, were deemed too great a threat to the Soviets and a 
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series o f nationalist uprisings were brutally crushed there in 1956 3 6. Following on from 
this, Communist leaders sought to regain a tighter form o f control over eastern Europe 
This tightening o f control was an inevitable consequence o f the contradictions that existed 
in the Soviet's new-look, post-Stalin, foreign policy Above all else, the pursuit o f co-
existence with the West was not compatible with the aiding o f socialism throughout the 
world By compromising or accommodating the West the Soviets were failing to aid or 
uphold the socialist cause3 7 
The socialist cause and expansionist policy o f the USSR finally floundered when in 1962 
Khrushchev backed down from the Cuba stand-off This stand-off, with its real threat o f 
nuclear holocaust, proved a turning point in the Cold War 3 8 . In short, in this particular 
instance the Soviets had been forced into neglecting one of their most valued satellites 
There follows a brief outline o f the series o f events which constituted this vital twist in the 
deepening bipolar order 3 9. 
Castro had come into power in Cuba in 1959 on the wave o f a popular rebellion against 
the corrupt regime o f Bastita. Castro's agrarian reforms were o f concern to US capitalists 
at the outset but when Cuba signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in February 
1960 the USA was compelled to respond by severing trade links. With Cuba now firmly 
established within the socialist camp, the US government were to take things one 
significant step further In 1961 the Central Intelligence Agency (CLA)-inspired Bay o f 
Pigs invasion attempted to topple Castro and eject the socialist government. Although 
this attempt failed i t sent clear signals to the USSR about the lengths to which the USA 
was willing to go to challenge the global expansion o f communism. Initially, the Soviets, 
neither impressed nor intimidated by the US tactics, agreed to provide protection for 
Cuba, which did after all present them with an excellent strategic foot-hold in the West. 
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On 14 October 1962, the US president was informed o f the presence o f nuclear missiles in 
Cuba President Kennedy responded by imposing a naval quarantine to thwart any further 
importations o f technology or armaments. The bipolar order which the balance o f terror 
had imposed on the world was at its most fragile and closest to breaking-point and as 
many a commentator since has noted, "the world held its breath" 4 0. Fortunately the 
balance remained intact and, after numerous diplomatic exchanges, on 28 October 
Khrushchev announced that the weapon systems would be stripped and shipped back to 
the Soviet Union. In return, Kennedy agreed to remove some US missile sites from 
Turkey. However, these concessions by the US were o f minor significance and for the 
Soviet Union this perceived failure marked a great setback, less in her relationship with the 
West, which was soon mended, but more in so far as her standing in the socialist camp 
was concerned Soviet vulnerability and inferiority to US missile power had been 
demonstrated and further credence had been given to the Chinese argument that the Soviet 
Union was a mere "paper tiger" 4 1 Nevertheless, the wider-world beyond the two 
superpowers could breath again, relieved that sanity had prevailed and the world had not 
this time, as in 1939, been plunged into a phase o f ideologically driven devastation. 
Above all else, the Cuban missile crisis had highlighted to the world that the logic o f 
nuclear strategy was fundamentally flawed. Both sides had depended on policies o f 
massive retaliation which effectively amounted to mutual assured destruction ( M A D ). It 
was the realisation that the strategic reasoning behind these policies was truly M . A . D . 4 2 
and that the world had come so close to obliteration led the superpowers to seek means 
and ways o f limiting the spread o f nuclear weapons It led to a partial test-ban treaty in 
1963 and a nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1968. Although not all nuclear or potential 
nuclear powers signed these agreements (notably France, China and India) and others 
(such as Iraq) later renegaded on their commitments, commentators began to herald the 
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coming of a period o f detente4 3 This, the first in a series o f detentes was still marked by 
direct intervention by the two superpowers; US military involvement in Vietnam continued 
and the Soviets, invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 to put down the "Prague Spring" 4 4 which 
had threatened to topple communist party dominance. Nevertheless, in terms o f USA-
USSR relations detente marked the growth o f both the rhetoric and practice o f peaceful 
co-existence 
The tension between the two superpowers was reduced and the threat o f direct 
confrontation seemed to be diminishing. In terms o f respective geopolitical strategies this 
was certainly the case. In so far as US strategy was concerned there was a notable 
reduction in direct foreign intervention. This was mainly a policy response to the post-
Vietnam domestic political scene. US citizens had become increasingly unsupportive o f 
their country's global fight in support o f other countries against communism, particularly 
when, as in the case o f Vietnam, their troops were not dying fighting the Soviets but 
merely their puppet soldiers who were fighting a proxy war 4 5 Although US policy on 
foreign intervention was cut, trade patterns and aid disbursements continued to maintain 
the position o f pro-US elites in most countries o f Central and South America and Asia. In 
so far as the USSR was concerned, their policies also seemed to be aimed at reducing 
tension. However, the latter years o f the period o f detente saw an increase in the global 
capacity o f the USSR 4 6 . Not subject to the same levels o f public influence as US 
politicians, the communist leaders were quicker to forget the scare o f the Cuban missile 
crisis. Nuclear parity with the USA was achieved in the early 1970s and the Soviets used 
this capacity to aid socialist movements in Africa, where US involvement was minimal 4 7 . 
In Ethiopia, for example, the Soviet Union aided the revolution and helped the Ethiopians 
fend-off the Somalians in the invasion o f Ogaden. In addition to this, Soviet airlifts 
enabled Angola to contain the mercenary forces and counter-revolutionaries from South 
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Afr ica 4 8 . Finally, and most notably although not on the African sub-continent, Afghanistan 
had been in receipt o f massive sums o f Soviet aid since 1956 4 9 In 1978 a small urban-
based, predominantly middle-class, communist party overthrew the Daoud regime The 
coup probably owed more to the domestic tensions within Afghan society than to Soviet 
aid or expansionism. However, Soviet communist leaders were grateful for a socialist 
neighbour and Moscow showed no hesitation in stepping up economic and military 
assistance to the new government Despite this support, the new regime soon ran into 
trouble. The counter-revolutionaries were, initially at least, well organized and received 
aid from Pakistan, Iran and China. The new regime, on the other hand, was dogged by in-
fighting and with its growing repression soon lost what little support it had had. As 
factional fighting broke out the internal situation deteriorated and in December 1979 the 
Soviets waded in replacing Amin (the leader o f the regime) with their choice o f leader 
Babrak Karmal. The troubles that followed were widely covered by the international 
media and this coverage was used by the West as a rationale for the increased military 
expenditure which in turn signalled the re-commencement o f the Cold War 5 0 
In summary, the initial refusal o f France, China and India to participate in the two treaties 
o f the 1960s and later the Soviet's reluctance to lessen their role as sponsor o f global 
socialism had meant that the period o f detente was brought to an end 5 1 . In addition to 
this, a number o f factors meant that the US was ready for a resumption o f the 
confrontation: Powerful economic interests had to be protected, the arms lobby hated the 
business vacuum o f detente5 2 and the conservative-nationalist backlash in the wake o f 
events in I ran 5 3 and Afghanistan all propelled the USA into what has been referred to as 
the "Second Cold War" 5 4 . 
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The build-up o f Soviet arms was seen as a direct threat by the USA. In turn, increased 
military expenditure by the new Reagan administration in the early 1980s gave added 
weight to those in the Kremlin arguing for more resources to be devoted to defence As 
both superpowers responded to the build-up o f the other's arsenal there was a steady 
escalation in nuclear weaponry and the dialogue o f detente was replaced by rougher 
rhetoric about competition. Within the USA, economic factors clearly featured heavily as 
the hugely powerful military related industries undoubtedly influenced policy-making 5 5 In 
addition to economic factors, nationalistic sentiments also played a part since through 
clever manipulation o f the western media they were effectively used to justify the USA's 
possession and right to use nuclear weapons 5 6 Within the Soviet Union on the other 
hand, a different set o f factors spurred the continual build-up o f arms stockpiles. One has 
to take into account the fact that since 1917 the Soviet Union had been fearful o f attack 
and subsequently been placed on an almost permanent war-footing. Developments in the 
international scene were responded to by military rote and the defence forces created to 
deal with the perceived western threat built up their own momentum. Although economic 
factors alone did not feature as highly in a communist society the inert presence o f the 
massive Soviet military-industrial complex was strong enough to influence policy 
decisions5 7 
The rapidity with which the two superpowers were constructing their nuclear arsenals 
meant that neither was able to reflect fully on the potential repercussions o f their policies. 
By the 1980s both countries were investing the main part o f their budgets 5 8 into their 
nuclear projects and had the ability to destroy most o f human life on the planet. Although 
this potential was daunting it did effect a certain restraint over their actions 5 9. The Polish 
crisis o f 1980-1981 lasted far longer than the Czech crisis o f 1968, but at no time did the 
US seriously challenge the Soviet sphere o f influence in Eastern Europe. The Iran-Iraq 
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War raged for almost a decade from 1980 yet despite the well publicised use o f chemical 
weapons and the escalation o f world oil prices both superpowers showed immense 
restraint. 
To summarise, the last decade o f the Cold War is evidence that, as the title o f this section 
suggests, the wider-world had effectively become constrained and ordered through a 
balance o f terror. The extent o f the bipolar order, with the majority o f the northern 
hemisphere aligned to one o f the superpowers, is illustrated in figure 5: 
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The balance of terror depicted in figure 5 undoubtedly varied in its level o f intensity but, 
following successive periods o f entente and detente and ongoing technological 
developments in nuclear weaponry, by the early 1980s it was at its most delicate. 
Although the prospect o f a bipolar confrontation between East and West had been talked 
o f prior to t he end o f the Second World War neither the balance nor the order that would 
eventually derive from it were anticipated. Indeed, it was not until the bipolar balance was 
dismantled that some of its more positive derivatives were appreciated or even fully 
realised. However, this is touching on the focus o f the next chapter and at the close o f 
this section it suffices to say that this period in history was characterised by a world which, 
although never as free from regional instabilities, had never before come so close to 
experiencing absolute armageddon. Whether it had been the intention o f the two 
superpowers or not, this relative lack o f sub-global scale wars together with the very real 
prospect o f armageddon combined to impose one o f the most rigid phases o f order on the 
world that modern history has known. 
3.2 P R A C T I C A L IDEALISM IN T H E F A C E O F G L O B A L R E A L I S M : 
MALTA'S P L A C E IN T H E WIDER BIPOLAR G E O P O L I T I C A L WORLD 
O R D E R (1945-1989). 
Considering the proliferation o f long-range nuclear weaponry, which was the main 
defining theme in the Cold War wider-world, it becomes all too easy to conclude that the 
strategic significance o f locations such as Malta had waned almost overnight. However, 
when jumping to such conclusions one has to be cautious. Although throughout this 
phase in history barely any location continued to possess innate strategic significance in 
the traditional sense, few areas o f the globe escaped the designs o f the superpowers in a 
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more sinister sense From Malta's point o f view this meant that whilst she was no longer 
of much importance as a colonial outpost or wartime fortress her perceived alignment to 
either East or West remained o f relevance As it turned out Malta turned her hack on the 
emerging bipolar world which, under a heady influence o f political realism, was 
partitioning between two competing camps. Although their motivations are debatable, 
Malta's post-war political leaders and policy makers instead launched a steady drive 
towards self-determination and eventual neutrality and non-alignment In time, this drive 
witnessed Malta forging relationships with various states on either side o f the partition but 
crucially the main intention was always to strengthen Malta's autonomy. This effectively 
meant that Malta evolved into an active member o f the developing global non-aligned and 
neutral movement, avoiding any relationship o f dominance which may have implicated her 
in a biased manner with one superpower or the other. 
In the sense that these newly emerging non-aligned and neutral states were advocating and 
exercising an alternative to the realist-like political confrontation that most o f the rest o f 
the world was involved in, their policies can be thought o f as having been idealist based 
policies. Hence, the title o f this section which implies that even in the face o f the rigid 
political realism which had compounded the wider world throughout this phase in history, 
Maltese political leaders and decision makers, whether intentionally or not, were 
essentially engaged in a form o f idealism. 
Following on from the last section, which investigated the wider-world geopolitical setting 
in which realist-driven strategies and policies effected a situation o f bipolarism, this section 
tackles the mode o f idealism which shaped Malta's geopolitical development for the 
duration o f the Cold War. It elucidates the main events and policy moves that affected 
Malta's international relations for the four decades which followed the Second World War. 
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By doing so it justifies the assertion (made indirectly in the title) that Malta's geopolitics 
(or place in the wider world) throughout phase three o f her geopolitical development was 
dominated by the manifestation o f a practical mode o f idealism 
By the end o f the Second World War, Malta had a relatively healthy economy and a 
relatively large accumulation o f capital Throughout the war imports were cut drastically 
and wages had risen steadily as a result o f increasingly generous service departments6 0. 
However, the air o f prosperity merely disguised the same inherited economic 
vulnerabilities that had de-stabilised Malta repeatedly throughout her history. The islands 
had once again played an important role in wider-world events but the Maltese economy 
remained geared towards the occupying power's defence needs and this wartime boom 
was, like those previously, to prove only transient6 1 With the advent o f nuclear warfare 
and the creation o f N ATO few could foresee any future strategic role for the islands likely 
to open another chapter in their turbulent history 
The dockyard 6 2 and other military installations, which had made economic sense in a wider 
imperial context, had become wholly disproportionate within Malta alone 6 3. The 
continued survival o f the islands depended on economic diversification and the attainment 
o f a greater level o f self-sufficiency. In the immediate post-war years the most obvious 
and clear-cut solution to the impending problem was to strive towards the ideal o f political 
independence. The islanders had striven for this ideal previously (as outlined in section 
1.2) but their efforts had been placed on standby with the commencement o f the Second 
World War. By 1943, however, when good Anglo-Maltese relations were at a peak, the 
British had pledged to revive plans for internal self-government on the assumed victory 6 4 . 
The Maltese National Assembly had already been created when a commission was sent out 
from Britain to begin work on a new constitution. This new constitution came into force 
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in September 1947 and restored a dyarchal form of rule in which an elected Legislative 
Assembly with forty members was empowered to make laws, "for peace, order, and good 
government o f Malta" 6 5 . A cabinet o f not more than eight ministers, including the Prime 
Minister, was responsible to the Assembly. However, the Assembly's powers were 
fundamentally restricted since certain areas o f policy were to remain the responsibility o f 
the Imperial Government o f Mal ta 6 6 As in the pre-war dyarchal system o f government 6 7 
areas such as defence, civil aviation, immigration, currency and nationality were judged by 
the British to be "matters touching the public safety or defence o f our dominions" 6 8. As 
Malta struggled towards self determination these reserved matters were destined to be the 
cause o f many Anglo-Maltese disputes. 
The first post-war elections under the new constitution were won by the Malta Labour 
Party (MLP) under Dr. Paul Boffa. The next eight years saw disagreements and political 
uncertainties split the Labour Party 6 9. Boffa headed a new party, 'The Malta Workers' 
Party,' whilst the original Labour Party, now led by Dominic M i n t o f f 7 0 , remained in power 
until the elections in 1950. The Nationalists took office after this election, first as a 
minority government under Dr. Enrico Mizzi , then in 1951 and 1953 under Dr. Giorgio 
Borg Olivier in alliance with the 'Malta Worker's Party' 7 ' . 
In 1953, encouraged partly by Malta's recent appointment as the host for NATO's 
Mediterranean Command Headquarters, the Nationalists proposed that Malta should 
attain dominion status. The British Government refused at this stage, stating that Malta 
remained overly dependent on their investment7 2. 
In February 1955 the MLP, under Dom. Mintoff , regained power. Almost immediately, 
Min to f f put forward certain proposals for Malta's literal integration into the British Isles 
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which the M L P had begun to advocate in the 1950-53 elections The British government 
replied by convening a Round Table Conference which concluded that, "representation at 
Westminster was practicable and reasonable,"73 but recommended that a referendum be 
held. A referendum, held on I I and 12 February 1956, showed that nearly half the 
population supported the integration proposals Choosing to overlook the Nationalist 
boycott o f the referendum 7 4, the British government accepted the integration plan but only 
on the premise that a general election be held in iMalla before final approval for 
representation would be given. Mintof f rejected this and insisted that his country deserved 
f i rm and clear guarantees o f financial help, without equivocation- Anglo-Maltese relations 
were cooling and the Labour Party vowed not to yield, declaring that they would insist on 
"immediate and ful l independence" i f integration was to f a i l 7 5 
By April 1958 a British proposal for a five year trial period was rejected and integration 
talks were abandoned completely 7 6 In the same month MintofFs government resigned 
after disputes about control o f the police force 7 7 The Nationalist Party refused to co-
operate and once again the constitution was suspended78. Rioting in Valletta led the 
Governor to declare a state o f emergency and take over administration. In 1960 a 
commission under Sir Hillary Blood proposed self-government, subject to consultation 
with Britain on certain questions7 9. The new constitution was accepted, with some 
objections to the British right o f veto, and came into force in 1962 8 0 
The Nationalist party won the elections in February o f that same year, with a considerable 
majority 8 1 Borg Olivier became Prime Minister o f the new 'State o f Mal t a ' 8 2 and almost 
immediately opened negotiations with the British Government for a final constitution and 
the grant o f independence. There was disagreement on a number o f issues, including the 
status o f the Church, Commonwealth membership and whether to become a republic or 
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monarchy, and it was decided to hold another referendum 8 3. Sixty-six thousand voted in 
favour o f independence and fifty-five thousand against, while thirty-six thousand abstained 
or spoiled their ballot papers8 4. Following further negotiations in Britain, the finer details 
on the constitution and on questions o f aid and defence were decided upon 8 5 British 
forces were to remain in Malta until 1974 and in return Britain would provide six hundred 
thousand Pound budgetary aid for 1964 and fifty-one million Pound over the next ten 
Malta became independent at midnight on 20 September 1964, and was to be governed, 
for the first time in its long history, by the Maltese themselves The final ceremony was 
performed by H R H The Duke o f Edinburgh, who declared: 
"And now, Mr. Prime-Minister, it fells to me to perform the concluding act of British 
Sovereignty in these Islands, as I present to you these Constitutional Instruments which 
87 
establish Malta's Independence Long may it endure." 
British ties were not severed completely and the islands remained within the 
Commonwealth, acknowledging the Queen as their head o f state. The Sovereign was 
represented by a Governor-General who performed many constitutional functions and the 
British government was represented by a High Commissioner. Malta remained within the 
geopolitical sphere o f the Western bloc, establishing close links with N A T O and Western 
Europe. These links led Beeley and Charlton to refer to this period in Malta's history as 
being a phase o f "dependent sovereignty"8 8. Indeed, during the Nationalists' years in 
office, Malta became a member o f the Council o f Europe (1965) and an associate member 
o f the European Economic Community (1970). 
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Early in 1967 the British government announced cut backs in military spending and 
drastically reduced the number o f jobs available to the Maltese on the defence 
installations8 9. The Governor-General. Sir Maurice Dorman (1964-1971), made a 
forthright speech which spelled out the damaging effects that such cut-backs were likely to 
have on Malta's economy Following on from this, Prime Minister Borg Olivier managed 
to persuade the British government that the Maltese needed more time to allow their 
development plans to generate more jobs. The British government commissioned a 
defence review by Duncan Sandys and in response to this review decided to slow down 
the timetable for reductions. Acting on the advice o f Duncan Sandys, they did however 
reserve the right to re-open negotiations should new employment fail to be created quickly 
enough. 
Although there was never a need to re-open negotiations and the British government 
appeared content with the implementation o f the economic diversification process, the 
electorate did become dissatisfied with the lack o f progress the Nationalists had made and 
their country* s continued dependency on British military spending 9 0 
In June 1971 Dom. Min to f f once again led the Malta Labour Party to victory in the 
general election and Immediately began to implement far-reaching changes. He stressed 
that Malta needed to reclaim her identity from years o f subservience and informed the 
British government that the mutual defence and assistance agreement o f 1964 would have 
to be radically revised in Malta's favour or risk cancellation 9 1. The islands' strategic 
position in the Mediterranean had convinced the Labour leadership that Malta could play 
an independent role with respect to both the West and East The re-negotiation o f the 
1964 defence treaty with Great Britain was the initial step towards the adoption o f a non-
aligned policy 9 2 . 
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Following talks, the UK and N A T O agreed to pay fourteen million Pounds per annum in 
return for a new seven-year agreement (1972-70) giving British forces use o f the facilities 
in Mal ta v t This policy of non-alignment was intended to rid the Maltese o f their 
traditional heavy dependence on British military spending and to help bring in economic 
aid without the burden o f alignment with either bloc The aid required to implement the 
"Development Plan for Malta (1973-1980)" soon arrived from sources as diverse as Italy, 
Great Britain, NATO, Libya 9 - 1 and China 9 5 In the words o f Dominic Fenech; 
"'non-alignment was paying in cash, so that Malta's development plans could proceed"96 . 
On 13 December 1974, the House of Representatives passed, by the necessary two thirds 
majority, acts which amended the 1964 constitution. Malta became a republic -
"Republika Ta' Malta" - within the Commonwealth and the Head o f State ceased to be the 
British Sovereign but instead became a President o f Maltese nationality who would be 
appointed by the House of Representatives for a five year term 9 7 . 
The next major development o f geopolitical significance occurred in 1976 when the 
Labour government proposed to declare the neutrality o f the new Republika Ta' Malta in 
return for a quadrilateral security guarantee and financial assistance from Italy, France, 
Algeria and Libya Following the departure o f the last British forces in March 1979, 
Malta entered into a bilateral agreement with Italy. By the terms o f this neutrality 
agreement, which entered into force in May 1981, Malta became a neutral state and Italy 
pledged to act as guarantor to this neutrality. The agreement provided for military 
assistance in case o f a threat to or violation o f Malta's neutrality and included a protocol 
concerning military, economic and technical assistance to Malta 9 8 . 
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In 1987 the twin concepts of neutrality and non-alignment were eventually incorporated 
into Malta's constitution However, unlike the concept o f neutrality adopted by countries 
such as Austria. Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Switzerland, Maltese neutrality involved an 
active connotation. At the outset Malta launched several initiatives aimed at promoting 
Mediterranean security and co-operation; most notably its insistence upon the eleventh 
hour insertion o f the Mediterranean clauses in the Helsinki Final A c t " ; and in its support 
for the Italian-Spanish Non-paper on a Conference for Security and Co-operation in the 
Mediterranean (CSCM) 1 0 0 . 
In summary, this was the stage in Malta's international political history in which the 
Maltese, for various different reasons, eventually took control o f their own affairs. Their 
immediate aim in the post-war years was to regain the level o f self-determination that they 
had become accustomed to prior to the war They did this through both the established 
National Assembly and the 1947 constitution. Then, in a step which was counter, but in 
time would prove crucial as a trigger to the move towards self-determination, Maltese 
leaders proposed that the islands should attain British dominion status. Following on from 
this and undeterred by Britain's rejection o f this proposal, the next government took a 
further important step and proposed that Malta should be fully integrated into the 
Westminster system o f government. These proposals too were effectively rejected by the 
British, so triggering a more spirited push towards Maltese self-determination. This push 
started with the acceptance o f a form o f self-government proposed by Britain. The 
Maltese, however, were never likely to be content with some o f the terms o f this system o f 
self-government, particularly after their proposals for closer integration with Britain had 
been snubbed by the Foreign Office and especially since this rebuff had been issued in the 
immediate aftermath o f Malta's courageous and costly war effort in service o f the British. 
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Reasoning such as this led Luke to conclude that Malta's post-war quest for independence 
was, initially at least, tantamount to, "a stick with which to hit the Bri t ish" 1 0 1 . In reality, 
however, the push towards self-determination was probably more calculated and the 
rationale behind it less to do with seeking revenge against the British for their post-war 
rebuff of Malta than it was to do with Malta's leaders spotting a potentially lucrative 
opening in the evolving wider-world order o f things. 
This opening that Malta's leaders and decision-makers had spotted not only presented 
them with a number o f potential economic benefits but also with the prospect o f existing 
in peace without becoming unnecessarily entangled in the disputes o f the superpowers. In 
other words it provided the Maltese with a compromise between attaining a practical level 
o f economic self-sufficiency and aspiring towards the ideal o f peace and freedom from 
military interference by outside powers. Thus, in the sense that fulfilling such a vacancy in 
the wider-world bipolarism presented economic benefits that would enhance the islanders' 
prosperity, it was 'practical'. Furthermore, however, in the sense that the opening 
presented Maltese leaders with an alternative to competition or participation in wider-
world geopolitical power games, it was, in a political sense, 'idealist'. Hence, by opting to 
f i l l this opening that had been presented to them in the emerging bipolarism, Maltese 
leaders were reacting to wider-world developments in both a 'practical' and 'idealist' 
manner, or to quote the term used in the title to this section, they were interpreting and 
responding to geopolitical developments through a form o f "practical idealism". It was 
through such "practical idealism" that the Maltese moved away from the intermediate 
situation o f dependent sovereignty, towards republican status and eventual non-alignment 
and neutrality. 
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In much the same way that the "perceptive realism" o f the first phase o f the history o f 
geopolitical thinking in Malta was merely a variation o f a more widespread way o f 
interpreting the world geopolitically, this "'practical idealism" of phase three was a 
remaking o f what was becoming a more common and extensive method o f geopolitical 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the theoretical underpinnings o f this new post-war 
methodology and how it influenced Malta's specific policy framework throughout the Cold 
War are matters that are dealt with in the next section. In the meantime, this section is 
best concluded by reiterating that phase three o f Malta's political history saw the Maltese 
take up control o f their own affairs for the first time through a blend o f idealist aims and 
practical politics 
3.3 " P R A C T I C A L I D E A L I S M " 
So that parallels can be drawn between the various phases in Malta's development this 
chapter follows the same format as the previous two. In the first section an investigation 
into the geopolitics o f the wider-world was conducted and it was shown that between the 
years 1945 and 1989 a state o f world bipolar order prevailed. Although the relationship 
between the two superpowers underwent successive phases o f entente and detente it 
always featured in, or indeed adumbrated, all other occurrences and developments around 
the world. The second section investigated the policy responses to this wider world 
bipolarism through which Malta's political leaders carved out an international niche for 
their country. The role that Malta's political leaders envisaged was perhaps less involved 
than the roles Malta had played in the colonial era and the world wars. Nevertheless, as 
an active member o f the non-aligned camp, Malta and the other neutral countries 
functioned in such a way as to find an alternative to the apparent inescapabihty o f the 
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bipolar confrontation. For neutrals such as Austria and Switzerland this meant refusing to 
get involved in any aspect of the Cold War. For Malta, however, as already mentioned, 
this involved a more active pursuance of non-alignment through which Malta's idealist-
minded leaders and decision-makers sought to promote wider-world security and co-
operation 
It is now possible to draw a number of theoretical conclusions about the geopolitical 
thinking behind Malta's policy responses to wider-world geopolitical circumstances at this 
stage in history. As in the previous chapters, this is done first of all by investigating 
whether Malta's leaders were accepting of the continuity of the world-system or more 
intent on striving for change for the better. In addition to this, the previous two chapters 
have shown that the extent to which geopolitical thinking in Malta was either imposed 
from outside or inspired from within can be instrumental in determining whether realism or 
idealism formed the bases of the resulting policies. It is shown that throughout the Cold 
War those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta adhered mainly to a form of political 
idealism which can be defined as "practical idealism" 
Reference was made earlier in the chapter to the fact that Malta's international relations, 
particularly her special and long-standing relationship with Great Britain, underwent a 
series of significant alterations throughout this period in history. These alterations were as 
much the result of and a reaction to Malta's previous geopolitical experiences (i.e. in the 
colonial era and the two world wars) as they were a response to the evolving geopolitical 
circumstances of the Cold War. Nevertheless, regardless of what brought them about, 
these alterations to Malta's place in the wider-world were so significant that we must 
conclude that between 1945 and 1989 Malta's leaders were far more intent on striving to 
change their country's international relations for the better than they were on accepting the 
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realism which was at the heart of the bipolar confrontation. As the main protagonists of 
the Cold War were falling into the downward, realist spiral of arms competition, Malta's 
leaders were acting against this continuity and seeking to alter fundamentally the way their 
country interacted with the wider-world As shown in the final section of the last chapter, 
the converse had been true in the previous phase; in conceding much of the weight of their 
authority to the military leaders of their colonial rulers throughout both world wars, 
Malta's leaders had rendered themselves mere bystanders who were accepting of the realist 
continuity and unshakeable conflictual nature of all geopolitical change 
Thus, although the perceived economic benefits of being a neutral in the Cold War had 
been a factor which had driven Malta's leaders to be less accepting of the apparent 
continuity of a world interpreted and governed through realism, historical factors were of 
most importance. In other words, the main reason why Malta's leaders were striving to 
change their country's lot for the better between 1945 and 1989 was because of their 
determination to avoid ever again becoming unnecessarily entangled in the conflicts of the 
world's major powers. 
To succeed in changing Malta's geopolitical lot, Malta's leaders had first of all to take 
control of their own country's affairs and, as outlined in the second section of this chapter, 
this they did. Following a history of dependency measured literally in millennia, in which 
the Maltese succumbed to the wishes and protocols imposed on them from outside by a 
succession of foreign rulers, they were for the first time evolving policies themselves, or in 
other words policies inspired from within rather than imposed from outside. Each of these 
policies moved them one step closer to their twin-pronged ideal of non-alignment and 
neutrality and one step further away from their historical state of subordination 
Subordination had meant that for centuries Malta's geopolitical development had been 
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shaped solely by foreign impositions. It has to be said, however, that prior to the two 
world wars such a situation was not wholly unacceptable because of the general sense of 
physical security that it engendered Nevertheless, the hardships that Malta endured as a 
British subordinate throughout the Second World War in particular were too great for the 
Maltese to ever willingly experience again. Concession to foreign impositions became 
impermissible in the aftermath of the devastation of the Second World War and the 
Maltese began their surge towards independence. It was this surge towards independence 
which can, above all other things, be said to have dominated Malta's post-war international 
relations. It was most definitely a surge and not a switch since fully fledged independence 
took around three decades to attain. Although a more detailed account the policy 
responses to wider-world geopolitical circumstances which led to Maltese independence 
was provided in the second section of this chapter it is worth providing a summary here. 
The drive towards independence commenced in 1960 when Malta's fifth post-war Prime 
Minister, Borg Olivier, accepted the proposals of the Blood Commission regarding the 
terms of Malta's self-government Following on from this, Malta became independent at 
midnight on 20 September 1964. However, despite the official declaration of 
independence, performed by HRH The Duke of Edinburgh, Malta remained dependent on 
British Sovereignty102, British aid and the economic benefits of hosting British forces It 
took the charismatic and controversial leadership of one Dominic Mintoff to end Malta's 
dangerous dependency on the British. Through his "Development Plan for Malta (1972-
1979)" Malta became a republic with its own president. British forces were finally ejected 
In 1979 soon after which Malta began to fulfil her new role in the wider world as an active 
non-aligned and neutral state 1 0 3 
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The above summary highlights some of the main policy moves which shaped Malta's 
changing place in the wider-world throughout the Cold War. Clearly the British rejection 
of Maha after the Second World War influenced the Maltese in their initial quest for 
independence However, it was the particular mode of geopolitical thinking generated 
inside Malta which was the driving force behind the longer term movement towards 
independence It is to this mode of geopolitical thinking, the first which had been inspired 
internally, will now be addressed. 
The rubric "practical idealism" has already been proposed and briefly justified but it now 
requires further explanation, particularly with regards to how the mode of thinking it 
portrays differs from the thinking emanating from the mainstream idealist movement 
elsewhere in the world. This mainstream idealist movement had grown up in the respite 
after the First World War as a response to the extensive perception that everything should 
be done to prevent a recurrence of the bloodshed104. It was based on the conviction that 
international conflicts could be resolved peacefully, and indeed prevented, by developing 
new international institutions and legal processes. Hence, the appellation 'idealism' arose 
because adherents sought to change the world for the better, rather than merely describe 
and investigate it as it was. In the interwar period it matured as an intellectual approach 
and evolved into a critique of what was perceived as a reverie in geopolitics with the 
concept of the nation-state105. An assumption implicit in this concept is that states are 
unified and that their governments speak and act in the national interest. Idealism holds 
that, even if there were such an interest, it is by no means certain that governments have 
the capacity to identify it, and even then they frequently lack the desire or capacity to 
pursue it. 
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The extent of the devastation during the First World War and the widespread dismay as to 
its overall purpose meant that the idealists, with their characteristic optimism, were 
received relatively well Nevertheless, their first innings was short lived since their opener, 
the League of Nations, failed to prevent the Second World War, which was paralleled with 
and indeed caused by a resurgence of realist style geopolitics. All the same, idealism as an 
intellectual approach never died and its theoretical underpinnings were never buried 1 0 6. In 
the aftermath of the Second World War, especially for international actors such as Malta 
who had experienced the harsh realities of both the colonial era and the world wars first-
hand, idealism continued to represent an attractive intellectual approach. More than this, 
however, since the emerging bipolar order had created a geopolitical climate in which 
those who opted out of bipolarism could be ratified as viable neutrals by either or both of 
the two opposing sides, idealism represented a feasible and popular policy option. 
Whereas for the previous century-and-a-half the Maltese had been subject to the realist 
mode of geopolitical thinking imposed on them by the British, there was now for the first 
time an alternative on offer. Of course, if the idealist way of interpreting the world was to 
be incorporated into Maltese policy it had to be adapted to meet Malta's specific 
geopolitical circumstances and requirements. For instance, some of the agreements that 
Malta signed in an effort to guarantee her neutrality appeared to have been more 
motivated by offers of aid and trade than guarantees of peace 1 0 7 but then again this was, 
after all, the era in which geo-economics was seemingly taking precedence over the more 
traditional geo-politics Economic aspects of international relations such as trade and co-
operation were becoming more relevant than orthodox political aspects such as military 
preparedness and competition. It therefore comes as no surprise that the particular idealist 
mode of thought adopted by Malta's geopolitical thinkers was in certain respects a form of 
compromise Not only were those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta looking to 
free their islands from any future involvement in the power games of the worlds major 
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powers but concurrently seeking to acquire foreign aid to facilitate Malta's economic 
modernization A "Development Plan for Malta 1973-1980" was issued by the Office of 
the Prime Minister Closer analysis of this document reveals MintofFs ambitious plans for 
economic growth winch he set out in a broad social context. His strategy represented a 
new impetus for the economic management of Malta which would also free the islands of 
military treaties and bases. Hence, the label "practical idealism" which portrays the two 
concurrent motives behind the prevailing mode of geopolitical thinking in Malta at this 
stage in history As mentioned already, such aid came in from sources as diverse as Great 
Britain, Italy, NATO, Libya and China 
It was, however, not long before wider-world geopolitical changes demanded a new mode 
of geopolitical thinking Indeed, barely a decade passed after Malta's leaders had attained 
the ideals of constitutional non-alignment and neutrality when the bipolar geopolitical 
world order on which they were based disintegrated. The disarray over Maltese foreign 
policy which ensued signified the onset of an era of deep-seated uncertainty over 
geopolitical thinking on Malta. It is this uncertainty which opens the next chapter in the 
history of geopolitical thought in Malta, which in 1998 is still running. 
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Endnotes 
1 Dcighton 1990 in his book, which investigates "Britain- the Division of Germany and the Origins of the 
Cold War" cites the conference at Yalta as having been one of the maiu instigators of the Coid "War. 
2 For a thorough account of the challenges and alternatives that were emanating from this new group of 
theorists see Parker 1985 (and particularly the latter sections of Ch. 7 which is entitled 'Brave New 
Geopolitics'). These alternative ways of interpreting the world's geopolitical surface will also be examined 
in more detail later in this chapter. 
3 See Ch. 3 (Introduction). 
4 Although technological advances in many areas (e.g. transport and communications) can be said to have 
contributed to an overall climate which was conducive to a global stand-off, it was the technological 
advances in weaponry , and particularly nuclear weaponry; thai ensured that force continued to be the 
main factor in world affairs. The best account on the extent and significance of the advances in nuclear 
technology (or "the Nuclear Revolution") is Mandelbaum 1981. 
5 Combined, these two attacks killed over 100 000 people but the long term effects were comparable if not 
worse. A similar number were left suffering from radiation sickness and even future unborn generations 
were affected, deformed by the mutation of genes in the sick. For a concise run-down of these two 
catastrophic and highly significant attacks see Grcnville 1994. pp. 290-291. 
6 With the exception of Deighton op. cil. who has already been referenced as having identified the 
conference at Yalta in 1945 as the starting point of the Cold War, much of the literature on the Cold War 
seems to cite the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 as the starting point. See for e.g. Davison 1958, 
Grenville op. c i t , Kennedy 1988, Mastny 1979 and Walker 1994. 
7 For a comprehensive overview of the proceedings of the conference at Yalta and the repercussions of 
these proceedings see Hobsbawm 1994, pp. 233-234. 
8 Ibid 
9 It is not just the fact that 20 million Soviets perished at the hands of the Germans in the Second World 
War but also the callous, en masse manner in wliich most of the killings look place that generated a 
degree of bitterness in the post-war Soviet Union. For further details and a justification of the grudges 
that the Soviets bore against their former allies see Duffy 1991. 
1 0 See section 3.2 of this thesis for further details. 
1 1 Duffy op. cit. 
1 2 The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 was essentially a statement by the then President, Harry Truman: 
"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". See Hobsbawm op. c i t , p. 229. 
n The Marshall Plan of June 1947 was basically a massive American design for European economic 
recovery which mostly took the form of grants rather than loans and was aimed at restoring Europe into 
an effectively functioning buffer zone. 
1 4 N A T O , the anti-Soviet military alliance, was the 'logical complement' of the Marshall Plan. See Cook 
1989 for an investigation into the H (B|birui of the N A T O Treaty " 
They would have felt even more threatened had they known that the US joint chiefs of staff produced a 
plan to atom-bomb the twenty chief Soviet cities within ten weeks of the end of the war. See Walker 
1993, pp. 26-27. 
1 6 Cominform was established in September 1947 to try to bring all the communist parties into ideological 
conformity as prescribed by Moscow 
1 7 Grenville op. cit., p. 385. 
1 8 Ibid 
1 9 For a thorough account of the Soviet's lightening grip on Eastern Europe see McCauIey's "Communist 
Power in Europe, 1944-49", 1977. 
2 0 Ibid. 
2 1 Ibid. 
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2 2 The USSR ended the US's monopoly on nuclear weapons in 1949 although the first successful test on a 
tberrao-nuclear (hydrogen) bomb was not carried oui until 1952. Sec Mastny op. cil 
2 3 For US interpretations of the Korean War see Lowe 1986 or Hastings 1988. 
2 4 S E A T O included Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand 
2 : 1 C E N T O included Iraq (before the 1958 revolution). Turkey. Pakistan and the Shah's Iran and so 
completed the anti-Soviet military system whose main pillai was N A T O 
2 0 See Gaddis 1982 for farther details on American "strategics of containment". 
2 7 For a thorough account of the plan to restore King Zog to the throne of Albania, or more particularly to 
overturn communist rule there, see the B B C documentary. "The Cost of Treachery " (1980). 
2 5 Ibid. 
2 9 Demonstrative of the petty and propagandist form which the Cold War had taken on was the since 
named 'Doctor's Plot' (1953) which the Soviets concocted as having been carried out by western secret 
services Essentially this exercise in propaganda involved blaming 9 doctors (all but 2 Jewish) who had 
looked after lop Soviet leaders for murdering Zhdanov and other members of the Soviet elite. The 
allegations against the doctors have since been acknowledged as having been a poor attempt by Soviet 
propagandists to drum up anti-Semitic and anti-British/American sentiments. For further details see 
Grenville op. cit., p. 493. 
3 0 The process through which this new-look foreign policy was enacted soon became referred to as 
'destalinisalion'. Three texts are particularly useful on the process of dcstalinisalion and Khrushchev's 
role in it. Khrushchev 1977, Medvedev 1977 and Linden 1966. 
3 1 Linden op. cit. 
3 2 Certain commentators (See for e.g. Davies 1989 and the commentary in his introduction) would have 
us believe that the U S S R was a reluctant participant throughout the Cold War and that on numerous 
occasions they attempted to promote initiatives aimed more at co-operation than confrontation; this 
Twentieth Congress of 1956 being the first such occasion Such beliefs, however, are ungrounded since, 
regardless of the idealism and compassion that may seem to have been apparent in Soviet foreign policy, 
decisions continued to be based on realist interpretations throughout the Cold War and were intended to 
fulfil the realist aim of expanding communism. 
3 3 Medvedev op. cit. 
3 4 It was for instance at this time that aid was given to Cuba, Egypt and India (amongst others). 
3 5 See for e.g. Fetjo 1974. 
3 6 The most comprehensive account of events in "Eastern Europe since Stalin" is provided by Fetjo op. cit. 
3 7 Khrushchev himself acknowledged the contradictions inherent in the process of destalinisation. Sec 
Khrushchev op. cit.. 
3 X Once again, Khrushchev himself has since acknowledged this. Ibid. 
3 9 The following account is a summary of two of the most thorough examinations of the 13-day crisis 
written by Kennedy 1969 and Beschloss 1991. 
4 0 e.g. Ibid. 
" Ibid 
4 2 Moller 1991, p.3, uses the term 'Mutual Assured Destruction' and its acronym (M.A.D.) synonymously 
to make the point that it was easy to doubt the sanity of Cold War decision-makers at times. 
4 3 See for e.g. Hammond 1975, Bown 1976, Yanov 1977 and Stanley 1970. 
4 4 e.g. Skilling 1976. 
4 5 The best investigation into the miscalculations of U S policy makers in devising policy in Vietnam and 
the subsequent lack of US public support for this campaign was written by Cable 1991. 
4 6 See Brown and Kaser 1978 where the post-Khrushchev rekindling of Soviet global capacity is discussed 
in great detail. 
4 7 Ibid. 
4 X The roles that the Soviets played in Somalia and Angola are also covered in Brown and Kaser op. cit.. 
4 9 In 1956 the first payment of £25 million was made The following summary of the part the Soviets 
played in Afghanistan derives from Anderson 1990. 
5 0 Sec Donovan and Scherer 1992 for the role that the media, and television in particular, played in 
shaping public opinion throughout the Cold War. 
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5 1 Kaldor op. cil. 
5 2 The clout that llie arms lobby had in US politics throughout the Cold War is discussed in Spector 1984. 
5 3 The failure to gel the U S hostages out of Teheran marked the end of the Carter administration. It was 
replaced by Ihe more hawkish and conservative Reagan presidency. Gaddis op. cit. 
5 4 Hallidav 19X3 
O p t C l U I U p . 1.11.. 
? f > Donovan and Schererop. cil.. 
5 7 For a thorough account of influence that the scientists of the huge Soviet military-industrial complex 
exerted over policy making in the Cold War, but also the decline of this influence since the end of the 
Cold War. see; Kapitza 1992. 
5 8 By the 1980s the arms race involved the expenditure of about 500 billion dollars per year by the U S A 
and the USSR alone. See Rosecrance 1992, p. 64. 
5 9 Wells 1992 discusses the restraint that nuclear weapons effected over the actions of the superpowers, 
using the Polish crisis and the Iran-Iraq war to exemplify this deliberate curtailment of their powers. 
6 0 See for example Balogh and Seers 1955 for more information on the apparently healthy state of the 
Maltese post-war economy. 
6 1 Ibid Balogh and Seers were amongst the first to formally acknowledge Malta's historical dependency 
on defence spending by successive occupying powers. Following on from this acknowledgement, Britain 
made a declaration assuming responsibility for attaining diversification of the economy of Malta. 
6 2 For a separate account of the dockyard troubles see Muirie 1963. 
6 3 This observation was made by Jones 1971. 
6 4 Blouet 1992. 
6 - For more on the 1947 Constitution and its elected legislative assembly see Dobic 1967. 
6 6 The Maltese Imperial Government consisted of the Governor himself, the Lieutenant Governor, the 
Legal Secretary, the Director of Civi l Aviation and the Secretary. Ibid. 
6 7 The dyarchal system is outlined in more detail in section 2.2. 
6 X Dobie op. cit. 
6 9 Dobic op. cil. 
7(1 
The best know n of Malta's Prime Ministers, Dominic Mintoff, trained originally for the Priesthood but 
after winning a Rhodes scholarship was educated at Oxford from 1939, before returning to Malta. See 
Blouet op. cit 
7 1 Dobie op. cil. 
7 2 Austin 1971. 
73 
Report of the Round Table Conference on Malta's Integration into the British Isles 1955 (Cmnd. 9 
657). 
74 
The Nationalists Party called upon its members to Boycott the referendum on the grounds thai the 
guaranlees promised to the Church had not been properly spelt out. Also, being much less dependent for 
its support on the unions and ihe dockyard workers, the Party had a correspondingly smaller interest in 
the possible economic benefits. 
'- Austin op. cil. contains the best account of Ihe whole integration issue. 
7 6 Ibid. 
77 
This was a key issue since, in the absence of a local government structure at this time, the police were 
responsible for important administrative functions in the villages. 
The constitution had been suspended on two prior occasions, 1903. when Malta reverted to a form of 
Crown Colony rule; and in 1933, when the Nationalist Ministry was dismissed from office by the Imperial 
Government for insisting on parity of the Italian language with English. See Blouet op. cit. 
Sir Hillary Blood chaired a commission of four, appointed on 22 August 1960; he submitted his 
recommendations in December 1960. See Report of the Malta Constitutional Commission 1960 (Cmnd. 
1261). 
8 0 Blouet op. cit.. p. 217. 
Nationalist Party - 25 seats in the assembly. M L P - 16. [bid. 
This title was proposed by the Blood Commission and borrowed from the "recently created internally 
self-governing Stale of Singapore," Cmnd. 1261, Ss 23.90. op. cit. 
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s 3 The disagreements are set out in full in the. Report on the Malta Independence Conference, 1963 
(Cmnd. 1261). 
X 4 Figures from Dobie op. cit. 
x - s For more on these finer details see Malta: Independence Constitution (Cmnd. 2406) 1964. 
x o 75% o( this £51 million would be a gift and 25% on loan at current lending rates of the UK Exchequer 
A further £1 million would be made avaiiabie for the restoration ol historic buildings which had been 
occupied by British Forces. See Craig op. cit. p. 218. 
' Quote taken from Dobie op. cit.. 
* x Beeley and Charlton 1994. 
8 9 Ibid. 
9 0 Ibid. 
9 1 Blouet op. cit., p. 219. 
^ Craig 1971, gives an account of this period in Malta's history under the title "Towards Non-
Alignment\ 
9 3 Blouel op. cit.. p 220. 
9 4 Malta received aid from Libya upon the signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement (1974). Although 
financial assistance from Libya is still apparent in Malta today, the dispute over their median line cooled 
relations The main recipients of assistance are the Malta Labour Party and there are still a number of 
strong business links between the two countries. 
9 - Chinese aid came in the form of technical and financial assistance in the construction of a shipbuilding 
yard in the inner Grand Harbour (1973-1976). 
9 6 Fencch 1993. p. 52. 
9 7 Ibid 
9 8 Neutrality Agreement Malta-Italy 1980 (Valelta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1980) For a detailed 
breakdown of the military, economic and technical assistance the agreement guarantees Malta see Ronzilti 
1983, pp. 171-201. 
9 9 S e e C S C E 1975 and Grcch 1993. pp. 45-47. 
1 0 0 See Ordonez 1990. 
1 0 1 Luke 1949. 
1 0 2 Tliis is why Beclcy and Charlton op. cit. describe this phase of Malta's history as the period of 
'Dependent Sovereignty". 
1 0 3 For further details on Minloff s development plan for Malta see Agreement with respect to the use of 
Military facilities in Malta, London March 26, 1972 (Cmnd. 4943). 
1 0 4 Most acknow ledge that mainstream idealism originated from the thinking of French political 
geographers in the interwar years. As Parker op. cit. wrote. "In opposition to the 'watertight bulkheads' 
produced by the Nazi policy of national autarchy, the French geographers advocated a permeability of 
frontiers based on international co-operation". It was envisaged that all would benefit from such a 
development. There are two classic works which best epitomise this type of thinking: Demangeon 1932, 
translated his ideas into an appeal for the settlement of problems on an international level, and for a 
united Europe; and Ferenczi 1938, concluded that for a Europe in decline co-operation was a far more 
appropriate response than confrontation. For other examples of idealist thinking by French political 
geographers prior to (he Second World War see Goblet 1936 and Ancel 1938. 
1 0 5 Ibid. 
1 0 6 Towards the end and more so in the aftermath of the Second World War the American idealist 
movement became (he principal torch-bearer for the kind of ideas that had arisen in France prior to the 
onset of the Second World War. There were three theorists who became particular eminent within this 
movement; Walsh, Whittlesey and Latlimore. Walsh was perhaps the most radical of these, concluding in 
his early works, "|G|geopolitics can ennoble as well as corrupt. It can choose between two alternatives -
the value of power or the power of values", (Walsh 1943). Whittlesey also became a well established 
member of the idealist movement. He believed that the new world order (following the Second World 
War) should be based upon an improved relationship between the generally passive peoples of the tropics 
and the aggressive peoples of the middle latitudes, and also between the Occident and the Orient. He also 
proposed the solution of problems in the context of a world organization (Whittlesey 1943). Finally, 
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Laltimore also contributed substantially to idealist thought by arguing, amongst other things, thai the new 
world order should provide freedom and justice for the oppressed peoples of the world (Laltimore 1943). 
1 0 7 Sec endnote 92 of this chapter w here Fcnech is referenced as having made the point that Malta's non-
alignment was for a period ". paying in cash, so that Malta's development plans could proceed". 
161 
P H A S E 3: R E F E R E N C E S 
R E F E R E N C E S 
Ancel, J : Geographic des Irontieres. Gallimard, Paris (English Translation) 1938 
Anderson, E W : Ihe cultural basis of Afghan nationalism, Pinter, London 1990 
Austin, D : Malta and the End o f Empire, Frank Cass, London 1971 
Balogh, T. and Seers, D.: 7he Economic Problems of Malta, Malta 1955 
Beeley, B. W. and Charlton, W. A.: Maltese patterns of dependence: an historical 
perspective: Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. 1 10, no. 2, 1994, pp. 112-120. 
Beschloss, M. R . The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-J963, Harper-
Collins 1991. 
Blouet, B.: The Story of Malta, Progress Press, Malta 1992. 
Bown, C. and Mooney, P. J.: Cold War to detente, London 1976. 
British Government: Report of the Round Table Conference on Malta's Integration into 
the British Isles 1955, Cmnd. 9657 
British Government: Report of the Malta Constitutional Commission 1960, Cmnd. 1261. 
161 
P H A S E 3: R E F E R E N C E S 
British Government: Report on the Malta Independence Conference 1963, Cmnd. 1261. 
British Government: Malta: Independence Constitution 1964. Cmnd. 2406. 
British Government: Agreement with respect to the use of military facilities in Malta, 
March 26 1972, Cmnd. 4943. 
Brown, A and Kaser, M. (eds): The Soviet Union since the Fall of Khrushchev, 
Macmillan 1978 
Cable, L : Unholy Grail: The U.S. and the Wars in Vietnam, 1965-1968, Routledge 
1991. 
Charlton, W A.: Trends in the economic geograj?hy of Malta since 1890, University of 
Durham, Department of Geography, unpublished PhD thesis, 1956 
Clarke, C . and Payne, T. (eds): Politics, Security and Development in Small States, Allen 
and Unwin, London 1988. 
Connell, J.: Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World, Research 
IVlonograph No. 3, Department of Geography, University of Sydney, 1988. 
Cook, D.: Forging the Alliance: The Birth of the NA TO Treaty and the Dramatic 
Transformation of US Foreign Policy between 1945 and 1950, Seeker and Warburg, 
USA 1989 
162 
P H A S E 3: R E F E R E N C E S 
Craig, J.: Malta: Clarke, C. and Payne, A. (eds): Politics, security and development in 
small states, Allen and Unwin, London 1971, pp. 170-183 
CSCE, Final Act, Helsinki 1975. 
Davies, R W.: Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution, Macmillan, London 1989 
Davison, W P.: 77ie Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold Wen- Politics, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1958 
Deighton, A.: Hie Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins 
of the Cold War, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990. 
Demangeon, A.: The British Empire: A Study in Colonial Geograjyhy, Harrap, London 
1925. 
Demangeon, A : La Geographie Politique. Annates de Geographic, Vol X L I , 229, 
(English translation) 1932. 
Dobie, E . : Malta's road to independence, Norman, London 1967. 
Donovan, R J. and Scherer, R.: Unsilent Revolution: Television News and American 
Public Life, 1948-1991, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992. 
Duffy, P.: Red Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945, Athenaeum, 
New York 1991. 
163 
P H A S E 3: R E F E R E N C E S 
Fenech, D.: Neutrality and non-alignment in the Mediterranean: The case of Malta: 
Report of the Colloquium on Neutrality atid non-Alignmenl in the post-Cold War era 
Malta 21-22, May 1992, The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Valletta 
1993. 
Ferenczi, I.: La population blanche dans les colonies, In: Annatesde Geographic, Vol. 
X L V I I , 267, (English translation) 1938. 
Fetjo, F.. A History of the People's Democracies and Eastern Europe since Stalin, 
Penguin, London (2nd ed.) 1974. 
Frendo, H.: Party politics in a fortress colony: The Maltese experience, Midsea Books, 
Valletta 1979. 
Gaddis, J. L . : Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal ofPost-War American 
National Security Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982. 
Goblet, Y . M.: The Twighlight of Treaties, Bell, London 1936. 
Grech, J. C : Threads of dependence, Malta University Press, Malta 1978. 
Grech, J C : The C S C E Mediterranean Seminar - A further attempt ?: Malta Review of 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3, July 1993, pp. 45-47. 
164 
P H A S E 3: R E F E R E N C E S 
Grenville, J. A. S.: The Collins History of the World in the Twentieth Century, Harper 
Collins, London 1994 
Halliday, F.: The Making of ihe Second Cold War, London 1983 
Hammond, P Y.: Cold War and detente: the American foreign policy process since 
1945, Pan, USA 1975. 
Hastings, M : The Korean War, Pan, USA 1988. 
Hobsbawm, E J : Age of extremes: The short twentieth century, 19 J'4-1997, Michael 
Joseph, London 1994. 
Jones, H. R : The economic transformation of Malta in the 1960s: Scottish Geographical 
Magazine, Vol. 2, no. 87, 1971, pp. 128-141. 
Kaldor, M., Holden, G. and Falk, R. (eds ): The new detente: rethinking East-West 
relations, Verso, London 1989. 
Kapitza, S : Soviet Scientists: Low Pay, No Pay, Now Insults: Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (May 1992) pp. 399-409. 
Kennedy, P : The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Unwin and Hyman, London 1988. 
Kennedy, R. F : The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962: Thirteen Days, Pan, London 
1969. 
165 
PHASE 3: REFERENCES 
Khrushchev, N : Khrushchev Remembers, (2 vols.) Penguin 1977. 
Lattimore, O : The Inland Cross-roads of Asia., In: Weigert, H W and Stefansson, V 
(eds.): Compass of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography, Harrap, London 
1943 
Linden, C : Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership, 1957-64, Johns Hopkins 1966 
Lowe, P.: The Origins of the Korean War, Longman, USA 1986. 
Luke, H (Sir): Malta: An account and an appreciation, Harrap, London 1949. 
Mandelbaum, M : Hie Nuclear Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1981. 
Mastny, V.: Russia's Road to the Cold War, Columbia 1979. 
McCauley, M. (ed): Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949, Macmillan, London 1977. 
McSweeney, B.: Constaictive Ambiguity: Options for Neutrals in the 1990s: Randle, M. 
and Rogers, P. (eds.): Alternatives in European Security, Dartmouth Publishing, 
England, 1990, pp 147-158. 
Medvedev, R. and Z. 
Oxford 1977. 
Khrushchev: The Years in Power, Oxford University Press, 
166 
PHASE 3: REFERENCES 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Neutrality Agreement Malta-Italy 1980, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Valletta 1980. 
Moiler, B : Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe: The German Debate on Non-
Offemive Defence, Brassey's, London 1991 
Ordonez, F F The Mediterranean: Devising a Security Structure NATO Review, Vol. 
38, October 1-8 1990. 
Owen, C: The Maltese islands, David and Charles, Newton Abbot 1969. 
Parker, G.: Western Geopolitical nought in the Twentieth Century, St. Martin's Press, 
New York 1985. 
Ronzitti, N.: Malta's Permanent Neutrality: The Italian Yearh(X)k of International Law 
1980-J981, (English Translation) Vol. 5, Editoriale Scientifica, Naples 1983, pp. 171-201. 
Rosecrance, R.: A New Concert of Powers: Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 1991, 
64-82. 
Skilling, H. G.: Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey 1976. 
Spector, L.S.: Nuclear Proliferation Today, Vintage, London 1984. 
167 
PHASE 3: REFERENCES 
Stanley. T W and Whitt, D M : Detente diplomacy: United States arid European 
security in the 1970s, London 1970. 
Walker, M : The Cold War: And the Making of the Modern World, London 1993. 
Walker, M.: The Cold War: A History, Henry Holt, New York 1994. 
Walsh, E. A.: Geopolitics and International Morals Weigert, H. W. and Stefansson, V. 
(eds.): Compass of the World: A Symposium Political Geography, Harrap, London 
1943. 
Wells, S. F : Nuclear Weapons and European Security during the Cold War: Diplomatic 
History, vol. 16, no. 2 (Spring 1992) pp. 278-286. 
Whittlesey, D.: German Strategy of World Conquest, Robinson, London 1943. 
Wiberg, H.: The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences: Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol 24, No. 4, December 1987, pp. 339-363 
Yanov, A : Detente after Brezhnev: the domestic roots of Soviet foreign policy, Institute 
of International Studies, London 1977. 
168 
PHASE 4 
GEOPOLITICAL DISARRAY: 
MALTA AND THE WIDER WORLD 1989-200(1 
PHASE 4 
GEOPOLITICAL DISARRAY: 
MALTA AND THE WIDER WORLD 1989-2000 
PHASE 4 
4. 
GEOPOLITICAL DISS ARRAY: 
MALTA AND T H E WIDER WORLD 1989-2000 
This chapter deals with the current stage in world history which is commonly called the 
post-Cold War period. It is based on the premiss that the end of the Cold War, or in 
geopolitical terms the dissolution of bipolarism, has opened an uncertain chapter in world 
political history in which most international actors have been left in a state of geopolitical 
disarray, willing a new world order. 
The current fin de siecle* has broadly presented policy-makers with three separate 
options, each of which is based on a slightly different interpretation of the nature of the 
current geopolitical surface of the globe Theorists in the US, inspired by what they 
perceive as their country's victory in the most massive confrontation the world has ever 
witnessed, are advocating that the outgoing bi-polar model should be supplanted with 
their very own uni-polar geopolitical model Intimidated by the prospect of an orderless 
world and fearful of any return to anarchy, many political decision-makers elsewhere are 
also accepting and supporting the idea of the US acting as a global superintendent. 
Congruent to this, however, there are two additional movements, both of which have 
reservations about unequivocal US global hegemony, and instead advocate two alternative 
courses available to policy makers. The first movement argues that the UN, as the only 
reasonably independent international organization, is more suited than the US to ensuring 
unbiased international peace and security. The second believe that economic factors and 
specifically the fiscal powers of Japan and Europe have come to dominate international 
relations, and hold that geo-economic considerations such as these should form the basis 
of the new world order. 
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In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War all three of the above courses featured in 
Maltese policy making. Policy makers, in many ways oblivious to other regional 
developments, were keen for Malta to fit into one of the above three global meta-theories. 
The Nationalist government of the early post-Cold War years set about a policy wliich was 
based on an acknowledgement of the increased significance of geo-economics, or more 
specifically Europe's fiscal power, in international affairs. Furthermore, via an intriguing 
manoeuvre, government policy at this time also simultaneously involved overt support for 
a new world order based on US geopolitical hegemony. The foreign policy adopted by 
the Labour Party, both in opposition and more recently in government, instead relies 
heavily on the UN taking on a more protective and authoritative role in international 
relations 
Following the same format as the previous chapters, this chapter first paints a wider world 
geopolitical picture of this short period in history. More so than for any of the other 
phases investigated it is important that this picture is seen as being dynamic since above all 
else it was characterised by drastic and unprecedented geopolitical change. The first 
section examines the events which led to the dissolution of the bipolar order and those 
which have characterised the post-Cold War era of geopolitical change. Section two 
investigates Malta's place in this ongoing geopolitical change and the efforts that were 
made to retrieve a function for Malta in the aftermath of the bipolar order. The policies 
executed by the Nationalist government immediately following the Cold War, which 
amounted to a mis-placed fealty for EU economic prowess and support for US global 
hegemony, are critically analysed. In addition to this, the powerful opposition of the 
Labour Parry to these policies is evaluated and a critical assessment of the alternative UN-
dependent policy course which they have opted to follow since their 1997 election victory 
is also attempted. Finally, the third and concluding section of this chapter draws together 
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the previous two sections, investigating a number of more esoterical conclusions which 
relate to the various theoretical frameworks through which Malta's leaders of all political 
persuasions made policy decisions These frameworks are shown to have been direct 
derivatives of the models that were being used by theorists throughout the world to 
prescribe and indeed will the advent of a new geopolitical world order. The Maltese were 
once again subscribing to geopolitical thinking imposed on them from outside and it is 
seen that in many other respects also Maltese geopolitical thinking throughout phase five 
was and still is historically-biased. 
4.1 THE WIDER WORLD 1989-2000: DISSOLUTION OF BIPOLAR ORDER 
As with the opening sections in all of the previous chapters, this section is devoted to 
condensing an event of major global and historical proportions into a few thousand words. 
The difficulties inherent in this task are obvious and dictate that it is of vital importance 
that the investigation is strictly relevant to the main thrust of this thesis. To this end, the 
following paragraphs present an examination of the close of the Cold War and the 
immediate post-Cold War era from a geopolitical perspective. The purpose of this 
analysis is first and foremost to track the main wider-world occurrences which Malta was 
caught up in at this stage in her historical development. 
The beginnings of the end of the Cold War can be traced to Mikhail Gorbachev's 
appointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. 
He initiated the series of reforms which eventually resulted in the massive revolution in the 
political and economic organization of the Soviet bloc, which in turn led to the demise of 
the Warsaw Pact and subsequently the end of the Cold War2. He had come to appreciate 
the extent of the discontent amongst previously good communists that had arisen from 
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increased contacts with the West and the widespread realisation of the stark contrasts in 
living standards. As a response to such discontent, which was particularly apparent in 
eastern Europe, Gorbachev adopted a tripartite strategy to initiate his proposed reforms3. 
The first part of this strategy he referred to as perestroika (meaning restructuring)4. 
Through his policy of perestroika he curtailed the role of central planning, significantly 
reduced subsidies to industry, encouraged a small co-operative sector and in an 
unprecedented move gave the go-ahead for a considerable number of joint ventures with 
foreign investors. In time, Gorbachevs perestroika came to permit private ownership and 
eventually led to the wholesale opening up of the Soviet economy. For the second part of 
his strategy he coined the term glasnost (or openness)5. Through glasnost he allowed 
increased freedom of expression, abolished many forms of censorship and authorised open 
debate as well as reserved levels of criticism for the first time. Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly given the high level opposition he faced, he implemented demokratizatsiya 
(democratization)6. This, the third strand of his strategy, saw the introduction of open 
elections to numerous candidates, none of which were obliged to be members of the 
Communist Party. 
To back up his tripartite strategy Gorbachev moved towards eliminating the use of military 
force in maintaining the communist governments in its east European satellite states. His 
foreign minister, Edward Shevardnadze backed him enthusiastically on this move, spelling 
out to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1990 why-
repression in Eastern Europe was no longer acceptable: 
"It is only through extensive international co-operation that we will be able to solve our 
most acute domestic problems"7. 
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Thus, in short, he and Gorbachev were warning that any further use of military force in 
maintaining the puppet communist governments in Eastern Europe would irreparably harm 
the more important new Soviet interest, 'socialist internationalism*. Like Britain, and 
indeed all other colonial powers, the Soviet Union had reached the point where the 
burdens of empire, and particularly its negative effects on Soviet relations with the rest of 
the world, far outweighed the advantages which remained to be had. Furthermore, in the 
missile age, just as strategic outposts such as Malta had been rendered useless, territorial 
buffers such as those in eastern Europe no longer provided any protection. 
The above factors combined to create a climate in which the possibility of Soviet 
intervention was no longer feared by those masses opposing their communist leaders. 
Moreover, without the Red Army behind them, the national people's armies of conscripts 
could no longer be relied upon to support the regimes against their own people. One by 
one these regimes came to realise that they could no longer safeguard their authority 
simply by changing the man at the top. Revolts were taking place in Hungary, Romania, 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland and crucially the main activists were the 
educated and the young9. Almost overnight the 'Iron Curtain'10 had lost its robustness and 
was rendered as incapable of separating the enraged revolutionaries from the centres of 
power in Budapest, Bucharest, East-Berlin, Prague and Warsaw as it had been shielding 
people in the East from the conspicuous prosperity of the West. On 9 November 1989 the 
Berlin Wall, which had become a potent symbol of the division of Europe, fell before an 
onslaught of the people. I f the Berlin Wall had become a potent symbol of the Cold War 
then the television footage of it being smashed down amidst popular demonstrations11 has 
since become an equally potent symbol of the tumultuous geopolitical changes which have 
taken place so far in the post-Cold War era. 
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Initial changes to the geopolitical map resulted from the weakening or defeat of the 
various puppet communist governments which had remained in power throughout eastern 
Europe even up until the Spring of 1989. By the June of 1989 Lech Walesa's solidarity 
movement had won the free elections in Poland12; and by the autumn of that same year a 
succession of popular revolts fatally weakened or toppled the communist governments in 
East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia13. Although the short 
transitional period was relatively peaceful in some cases'4, in others it was more 
problematic. In Romania, for instance, a violent coup included the execution of the 
communist leader, Nicolae Ceaucescu15. Violent or not, the above revolutions all had the 
effect of exposing the previously suppressed underlying cultural and economic differences 
both within and between the countries of central and eastern Europe. Most notably, such 
differences resulted in the splitting of Czechoslovakia into two separate states (1992), the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Of the two, the Czech Republic is considerably more 
advanced, industrially and economically, and is most likely to secure accession to the 
European Union, along with Poland and Hungary'6. In contrast, other countries such as 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania have been slow to capitalize on their new found freedom 
and are indeed less well placed to ensure any significant future economic modernization17. 
Following on from these initial changes the geopolitical map underwent a further 
readjustment, which was every bit as sudden and momentous as the one that had just taken 
place in eastern and central Europe. This further reshuffling was expected by few, 
especially so early in the process of perestroika (restructuring), since it took place within 
the boundaries of the Soviet Union itself18. At the time of writing (April 1998) this has 
meant that the Soviet Union has crumbled into fifteen separate national republics. The 
reason why this situation is continually changing is that there are nationalist minorities 
within these separate republics which are insisting on independence19. The chances of 
them attaining independence vary according to the specific circumstances of their 
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particular case. Whereas the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were 
sovereign states prior to the Second World War, were at the outset able to support their 
bids for independence most successfully, others were not 2 0 Especially in Soviet central 
Asia, where there were fewer resources for state-building and fewer gains to be had from 
outright independence, it was more difficult for nationalist leaders to make feasible bids 
for independence. Both here and elsewhere, where circumstances are not necessarily 
conducive to outright independence, the separate republics have remained in a loose 
alliance with Russia, the central and largest republic. This alliance is known as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 2 1 
The two stages of geopolitical reshuffling outlined above obviously heralded the demise of 
the East's Cold War defence alliance. The Warsaw Pact, as it was known, was entirely 
dependent on a tight-knit military alliance between the various administrative regions of 
the Soviet Union and close military co-operation with and between the communist states 
of central and eastern Europe. By the end of 1989 the requisite military alliances were no 
longer in place and co-operation over issues such as the training of and authority over 
conscripts was, given the extent of public dissent, no longer practicable22. 
The Warsaw Pact military alliance was officially dissolved in March 1991, although it had 
been impotent for at least a year prior to this date and Gorbachev had officially declared 
the end of the Cold War in 1990. In geopolitical terms the bipolar world order had ended 
in a spectacular fashion. Negotiations for the diminution of conventional and nuclear arms 
between the United States and the former members of the Warsaw Pact made astonishing 
progress23. Although in NATO the other half of the bipolar geopolitical order remained 
intact, its member states rapidly set about changing its functions24. The armed frontier 
which ran through the middle of Germany evaporated. Not only was the theoretical 
western line of defence pushed eastwards, but to the east of that line there were friendly 
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countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, who were seeking to join the European 
Union Shortly afterwards the need to defend frontiers militarily in eastern Europe became 
as unnecessary and outdated as it was in western Europe. 
In short, the tripartite strategy for change inaugurated by Gorbachev, the end of 
communist rule in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union constituted 
an unprecedented and wholesale global geopolitical reshuffling. In a round about way this 
geopolitical reshuffling, and more specifically the alterations in the various regional 
balances of power it brought about, paved the way for other smaller scale conflicts, many 
of which had previously been suppressed, to take on global significance. 
The most notable of these smaller conflicts which was quick to assume global significance 
was the expensive but awesomely efficient US-led liberation of Kuwait and invasion of 
Iraq (1991)2 5. Following on from this, the "Death of Yugoslavia"26 (1991-1995) was 
elevated to the world stage and the pitfalls that the West and then the UN encountered in 
attempting to find a solution to the complex range of conflicts in the Balkans became the 
cause of major embarrassment and did little to promote an air of global calm or order. 
The Gulf campaign and Yugoslavia aside, in 1993, two years after the Cold War had 
officially ended, twenty two 'hot' wars were still being fought around the world. 
Communal rivalries and ethnic challenges to states which had been suppressed throughout 
the Cold War contributed to conflict in all but five of these episodes27. About twenty-five 
million refugees were fleeing from communal conflict and repression, a number equivalent 
to the entire population of Canada. At least four million people had reportedly died as a 
direct or an indirect result of these conflicts, two-hundred thousand of them in 1993 alone. 
The United Nations had thirteen peacekeeping operations under-way, the most ever in its 
fifty year history28. By 1994, although working under broader definitions, a group of 
American researchers had recorded seventy conflicts world-wide and by 1995 their tally 
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had risen to a record seventy-one This 1995 figure was double the number logged by the 
National Defence Council Foundation in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down 2 9. 
Between theorists and practitioners of international relations30 there was little i f any 
consensus over how to interpret or react to the above disarray. As will be explained in the 
final section of this chapter; some chose to interpret the world as being ordered around US 
hegemony and reacted to geopolitical developments accordingly; others preferred the idea 
of order based around a UN-imposed universal security and others saw a more peacefully 
competitive geo-economically ordered worl d. In short, as the title of this section suggests, 
the post-Cold War world was a world in a state of geopolitical disarray 
4.2 RETRIEVING A FUNCTION FOR MALTA IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
BIPOLAR ORDER: 1989-2000 
This section examines Malta's place in the wider world between 1989 and 2000. Whereas 
in the previous phases investigated there was a degree of certainty over the role that Malta 
played in the wider-world, throughout this phase Malta's international affairs have been 
clouded by a dense fog of uncertainty. Politicians and decision-makers alike have been 
hindered by an overwhelming irresolution over the role that their country should play in 
the new uncertain world and, in much the same way as many other international actors, 
Malta is in a state of geopolitical disarray. The islands' immediate surroundings in the 
Mediterranean have altered drastically, shifting from a compound state of East-West 
confrontation to a complex state of North-South tension. Malta has struggled to adjust to 
this over-night transition and has subsequently been left in a state in which there is little 
consensus of opinion over the two alternative foreign policy courses. The extent of the 
disarray over Malta's post-Cold War geopolitics has revealed itself in a heated domestic 
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political debate which has been conducted at a "highly emotive" level for almost a 
decade3'. This debate provides the main focus of this section. The contrasting policy 
responses to global geopolitical change advocated by the Nationalist and Labour Parties 
are analysed. Such an analysis demonstrates Malta's indeterminate geopolitical place in 
the post-Cold War world and highlights the uncertainty surrounding the type of 
international role which Malta has recently sought and is still seeking to fulfil 
4.21 The Nationalist Policy Response: Security through the EU 
In June 1994, Maltese Foreign Minister Guido de Marco, pledged Malta's commitment to 
an evolving European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as envisaged in the 
Maastricht Treaty32 In this, his first address to the (West European Assembly) WEU 
Assembly, he contested that neutrality and non-alignment had been superseded by 
historical events and were no longer viable options He mentioned Ireland as an example 
of a country whose policy of neutrality had not prevented EU membership. Also, citing 
the then prospective membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Guido de Marco stated 
that amendment of the Maltese Constitution would not be necessary33. 
His address summarises the position beheld by the Nationalist Party to this day. They 
argue that Malta's neutrality is \vw/ generis^' and simply prevents the use or deployment 
of military bases, facilities or personnel on the islands. They are adamant that it does not 
prohibit Malta from seeking alignment with common EU foreign policy positions. 
Adherents to the Nationalist stance point out that in seeking accession they are , "actively 
pursuing peace, security and social progress among all nations," and are therefore working 
in accordance with their constitution \ Although their support for EU membership is 
mainly for economic and political reasons, the Nationalists expect that Malta's security 
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would ultimately be enhanced through a CFSP As the former Foreign Minister, Guido de 
Marco argued: 
"Membership of the Union would guarantee Malta's security, would enhance Malta's role 
in the search for stability in the Mediterranean region and would see Malta participate in 
the Union's initiatives for international cooperation"16. 
This is why throughout their last term in office the Nationalist's "primary policy objective 
was [is] their quest for membership of the European Union,'^ and this is still now seen by 
them as the only viable way in which Maltese security could be guaranteed. Nevertheless, 
despite their apparent assuredness, a number of obstacles stood in the way of Malta's 
accession to the EU and will also therefore continue to hinder any possible future Maltese 
involvement in the evolving CFSP. 
Memories of Dom. MintofFs policy of 'positive neutrality', in which his Labour 
government distanced itself from the western camp by signing agreements with the Soviet 
Union (1981), North Korea (1982) and Libya (1984) , proved too recent for many in the 
European Commission. Also, concern over the finer details of Malta's neutrality, 
particularly the level of opposition to EU membership, were such that the European 
Commission reported that: 
"The principle of neutrality and Malta's non-aligned status set out in the Maltese 
Constitution raise the problem of their compatibility with Title V of the Maastricht Treaty 
and would lead to difficulties in the area of joint action and future co-operation on 
39 
defence." 
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Thus, no matter how convenient a form Maltese neutrality was to have taken it was never 
likely to have integrated with a pan-European CFSP, even i f the Nationalists had secured 
another election victory in the October 1997 and accession to the Union. Therefore, 
neutrality and non-alignment were clearly the main hindrance to the Nationalist 
Government in their European-based approach to foreign policy and security. Although 
explicit proposals were never put forward to carry out the necessary constitutional 
amendments, attempts to drop them would undoubtedly have followed a further election 
victory 4 0 . In this respect, Malta came extremely close to discarding her hard-earned 
neutrality. In order to assess just how close, we now turn to the second political 
manoeuvre which seriously undermined Malta's international standing as a neutral and 
non-aligned state. 
4.211 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
On 26 Apri l 1995, Malta subscribed to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. 
States joining this programme were invited to take part in joint training and planning and 
possibly to participate in peacekeeping missions under the authority o f the United Nations 
and the OSCE. They were entitled to name representatives at NATO headquarters in 
Brussels and in return were compelled to make a commitment to transparency in defence 
planning, sharing information about military spending and forces and the democratic 
control o f their defence forces 4 1. 
The step taken by the Maltese government on 26 April 1995 surprised many; both pro-
and anti- European accession. The move appears to have been cleverly calculated and 
designed to distract the electorate from the main reason (essentially their desire to 
conform with EU guidelines) why the government had sought to abandon neutrality 4 2. 
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The programme was originally set-up as a compromise formula intended to attract East 
European countries within the western security sphere o f influence without submitting to 
their initial demands for firm security guarantees or eventual full N A T O membership. 
Crucially, therefore, it is not to be seen as an outright expansion o f N A T O and as such 
was ideally suited to testing public opinion and teasing the opposition's interpretation o f 
Maltese neutrality. It presented the government with an opportunity to side-track the 
frustratingly protracted process o f EU accession in favour o f a fresh debate on the viability 
and legality o f PfP The expected objections from the Labour Party would, it was 
intended, draw attention to the restrictions that constitutional neutrality imposed on the 
Maltese 4 3. After all, how could the opposition object to a programme which merely 
amounted to a formula for multinational co-operation and military training? In addition to 
this, the fact that long-established neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden had 
become members o f PfP would serve to further isolate any objectors. 
Subscription to PfP certainly had the effect o f stirring up a hotly contested political debate 
and undoubtedly gave further indication to Brussels o f the strength o f the then 
Government's intent. However, it also succeeded in dis-crediting or eroding Maltese non-
alignment and neutrality, i f only in a transitory way. In a nutshell, as Maltese political 
commentator Dominic Fenech put it , the Nationalist government had, 
"aimed to extricate itself from the potential checkmate posed by neutrality by shifting the 
burden of justification onto the Labour Opposition"44. 
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4 . 2 2 The Malta Labour Party ( M L P ) Viewpoint: 
Security through non-alignment and neutrality 
Having been responsible for enshrining neutrality in the constitution in 1987, the MLP has 
repeatedly pledged to maintain it. Those supporting this stance simply reiterate along 
these lines: 
"Without the necessary two-thirds majority to remove it, neutrality remains entrenched in 
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the Constitution." 
In the interview I conducted with the debuty leader o f the Labour Party (and main 
spokesperson for Foreign Affairs), Dr George Vella, he responded to comparisons drawn 
between Malta and other neutral countries within the EU by citing the differences between 
their own "constitutional neutrality" and a "neutral foreign policy" such as the one adopted 
by the Irish, which can be modified accordingly. Indeed, it is the entrenched nature o f 
Malta's neutrality which means that: 
"The Commission cannot rely on Malta being consistent in serving the CFSP and a 
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Common European Defence." 
Throughout the Nationalists' most recent term in office this argument effectively gave the 
MLP the power o f veto with regard to EU membership, a situation that was strongly 
repudiated by supporters o f the government in Malta and certain political commentators 4 7 
While they recognised that the role o f neutrality and non-alignment has altered since the 
end o f the Cold War, the MLP have consistently argued that it is still highly relevant to 
Malta's particular geopolitical situation^. Again, they dismiss the comparisons with 
Ireland or Switzerland made by those in favour o f the European-based approach, neither 
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of which are located hi security environments o f comparable volatility to the 
Mediterranean. The crux o f their argument is that the demise o f East-West confrontation 
has failed (o enhance stability in the Mediterranean and its immediate hinterlands4^ As 
theorist Alberto Bin puts it when investigating "the security implications o f Malta's 
membership o f the European Union": 
"It is worth pointing out that with the end of the Cold War, more tensions have sprung 
between North and South. These tensions are not felt anywhere else as much as they are 
felt in the Mediterranean.' 
As a response to this situation the MLP has long argued that Malta should persist in its 
active regional policy by continuing to contribute to fora such as the U N and the CSCE \ 
In the words o f former Foreign Minister Alex Sceberras Trigona: 
"Mediating between non-aligned states, as well as between them and aligned states is a role 
that Malta should not and cannot afford to give up lightly. It is truly in keeping with 
Malta's real vocation as well as living up to Malta's constitutional role of being a neutral 
state actively pursuing peace."* 
The document which set out the Labour Party's National Security policy 5 3 prior to their 
election victory in October 1996 contained a listing o f the "various threats which could 
actively constitute a security threat to the island" 5 4 hi many ways the report was in touch 
with the existing security situation, concluding that Malta's geopolitical environment was 
more likely to present a non-military threat than a military one. However, it then went on 
to declare: 
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"There is no indication that in the foreseeable future we can fall prey to any military threat 
f rom another country or foreign power with the specific aim to threaten our territorial 
integrity 
Clearly, any cautious military planner would judge this statement to be misguided, 
especially in an area as strategically sensitive as the central Mediterranean and in the wake 
o f the occupation o f another not too distant micro-state, Kuwait. As well as this unwieldy 
statement the report had further shortcomings, particularly in the latter section which 
presents the opposition's alternative policy on National Security. This policy amounts to 
little more than maintaining and strengthening the status o f neutrality and non-alignment, 
although a proviso is included which enables the MLP, "to adapt their (our) policies to 
altered circumstances i f the need arises"'56. On this note, whilst the MLP has never given 
explicit support for Malese accession to the EU, it certainly does not rule out Maltese 
involvement in European affairs, primarily by way of some form o f bilateral agreement 
between Malta and the E L 5 7 
In short, the Labour Party report highlighted the right problems but failed to come up with 
the appropriate policy recommendations. Although emphasis was aptly placed on 
diplomatic representation, confidence building measures, and dialogue through 
international fora such as the UN and the OSCE, a pre-occupation with neutrality and 
associated ideologies prevented the opposition from coming to terms with the very real 
issues they themselves had highlighted 
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To summarise, this section (-1.2} has propounded the uncertainties surrounding the policy 
responses which determined Malta's place in the wider post-Cold War world. Al l o f the 
policy responses emanating from Malta's political leaders in the last decade have failed to 
address the specificalities of Malta's unique contemporary geopolitical environment. Both 
political parties have instead attempted to respond to contemporary geopolitical changes 
through what they intended would be all-inclusive policies; the Nationalists striving for EU 
accession and closer affiliation with NATO, and the MLP seeking to ensure the 
continuation o f Malta's non-aligned and neutral international status The final section o f 
this chapter examines the nature o f the historically-biased geopolitical thinking on Malta 
which gave rise to these three blanket policy responses which were intended to ensure a 
stable geopolitical place for Malta into the next century, but which unfortunately failed. 
4.3 M A L T A 1989-2000: W I L L I N G A N E W W O R L D O R D E R O U T OF 
G E O P O L I T I C A L D I S A R R A Y 
This section is based on the premiss that at the fin de siecle Malta, and most other 
international actors for that matter are longing for the coming o f a new world order out o f 
the geopolitical disarray which currently prevails. The ongoing domestic political debate 
over the geopolitical function Malta should adopt in the post-Cold War era has been 
shown to be one o f starkly contrasting viewpoints. Despite this, there are some who 
believe that, 
"the minds of government and opposition seem to be slowly converging on the 
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fundamental issue of the country's security" 
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Or as Dominic Fenech has put it; 
"beneath the rhetoric , there exists in Malta much more consensus on the question o f 
security than might appear on the surface, or than there has been during the past 
decades"-^ 
Despite the optimistic overtones discernible in the above statements, given the vibrancy o f 
Malta's domestic political scene, there are few policy matters over which absolute 
convergence is a likely prospect and Malta's external security or international affairs is in 
no way one o f these. As this section will show, there is nevertheless a level o f 
convergence, albeit subconscious, over the geopolitical thinking behind the policies 
through which Maltese politicians have chosen to respond to post-Cold War changes in 
international relations. As wil l be seen, however, this convergence does not necessarily 
direct Maltese foreign policy onto the right course. 
This section draws together the findings o f the previous two sections, investigating the 
various modes o f geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses to world-wide 
geopolitical developments. These modes o f thinking are shown to be direct derivatives o f 
the models or meta-theories that were and, in some cases, still are being used by theorists 
throughout the world to prescribe and indeed induce the coming o f a new geopolitical 
world order. It is argued that only in this respect is there any convergence o f thought 
between Malta's opposing political camps. It is shown that the thinking o f both Labour 
and the Nationalist Party policy-makers since the end o f the Cold War has exhibited an 
historical bias i f for no other reason than that the Maltese are once again subscribing to 
geopolitical thinking imposed on them from outside. 
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4.31 Three Models of New Wor ld Order 
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by almost instantaneous proclamations in 
international diplomatic circles of a "new world order""" Like many 'new-' terms it itself 
is not all that new since commentators have been predicting a new world order for at least 
a couple o f centuries Already in this thesis, for instance, two very different world orders 
have been investigated (the colonial geopolitical world order and the bipolar geopolitical 
world order which were separated only by the unquestionably relative dis-order o f the two 
world wars) both o f which were new at one stage in history. As a further example, the US 
political geographer Isaiah Bowman chose to refer to the period immediately alter the 
First World War as being characterised by a new world order 6 1. What we are concerned 
with here is that several decades after Isaiah Bowman made his historic declarations, in the 
immediate aftermath o f the Cold War, many contemporary political geographers are once 
again heralding the dawning o f a new world order 6 2. It is, however, important that 
throughout this section these proclamations are seen in their historical context and also, 
therefore, to appreciate that they are in no way unprecedented. 
The post-Cold War proclamations o f new world order are essentially based on simplistic 
interpretations o f the events outlined in the first section o f this chapter. Three differing 
interpretations o f the geopolitical reshuffling which accompanied and indeed constituted 
the ending o f the Cold War have established themselves in academic and political circles 
around the world. These geopolitical interpretations have led to three simplistic forecasts, 
models or meta-theories o f 'new world order' 6 3, each o f which is highly subjective since 
ultimately they serve the purposes o f their main perpetrators. Broadly speaking, one is 
based on US global hegemony, the other on UN global supervision and the other on the 
fiscal containment powers o f international capitalism. Since between them they summarize 
the wider-world geopolitical thinking which currently influences Maltese decision-makers 
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this section analyses the three main ways in which theorists interpret the geopolitical re-
shuffling that accompanied the ending of bipoiarism. It also describes how each o f the 
three models are used to prop up their perpetrator's own rhetoric on the supposed new 
world order Since it is argued in the concluding chapter o f this thesis that these models 
were at best premature, and more probably flawed for all time, this analysis takes on a 
critical form. 
4 311 The Model o f US Global Hegemony^ 
The most significant outcome of the reshuffling which accompanied the ending of the Cold 
War is that the US has become the world's "only power capable o f acting as the stabilising 
hegemon" 6 5, in military and geopolitical terms at least To contemporary realist 
commentators, most o f whom now represent (he United States and her closest allies, this 
reshuffling has been interpreted as a 'victory' for capitalism, liberal democracy and free-
market economies6 6. In a statement which typified the mainstream realist interpretation o f 
the ending o f bipoiarism Francis Fukuyama pronounced that history had ended since the 
West had indeed 'won' the Cold War 6 7 
The sudden decline o f the USSR as a superpower is seen as a rationale for such an 
interpretation. Racked by internal dissent that made political consensus impossible and 
riven by economic difficulties which had rendered it incapable o f sustaining a global 
military presence, the Soviet Union is no longer a superpower able to compete in any way 
with the USA. As mentioned already, the let up in political repression has revealed a still 
pristine ethnic mosaic that had been preserved for decades68. I t is the re-emergence o f this 
ethnic mosaic that has sounded the final death knell for the superpower known as the 
USSR which had constituted one half o f the bipolar geopolitical world order. And so, by 
189 
P H A S E 4: G E O P O L I T I C A L T H I N K I N G BEHTND M A L T A ' S P O L I C Y R E S P O N S E S 
1990, the old bipolar structure which had dominated the post-1945 world was a thing o f 
the past 
Whai is envisaged by the proponents o f models based on US global hegemony is the 
replacement o f this old bipolar structure with a new 'unipolar'6" structure As is only to be 
expected, the most ardent supporters o f this particular interpretation or model of the 
world are representatives from the US or the US's closest allies. What they envisage is a 
framework o f alliances centred primarily, i f not exclusively, on US power and strategic 
leadership. This model, designated by one theorist as "hegemonic peace"70, is therefore 
premised on the preservation or revamping o f .America's major alliances, in particular 
N A T O 7 1 
N A T O is seen to be capable o f providing a continuing and effective bridge between 
Europe and the United States, maintaining the balance between a unified Germany and the 
rest o f Europe, ensuring Germany's continued adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) 7 2 , and making it possible for European defence to remain viable with relatively low 
levels o f military expenditure 7 3. So in short, although N A T O has been deprived o f its 
primary function (i.e deterrence to Soviet aggression and expansion), another function is 
judged to have assumed increasing importance; the containment o f German power 7 4 . 
In addition to the containment o f German power the US, it is argued, has a more bold and 
active role to play in the maintenance o f international peace and security. With regard to 
this, the victory o f the US-led coalition against Iraq in Kuwait (1991) demonstrated the 
US's intentions clearly. Krauthammer argued that this victory; 
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"brought sharply into focus ... the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world 
... : a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the 
industrial West" 7 \ 
He goes on to reason that since the vaunted multipolarity o f Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm was mainly 'pseudo' and because the United Nations is "the guarantor o f 
nothing"7'': 
"Our best hope for safety is in .American strength and will - the strength and will to lead a 
unipolar world, unashamedly laving down the rules of world order and being prepared to 
enforce them" 7 7 . 
The previous statements summarise as well as any the stance that has been adopted by 
those who proclaimed a new world order based on US global hegemony. 
4.312 The Mode! o f United Nations (UN) Global Policing 
Certain non-western academics and politicians 7 8, many o f whom are sceptical o f the US's 
delusions o f geopolitical grandeur, as well as certain liberally-minded commentators in the 
West7'1, believe that US leadership alone is not a suitable basis for a new world order. 
They, along wi th representatives from minor world powers who have long been 
advocating an expansion o f the UN's powers o f enforcement 8 0, perceive a new world 
order in which the U N would be able to resume fully its originally intended purpose o f 
securing the peaceful mediation o f international conflicts. 
Most accept that the US, as the only remaining military superpower, would have an 
important role to play in facilitating the execution o f the Security Council's decisions. 
Nevertheless, they argue that the U N , which has been freed from the ideological deadlock 
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which had made it so difficult to act in the past and was after all the only reasonably 
independent international body, is a more suitable crux for the new world order. 
This model, referred to by Jackson as the "Collective Security Model", is thus based on 
the "utopian hope for a UK system"*'. Jackson, and others who share his beliefs 8 2, have 
argued that since the UN managed to act against Iraq the post-Cold War world was 
heading towards a period o f enhanced collective security which is to be superintended by 
the UN. Such a model fits in with the UN Charter which does in any case give the 
Security Council the authority, "to maintain or restore international peace and security," 
and to enforce the will o f the council on a state that has broken the peace81. Hence, use o f 
military force by the Council for these purposes was foreseen by the founders o f the U N . 
Therefore, the advocates o f a post-Cold War mode! o f UN global policing are merely 
prescribing that the facilities the UK has at its disposal be put into action. To an extent 
their initial prescriptions were heeded, and on 15 November 1989 the U N General 
Assembly accepted a resolution which pointed to the great powers' commonly shared 
desire for a revitalised United Nations with a central role in strengthening international 
order 8 4. In July 1991 this resolution was backed up by a Political Declaration o f the 
Western Economic Summit in London 8 5 , confirming the international communities support 
for a more potent U N 
Most supporters o f the UN Global Policing model, and others like it, believe that even 
short o f direct military intervention across recognised international boundaries, the United 
Nations would be able to take various initiatives aimed at war prevention, conflict 
resolution and peacekeeping. Increased utilization o f this latter function is seen as being 
fundamental to the success o f a newly empowered UK since it is one which it has 
previously performed with moderate success, at least in conflicts that have been peripheral 
to the Cold War 8 6 . Little time was wasted and as early as 1991 U N personnel in 
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peacekeeping and related operations were deployed along the Arab/Israeli borders and in 
the Golan Heights, Lebanon, Iraq/Kuwait, India/Pakistan, Cyprus, El Salvador and 
Angola*1'7. There soon followed a significant deployments to Western Sahara (September 
1991) and Cambodia (February 1992) and then, in the largest peacekeeping operation ever 
attempted, Yugoslavia (March ]992) x x . Equally indicative o f future possibilities was the 
role that the UN was playing in mediation and conciliation with respect to several long-
standing conflicts 8 9 . Indeed as Camilleri wrote: 
"In country after country the UN was acting as the midwife of political transition, 
supervising elections: overseeing the demobilisation of military units previously engaged in 
civil war; creating an impartial police force; rebuilding war-torn economies; and 
sometimes, even when not invited, initiating major "humanitarian relief programs."*-' 
Although the UN was some way from establishing itself as the pivotal force in a new 
world order and there were those who doubted its potency 9 ', for a short time at least, it 
was fulfilling many o f the roles envisaged for it by advocates o f UN-based geopolitical 
models. 
4 313 The Model o f International Capitalism 
What is envisaged here is a global situation in which the increased economic 
interdependence that followed the opening up o f capitalist markets in the former Soviet 
Union will create a new international trading order which would in turn enhance global 
security Three arguments are proposed to support this interpretation or model. First o f 
all, and fundamentally, it is proposed that increased interdependence will directly reduce 
the incentives to use force as a means o f settling disputes9 2. Second, advocates o f the 
model o f international capitalism argue that interdependence wil l increase incentives for 
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states to institutionalize co-operation and engage in rule-based international behaviour. 
Finally, it is posited that intensified interdependence will shift economic priorities in ways 
that will make territorial conquest less desirable'" 
Two of the earliest proponents o f this model were Keohane and Nye who showed in their 
book. Power and Interdependence (1977), how increased economic interdependence 
among advanced industrial states could enhance security directly by reducing their 
incentives to use force against one another in settling their disputes. They cited two 
examples to support their beliefs; Canada abandoning war plans for fighting the United 
States after World War 1 and France abandoning its war plans against its European 
neighbours9 4. 
More recently, and particularly in the aftermath o f the Cold War, theorists have built on 
these arguments and two distinct camps have emerged, the so called "economic doves" 
and their counterparts the "economic hawks" 9 5. In short, the economic doves hold that 
increased international economic activity can only be for the good o f the international 
community. The hawks, on the other hand, point to the new types o f conflicts that the 
typically skewed relationships o f economic interdependence which result from 
international capitalism can generate96. Such conflicts are a relatively new phenomenon 
because they were not possible in the Cold War when adversarial states remained aloof 
from one another. Proponents o f the model o f international capitalism generally accept 
both o f these arguments and conclude that even a new geo-economic world order as 
perceived by the economic hawks would be safer than previous geo-political world orders 
and disorders have been. As Ruggje 9 7 points out, in a bid to reduce these new economic 
conflicts, states have institutionalized their interdependencies in international regimes and 
the rules and procedures o f these regimes enforce the norm o f reciprocity and ensure a 
convergence o f expectations which can lead to compromise 9 8. After all, who could 
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contemplate a scenario involving conflict between member states o f the EU. Cable draws 
similar conclusions, reasoning that even the most hawkish o f states will soon deduce; 
"that contemporary global conditions require a co-operative rather than confrontational 
pursuit of an economic security that is a shared condition rather than a goal of individual 
states"99 
So, whether one veers towards the perspective o f the hawks or doves, the model outlined 
here depends on competition between states being curtailed at the economic level and 
geopolitical considerations, therefore, eventually paling into relative insignificance. Out of 
this competition, advocates o f the model o f international capitalism foresee the emergence 
of a new world order based on fiscal power alone Whereas the traditional ingredient o f 
international power has long been armed force the new fiscal power derives mainly from 
the "capacity to exploit technological innovation" 1 0 0 . 
It has long been known that governments do not treat national economies only as a means 
o f enriching their citizens. In the 1960s the British economist, Hawtrey, wrote o f a world 
where "the major concern o f the state is prestige The means to prestige is power. Power 
is economic productivity capable o f being applied as a force" 1 0 1 Samuel Huntington has 
expressed the same basic point in a modern idiom: 
"Economists are blind to the fact that economic activity is a source of power as well as 
well-being. It is, indeed, probably the most important source of power and, in a world in 
which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be 
increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states."102 
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The model which is implicit in this view is not dissimilar from the zero sum game, 
discussed in the introduction o f this thesis as being one o f the favourite tools o f traditional 
realist geopoliticians, in which the gains o f one country (primacy) are seen as cancelling 
out the losses o f another (subordination) even i f both achieve growing prosperity. It was 
such thinking that led Hazel Henderson to conclude: 
"The Cold War is over, Japan has won." 1 0 3 
In summary, this thinking has been called "geo-economicsM by Edward Luttwak, "the 
pursuit o f adversarial goals with commercial means"1 0 4. Those concerned with national 
security in this new geo-economic world order are envisaged as having only to grapple 
with these less deadly economic 'wars'. 
As well as the US, which although possibly in economic decline is forecast to remain a 
global fiscal power well into the next century, the future pillars o f this new geo-economic 
world order are seen to be Japan and Germany (and/or Europe). In addition to these two 
pillars some theorists also believe that the potential for fiscal prowess that China and 
Russia exhibit also has to be taken into account' 0 5. Finally, since economic well-being has 
a direct bearing on development levels many theorists also bring North-South tensions into 
play in their models and talk o f a switch f rom East-West military-related confrontation to 
North-South economically-derived tension 1 0 6. 
4.32 Malta 's three post-Cold W a r policy frameworks 
The three models elucidated above as having dominated post-Cold War geopolitical 
thinking around the world also reveal themselves in a major way in Maltese geopolitical 
thinking They do so in the form o f the policy frameworks through which Malta's leaders 
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and their decision-makers generate foreign policy. Broadly speaking, three separate 
frameworks can be identified as having exerted influence over Maltese post-Cold War 
foreign policy, although overlaps exist between them. The following paragraphs examine 
these three separate policy frameworks and show how they are not only direct derivatives 
o f the simplistic meta-theories outlined above but also how they are in many respects 
descendants o f some o f the past frameworks through which Maltese foreign policy has 
been constructed For reasons that wil l become clear, it is proposed to call these policy 
frameworks imperceptive colonial realism, neo-fortress realism and impractical idealism. 
4.321 Imperceptive colonial realism 
It is difficult to conclude that the Nationalist Party's approach to policy both in 
government and in opposition derives from anything other than a realist policy framework. 
For almost a decade their main foreign policy priority has been to attain accession to the 
European Union. This quest has had a damaging effect on Malta's relationships with the 
poorer and more troubled countries to the south and east o f their region and so 
jeopardised the once cherished ideal o f pan-Mediterranean co-operation 1 0 7 
The policy framework through which Malta was governed by the British in the first phase 
identified in this thesis was labelled perceptive colonial realism10*. The two main defining 
characteristics o f this framework were that the colonial administrators assumed that the 
British nation-state accurately represented the population o f its entire empire and, 
furthermore, they were acting in the best interests o f colonial populations by providing 
them with a level o f physical security. In addition to this, the adjective perceptive implies 
that the framework through which the British governed Malta, although unquestionably 
authoritative, was decidedly more perceptive towards the needs o f the native population 
than were the policy frameworks imposed on other British and other European colonies. 
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The interpretations behind all such policy frameworks were such that the colonial world 
was seen as a mosaic o f individual and autonomous units, which were in continual and 
aggressive competition with each other As explained in the first chapter o f this thesis, 
policy frameworks such as this were not strictly unique to the British empire The other 
great European empires, and the minor ones as well, were also administered through 
policy frameworks which would now be referred to as being realist in nature. The genesis 
o f this pervading realist outlook on the globe was what Gearoid O'Tuathail referred to as 
the "Eurocentric" and "expansionist gaze" that the main colonial powers had over the rest 
o f the w o r l d 1 0 9 
A century on from the colonial era referred to by O'Tuathail and a critical assessment o f 
Maltese foreign policy under the Nationalist administration could plausibly conclude that 
the islands' policy-makers are once again subscribing to a Eurocentric geopolitical gaze. 
The only differences between this and the one cast by the main European powers over a 
century ago being that military- aspects o f competition have taken a back seat to economic 
aspects o f competition Through this gaze, the main European powers are seeking to 
expand their economic influence in a number o f different ways. With an arrogance 
comparable to that displayed by early colonizers, today's major European powers assume 
that the potential benefits to prospective newr recruits vastly out-weigh any possible 
disadvantages that may accompany their accession to the EU. In other words, it is 
assumed that by guaranteeing a level o f economic prosperity the E U can adequately 
represent the best interests o f any new populations. This is assumed to be the case 
regardless o f the specific circumstances o f the would-be economic colonies. Therefore, it 
is easy to see why to the most cynical o f observers it may seem almost as i f the western 
and EU-dominated media acts as an all-pervasive modern day missionary and any doubters 
are dismissed as retrogressive and undemocratic, the contemporary equivalent of pagan 
primitives. 
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The geopolitical thinking behind the Nationalist government's policy responses in the 
period immediately after the end o f the Cold War draws heavily on the model o f 
international capitalism outlined earlier (5.311) In simple terms, thinking is based on the 
assumption that in the post-Cold War world geo-economic factors have come to be more 
significant than the more traditional geo-political factors and that Malta must re-align her 
international relations to take this into account. However, the transition from a geo-
political globe to a geo-economic one alone is not seen by advocates o f the Nationalist 
Party's foreign policy stance as being capable o f producing a more peacefully competitive 
world, and so in their interpretation straight-forward economic realism also comes into 
play. In short, the choice is seen as being between alignment with either an impoverished 
and volatile southern flank or a prosperous and stable northern flank. 
To summarize, such thinking is tantamount to a reversion to the earlier forms o f 
geopolitical thinking exhibited by Maltese policy-makers which also resulted in 
concessions o f self-determination being made to a more powerful international actor 
However, this time around there is a danger that the main economic colonizers, convinced 
as they are o f the enhanced regional stability that would accompany an enlarged EU and 
pre-occupied with the economic efficiency o f the elite club within the elite club itself, may-
fail to be overly attuned to the needs o f new and less significant member states. Hence, 
the term proposed in the title to portray the geopolitical thinking behind the Nationalist 
Party's main policy responses; imperceptive colonial realism 
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4.322 Neo-fortress realism 
It is argued above that economic realism constitutes the bedrock o f the Nationalist Party's 
post-Cold War foreign policy-making framework or in other words that economic and 
perhaps politico-economic factors exert the strongest influence over their policy responses 
to international developments However, in addition to the economic realism apparent in 
the Nationalist Party's policy framework the continued importance o f hard-headed realist 
geopolitics to their thinking over policy must also be taken into account. 
The policy initiative examined in the second section o f this chapter which best illustrates a 
return to hard-headed realist geopolitical thinking was the signing o f the NATO 
Partnership for Peace accord in 1995. Although, as discussed, the motives behind this 
manoeuvre were complex (involving an attempt to pander to the demands o f the EU and 
perhaps deliberately undermine Malta's neutral status) the realist military and geopolitical 
motivations behind this intriguing policy manoeuvre should not be overlooked. 
Prior to Malta's involvement with N A T O through PfP there had been no significant place 
in Malta for realism, or policy decisions based mainly on military considerations, since the 
Second World War. The strain o f realism that defined geopolitical thinking in and on 
Malta throughout the Second World War was labelled in chapter two as fortress realism. 
Like all forms o f realism, this particular strain o f realism embodied a number o f 
assumptions about the nature o f the world and it was these assumptions that determined 
the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses to the two world wars. First and 
foremost, the inevitable continuity o f global conflict was assumed, as was the primacy o f 
war and preparation for war above all other matters o f the state It follows that the 
maintenance o f territorial security was taken to be the most important o f all o f the tasks 
bestowed on Malta's colonial and native leaders. In addition to this, it was assumed with 
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conviction that Malta's military guardian, the British nation-state, accurately represented 
and acted in the best interests o f all citizens o f its empire 
Although it would be somewhat unrealistic to imply that by signing PfP Malta's leaders 
had reverted to an historical mode of geopolitical thinking that was identical to fortress 
realism, when making historical comparisons the parallels are impossible to ignore. In 
choosing to align Malta with the most powerful military alliance the world has known, 
Malta's leaders were turning their back on their country's hard-earned neutrality and the 
ideal o f a co-operative peace. No matter how tenuous alignment through PfP was 
intended to be, they projected the islands back into the power games of the world's main 
players and the reality o f inter-state confrontation In this respect, it is possible to 
conclude that Malta's leaders were once again subscribing to the realist impositions o f 
outside powers War, preparation for war and considerations o f territoriality had shot up 
the Maltese government's agenda in the aftermath o f the Cold War and the Maltese found 
themselves a part o f the Western security camp almost overnight 
One can only conject that the geopolitical thinking behind this policy response derived 
from ,a similar kind o f interpretation o f geopolitical change to the one that had led to the 
model o f US global hegemony (see 5.312). In other words, no matter what other motives 
the government had at this time (impressing the EU, testing public opinion over Malta's 
neutrality, shifting the burden o f justification over Malta's non-alignment to the 
opposition) it was confident in the US's ability to lead a new peaceful world order. In 
Malta's location, pandering to the Western generated model o f US global hegemony was 
especially risky. As wi l l be seen in the concluding chapter o f this thesis, in the post-Cold 
War world it is the more insidious threats that transgress national boundaries that in many 
ways pose the greatest threat to international peace and security. Malta's closer 
association with N A T O could easily have been interpreted by some of the intra-state 
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Terrorist movements to the south and east o f the Mediterranean as gestures that were 
hostile to their own radical causes Furthermore, given the lack o f any commitment by the 
US to protect signatories (which was initially included in the programme in an effort to 
limit the expected Russian hostility to what they may well have perceived as a first step 
towards the expansion o f NATO) , Malta may well have been on a hiding to nothing. In 
short, Malta came very close to once again becoming a scantily protected fortress or 
outpost on the West's southern flank and for this reason it is feasible to label the 
geopolitical thinking which almost led to this as neo-fortress realism. 
4.323 Impractical idealism 
There is an alternative strand o f geopolitical thinking in Malta to that evident in the 
policies o f the Nationalist Party, developed by the Labour Party's think tank in response to 
the developments which have characterised the post-Cold War world 
As outlined in the second section o f this chapter, the Labour Party have responded to the 
end o f East/West bipolarism by effectively imagining the emergence o f a new bipolarism 
between North and South. The increasing tensions between North and South are used to 
justify the continued relevance o f Malta's neutrality in the post-Cold War w o r l d " 0 . They 
foresee an important role for Malta as a regional arbitrator between the two emerging 
camps and are critical o f any Nationalist policies which stand to interfere with this planned 
role. To this end, since coming to power in October 1996 they have withdrawn from PfP 
and made no further efforts to seek accession to the E U " 1 . Inspired by a resurgence o f 
idealist thinking and sentiments" 2, they have set about re-establishing Malta's 
internationally recognised neutrality and non-alignment. 
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It is envisaged by the new government that the UN, and perhaps eventually a regional 
forum for the U N in the form of a CSCM, will be able to offer the requisite protection to 
Malta in her fulfilment o f this role. Hence, the thinking behind the Labour Party 
leadership, both when in opposition and in government, owes much to the thinking behind 
the model o f universal security which was outlined earlier (5.313). As was spelled out by 
the deputy leader and foreign affairs spokesman for the Labour Party, they see the U N as 
the only suitable body around which to base a new world order 1 1 1 In short, they hold that 
i f micro-powers or minor international players such as Malta are to retain any meaningful 
level o f self-determination in the post-Cold War world they must be backed up by a more 
willing and potent U N " 4 . 
The conceptual framework through which Maltese decision-makers generated policy in 
the Cold War was labelled in the last chapter as practical idealism, idealism because 
Malta's political leaders opted out o f the realism o f the bipolar confrontation, choosing 
instead to strive towards neutrality and non-alignment in their idealistic quest for peace; 
and practical idealism because in their somewhat idealistic quest they were not blind to 
the more practical requirements o f a developing island micro-state. 
It can be argued that the geopolitical thinking behind the Labour Party's responses to post-
Cold War world developments is similarly idealist in nature. Although official documents 
setting out their foreign policy, both in opposition and in government, identify the diverse 
range o f potential threats to Malta's security they all tend to draw conclusions along the 
following lines; 
"There is no indication that in the foreseeable future we can fell prey to any military threat 
from another country or foreign power with the specific aim to threaten our territorial 
integrity." 1 1 5 
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Consequently they choose instead to focus on the less ominous aspects o f contemporary 
international relations On this, in 1994 former foreign minister Alex Sceberra Trigona 
spelled out the post-Cold War role that the Labour Party envisaged for Malta: 
"Mediating between non-aligned states, as well as between them and aligned states 
is a role that Malta should not and cannot afford to give up lightly. It is truly in keeping 
with Malta's real vocation as well as living up to Malta's constitutional role of being a 
neutral state actively pursuing peace."' l f> 
The idealist thinking behind much o f the discourse to be found in documents concerned 
with post-Cold War Labour Party foreign policy is there for all to see. However, whereas 
in the Cold War few could question the validity o f neutrality as an instrument o f foreign 
policy for certain states, there is a large question mark over its continued relevance and 
indeed practicality in the post-bipolar w o r l d " 7 Throughout the Cold War, states who 
pursued policies o f neutrality or non-alignment could expect backing and endorsement 
from a range o f international actors. As has already been mentioned, at one stage Malta 
was receiving moneys from as diverse a range o f sources as Italy, Great Britain, N A T O , 
Libya and China, as Dominic Fenech stated; 
"non-alignment was paying in cash, so that Malta's development plans [referring to the 
'Development Plan for Malta (1973-1980)'] could proceed"118. 
Since the end o f the Cold War support from other international actors for Maltese 
neutrality has dwindled It is not that anyone is against Malta's neutrality but more that 
most actors are apathetic towards declarations o f non-alignment and neutrality. After all, 
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in the post-bipolar world there are no longer two 'poles' between which an effective 
balance can be created Even i f tensions between North and South are envisaged as 
becoming more significant in the future, they themselves are never likely to be sufficiently 
confrontational to justify policies of neutrality for intermediary states1 1 9. In short, in terms 
o f security considerations and economic common sense the vigorous re-confirmation o f 
Malta's policy of neutrality and non-alignment is impractical given the regional and global 
geopolitical environment. Hence to summarize and propose a term for purposes o f 
comparison, such a policy response to the end o f the bipolar world derives from a strain o f 
geopolitical thinking which can be thought o f as impractical idealism. 
4.33 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the post-Cold War era. It has moved from examining the 
wider-world geopolitical changes which caused the Cold War to end and also dictated the 
nature o f the world after bipolarism, through an assessment o f the contrasting policy 
responses through which Maltese leaders reacted to these changes, and ended with an 
enquiry into the thinking behind these policy responses. Three labels have been suggested, 
all o f which have some negative connotations. They are each designed to depict the 
historic parallels that can be drawn between the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's 
contemporary policy and that behind the policies through which the Maltese were 
governed at earlier phases in their political history In addition to this, it was concluded in 
the last section that this historically derived geopolitical thinking that has dominated post-
Cold War decision-making in Malta also draws heavily on one o f the three main meta-
theories or models that theorists elsewhere in the world have used to interpret assumed 
new world order. 
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The three labels used to depict the various strains o f geopolitical thinking behind Malta's 
policy responses in recent years are negatively connotated because each strain o f thought 
has been related to the thinking that dominated a past era, and none o f them are strictly 
relevant to Malta's contemporary circumstances Imperceptive colonial realism has been 
paralleled with the policy framework labelled 'perceptive colonial realism', which the 
British governed Malta through in the first phase examined in this thesis. The geopolitical 
thinking behind neo-fortress realism has been shown to equate in many ways with the 
thinking that inspired British command o f Malta throughout and between the two world 
wars. Finally, the similarities between unpractical idealism and the mode o f geopolitical 
thinking behind Malta's quest for the ideal o f security through non-alignment and 
neutrality in the Cold War era have also been investigated 
It is possible to argue that in many ways the outdated modes o f geopolitical thought that 
have dominated and dogged Maltese responses to global changes over the last decade are 
not just related by fluke to past modes o f thinking but have their roots in the various 
historical modes o f thought. Although he was not strictly concerned with geopolitical 
thinking, Sultana has made the point that the events the Maltese as a people have been 
exposed to are bound to influence their present-day thinking. For instance, he has 
proposed the idea o f Malta's modern "welcoming society" orientation which he argues is 
most likely derived from a gradual erosion o f the islanders' self-confidence caused by the 
successive colonizers grooming a certain liege mentality. To the rulers, effective control 
depended on the Maltese harbouring positive dispositions towards their occupiers and 
such a mentality was therefore an essential ingredient for a secure fortress. Today, 
however, Sultana points out that this "welcoming society" orientation has the effect o f 
exposing Malta's national integrity, internal cohesion and core values to external political 
interference. In making such a point Sultana comes close to moving away from the mainly 
sociological focus o f his 'inquiry' and verifying precisely the point being argued here that it 
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is entirely plausible to assume that in terms o f geopolitical thinking about Malta, many o f 
the habits o f history transpose into the rotes o f today. In particular, it is easy to see how a 
history characterised by dependence, with a succession o f foreign overlords making 
decisions for the Maltese has bequeathed certain legacies which are discernible in the more 
realist-related thinking apparent in recent Nationalist Party policy responses. Indeed, even 
the more idealist responses adopted in the last decade by the Labour Party are tantamount 
to a continuation o f the policies that were designed to serve the Maltese throughout the 
Cold War 
It is thus possible to conclude that all three o f the contemporary modes o f Thinking in 
Malta are based on a combination o f outdated thinking and one o f a series o f meta-
theories. As wil l be shown in the following paragraphs, each o f these meta-theories is 
arguably fundamentally flawed and the outdated thinking is doomed to failure. 
The three meta-theories or models on which Malta's foreign policies (and the foreign 
policies o f many other international actors) were based in the aftermath o f the Cold War 
can be said to have been fundamentally flawed since they failed to materialise The 
following three paragraphs explain briefly why this proved to be the case. 
The western generated visions o f a unipolar world kept in line by the military might of the 
US were soon seen to be flawed. Although the US-led campaign in the Gulf (1990-1991) 
may have been cause for some optimism, upheavals in Latin America, coups in Africa and 
rioting in Asia could not be as easily explained or understood as Islamic-motivated anti-
western provocation or the Soviet-inspired plots o f the Cold War. Most notably, 
however, the conflicts in the Balkans between 1991 and 1995 created a problematic too 
complex for the US to deal with and served to illustrate the limitations o f US attempts at 
global geopolitical hegemony Regardless o f the US-brokered peace settlement in Dayton, 
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Ohio on 2! November 1995, the credibility of the concept o f a new world order based on 
US unipolarity had been irreversibly undermined Perhaps more significantly however, as 
the extent o f the US's domestic problems came to light throughout the !990s. US leaders 
began to doubt that they had the ability or support to pursue such an ambitious and 
responsible role. 
The second model o f new world order investigated in the last section (4 .312) was the one 
based on the Utopian hope for an all-encompassing and all-pervading UN system. 
Although the revitalization of the UN's peace-keeping functions over the last decade or so 
has proved invaluable, the organization has failed to demonstrate its effectiveness in 
policing major world problems. It played an insignificant role in the Gul f campaign (1990-
1991) yet managed to amass huge debts, it dragged its feet over Yugoslavia (1992-1995), 
and has suffered a series o f humiliations in Somalia (1992), Angola (1991) and Rwanda 
(1993) 1 2 0 The major factor in this disappointing run o f form was that the level o f great 
power consensus over how to react to sudden and unpredictable developments was 
lacking Such consensus depends on a neat dividing line between law-abiding and law-
breaking states and the use or threat o f force by the former against the latter 1 2 1 . A 
dividing line such as this was the forlorn hope of the founding fathers o f the U N who held 
that international peace and security could be attained through the rule o f international 
law. In short, their best intentions have always been beyond their reach since even i f such 
a line were to persist in the eyes of the Permanent Five, it may not be perceived by other 
members o f the Security Council or by significant segments o f the UN's membership in the 
same way. 
The third model o f new world order examined in the last section (4.313) was labelled the 
model o f international capitalism. This model has also failed to establish itself in the 
decade or so since the end o f the Cold War. The model o f international capitalism was 
208 
PHASE 4: GEOPOLITICAL THINKING BEHIND MALTA'S POLICY RESPONSES 
premised above all else on the fact that peacefully trading democracies do not fight each 
other It was argued that as more countries open their borders to trade and become 
democratic (witness eastern Europe) a new more stable and secure international trading 
order would emerge. The above premiss is quite simply flawed since prior to 1914 
Britain, France, and Germany were more democratic than many countries around the 
world are today and intra-European trade was flourishing, yet this did not prevent war 
Furthermore, the argument carries no weight because many o f the new democracies that 
have emerged in recent years are little more than facades or transitional democracies and 
thus represent far too fragile a base around which to plan a new world order In summary, 
geo-economic factors have failed to take precedence over geo-political factors as was 
anticipated by advocates o f this model. The clearest demonstration o f this was the recent 
decision (May and June 1998) taken by Pakistani and Indian governments to pursue 
offensive nuclear weapon building programmes despite being aware that they were 
increasing the likelihood o f a costly arms race and knowing that the atomic tests required 
by these programmes would almost certainly invite UN-imposed economic sanctions. In 
addition to tliis, however, economic progress in the successor states o f the Soviet Union 
has been adumbrated by organized criminal activity, poor accountancy and leadership and, 
furthermore, the developed nations have failed to address adequately the disparities that 
exist between them and the world's poorer nations. In short, the spawning o f international 
capitalism would i f anything appear to be faltering and is certainly not taking place at 
anything like the rate that most theorists had predicted in the immediate aftermath o f the 
Cold War This spawning or multi-dimensional expansion o f capitalism has been referred 
to as the "western-centred process o f normative convergence" 1 2 2. Quite simply, such 
western inspired convergence can never form the basis o f a more peaceful world order 
since it will never escape criticism and resistance from that large section o f humanity 
which has contributed little towards it and gained even less from it. 
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The above models all failed to acknowledge the important role that the new regional 
specifities or interacting regional trends had in explaining the nature o f the contemporary 
geopolitical surface o f the globe. In Malta, however, the recent renaissance in geopolitical 
thinking was not only based on a preoccupation with such models but also on an 
reluctance to discard classical modes o f geopolitical thinking. Together, this 
preoccupation with global meta-theories and general reluctance to look beyond classical 
modes o f geopolitical interpretation, has meant that the Maltese are relatively unaware o f 
some of the most vital issues currently affecting their region. 
Having just discussed their unhealthy commitment to global meta-theories o f new world-
order, this chapter now turns to the widespread reluctance that seems to be apparent 
amongst Maltese geopolitical thinkers to look beyond classical modes o f geopolitical 
thought, which can be explained in terms o f a downward spiral in the history o f 
geopolitical thinking in Malta: 
?.in 
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Figure 6 shows how over the last two centuries or so the dominant mode o f geopolitical 
thinking in Malta has swung clearly between variations o f realism and idealism 
Throughout the colonialism of the nineteenth century and the anarchy o f the two world 
wars those involved in geopolitical thinking in Malta were heavily influenced by realist 
interpretations o f the global situation Throughout the bipolarism o f the Cold War Malta's 
geopolitical thinkers leant more towards idealist interpretations o f the geopolitical surface 
o f the globe. This time period, which lasted almost two hundred years, can be said to 
have constituted the "heritage" o f geopolitical thinking in Malta As portrayed on the 
diagram, the period which followed this witnessed a "renaissance" in classical geopolitical 
thinking in Malta. The parallels which existed between the dominant modes o f 
geopolitical thinking in this renaissance period and the earlier heritage period are 
represented by the shaded arrows. 
The diagram is also intended to depict the regressive nature o f this whole state o f affairs. 
For almost two centuries now the dominant mode o f thinking has swung between straight-
forward modes o f realism and idealism. These various forms o f realism and idealism 
dictated Maltese interpretations and responses o f the changing global geopolitical 
situation. The spiral is intended to portray that as time goes on both strict realist and 
idealist methodologies seem to be becoming further withdrawn f rom the actual evolving 
global geopolitical situations. No effort is made on the diagram to forecast future 
geopolitical situations but the downward spiral does attempt to infer that they are likely to 
become less predictable. It is this unpredictability that wil l render both rigid realism and 
conventional idealism less and less relevant as the global geopolitical situation evolves. 
Seemingly, however, those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta are unaware o f the 
declining relevance o f these two traditional approaches Thus ultimately, geopolitical 
thinking in Malta is at risk o f spiralling on down into a hopeless state o f indecision in 
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which their is no consensus or middle ground between the two orthodox but irrelevant 
approaches of realism and idealism. 
In order TO escape from this doomed spiral Malta's geopolitical thinkers must turn their 
back on the current renaissance of classical geopolitical thinking and seek instead to 
promote the kind of rejuvenation that this thesis has introduced Their escape route is 
indicated by the dashed arrow on the diagram. The current renaissance of classical 
geopolitical thinking and the apparent pre-occupation with meta-theories of new world 
order have together effectively become a sancia simplicalas for Maltese policy-makers, 
relieving them of their duty to address the more relevant trends that are specific to Malta's 
own contemporary geopolitical environment. These less orthodox trends are what pose 
the difficult first-order questions to Malta's policy-makers. It is only by seeking to answer 
these more difficult first-order questions that Malta's policy-makers can begin to arrive at 
the kind of alternative interpretations of their unique geopolitical environment which are 
required to instigate a rejuvenation in their geopolitical thinking. The following chapter 
(5) aims to contribute to such a rejuvenation by tackling some of these first-order issues 
head on, without recourse to any one particular mode of thinking or school of thought 
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Endnotes 
' /•;/,> <ic wc / t- h a French term which means qu ite simph 'end of century'. This term is encountered in 
much of the contemnonn tiier.i'.urc on geopolitics and poiiiieai geography. "I ypically theorists use it to 
draw attention to the similarities that exist between the end of the current century and (he closing years of 
the last century, both of these periods having set new precedents with regard to the extent and rapidity of 
the global geopolitical changes which they witnessed. For further explanation and examples of the usage 
of this term see. Taylor J 989. p. xi; Parker 1985. (throughout) and O'Tuathail 1 W (throughout). 
2 The most thorough overview of this scries of reforms can be found in Sakwa 1990. 
* The follow ing paragraph contains a summary of the introduction to Gorbachev 1988. 
A Ibid. 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid. 
7 Grenville 1994. p. 895 
* Gorbachev April 1985, Gorbachev op. cit.. 
9 For more on the revolutions in eastern and central Europe see Bait 1991 
1 0 "Iron Curtain' was the term first used to describe the junction of the two great geopolitical blocs which 
inherited the territory of a prostate Europe. Churchill is often credited with having launched this concept 
in his now famous speech in Fulton, Missouri. (February 1946) when he warned of the dangers which 
were confronting the West in the aficrmath of the Second World War. Interestingly, however. Churchill 
had borrowed the term off the Nazi Propaganda Minister. Joseph Goebbcls. who had coined it in the last 
days of the war to describe the probable forthcoming confrontation between the Western allies and the 
Soviet Union. See Trevor-Roper 1978. 
1 1 This footage has since been incorporated into the entree of the acclaimed BBC Television series and 
book. The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin. See Roxburgh 1991. 
1 2 Bait op. cit.. 
n Ibid. 
1 4 Hobsbawni has made the point that for the most part the transitional period in eastern Europe was 
relatively peaceful because "hardly anyone had believed in the |coinmunist j system or fell any loyalty to it, 
not even those who governed it". He also states. "[A|at the moment of truth, no East European 
government ordered its forces to fire ... No groups of communist ultras anywhere prepared to die in the 
bunker for their faith". Sec Hobsbawm 1994, p. 488. 
For more on the coup which closed Nicolae Ceaucescu's harslily repressive rule and ended in him being 
shot with his wife beside him see Grenville op. cit.. pp. 898-901 and "Romania. Getting Nastier", The 
Economist, 4 February 1995,p. 32. 
1 6 See The Economist, 18 November 1995. 
1 7 Ibid 
I X It should be noted, however, that there were some who have since claimed to have forecast the break-up 
of the Soviet Union. Most notable of these is Brzezinski who in his book. The Grand Failure: The Birth 
and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century, (completed in August 1988) foretold that 
communism was in terminal crisis and that the 'reform' of communism would fail and result in the break-
up of the Soviet Union itself. See Brzezinski 1989. 
1 9 Kaiser 1996 lias provided an excellent account of the Geographv of Nationalism in Russia and the 
USSR 
2 0 Duncan 1995 made this point, p. 3. 
2 1 The alliance known as the CIS has now become an established and relatively stable member of the 
international community . However, commentators continue to wam of the latent nationalisms which exist 
in the CIS See for e.g. Kunz (The Sunday Times, 24 December 1995) and Ihe Economist, How many 
other Chcchnyas ?, 14 January 1995. 
2 2 Smith 1990 in his introduction raised the question of Ihe Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union 
and examined the effects that this was likely to have on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet military machine 
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2 - The best account of the progress made in these negotiations can be found in NATO's basic fact sheet 
No. 7. Sec NATO April 1994 
2 4 A plethora of articles, papers, books and official NATO documents spell out how N ATO's member 
states set about changing NATO's functions immediately' after the Cold War See for e.g. Ruble and 
Williams 1 W . Mortimer 7 December D'U and Cass 1995 Official NATO documents include llie 
T'-attsfhrma/usn nj .W«v«« 1 9 9 0 - i v 9 i . and the Future oj SATO (1994 Summit). Maltese 
commentators have also made an input, although typically lo promote their own domestic political views. 
See for e.g. Calleya's article in Malta's Sunday Times entitled "Nato's identity crisis" (12 February 1995) 
and from the contrasting viewpoint Montanaro's article "Transforming NATO into a partnership for 
peace" (9 April 1995). 
2 - For a thorough account of (he liberation of Kuwait and the Second Gulf War sec Bar/ilai 1993: and 
also Baudrillard 1995 for a thorough account of the actual events and an enlightening debate on the 
almost subconscious propagandist role thai the western media played 
2 6 See Silber and Little 1991 for a thorough investigation into what they call 77K- death of Yugoslavia and 
a critical assessment of the West's belated interventionist efforts. 
2 7 Harf f 1994. p. 10. 
2 8 Ibid 
2 9 See the article by Prentice in The Times (British), 3 January 1995. p. 12. 
M i The term "practitioners of international relations' can be taken specifically to mean politicians, 
particularly those concerned with and involved in foreign affairs, diplomats and members of the armed 
forces. Increasingly, however, in Ihe age of multi-national corporations and global economics 
representatives from business are effectively practitioners of international relations 
3 1 It was the student body KSL' which first alluded to the emotive nature of this particular political debate. 
In an article in Tkc Times (Alalia) 20 April 1995. they hit out at political parties for their campaigns on 
foreign policy issues saying they were "emotive, based on fear, and bluntly misinformative". p. 8. 
3 2 Sunday Times of Malta. 19 June 1994. pp. 9-11. 
" I b i d 
European Parliament 1988. p. 14. which quotes the then Nationalist Prime Minister. Dr Fcnech Adanu 
as saying, "Malta has not adopted, in the technical sense of international law. a status of permanent 
neutrality'". It is this statement more than any other which led the Nationalist commentators 1 met to 
repealed reference to Malta's neutrality as being sui generis (meaning one of a kind) 
3 5 Constitution of Malta, Article 1 (3) (1987 Amendment). 
3 6 Quote taken from The Times (Malta). "Joining E U will guarantee Malta's security - de Marco" (28 
January 1994) p. I. 
37 " 
Government publication. 1994, p. 12 
Although the 'Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation' betyveen Malta and Libya has been amended 
since the end of the Cold War. deleting the section relating to co-operation in security, it should be noted 
that Libya remains the only Mediterranean country with which the EU has no kind of agreement, see: 
Agence Europe, 9 April 1993, p. 12. Also sec section 2 of Ch. 4 of this thesis for further details of this 
significant stage in Malta's international relations. 
European Commission, April 1993, para. 19, p. 10. 
4 0 Dr. George Vella, the then Malta Labour Parly's foreign affairs spokesman and deputy leader, made 
this point (that yvcre the Nationalist Parly to secure another election victory they yvould undoubtedly seek 
to abandon the Neutrality and Non-alignment clauses in Malta's constitution) when intcrvieyved (12 April 
1995). 
4 1 For further details of the PFP framework document and hoyv it applied to Malta sec 77;e Times (Malta) 
"PM says Partnership contributes to collective security under UN, OSCE", 4 April 1995, p. 1; and The 
Times (Malta) "The Partnership for Peace invitation", 5 April 1995, p. 13. 
4 2 This line of reasoning emanated from Dr George Vella (Deputy Leader MLP and main Foreign Affairs 
spokesman) who described PFP membership as "ransom for Malta lo join the EU", The Times (Malta). 
April 5 1995, p. 8. See also, 77JC Malta Independent: "Partnership of convenience", 9 April 1995, p. 8. 
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4 3 Many of the commentaries in Malta's main newspapers at this time had corae lo focus on the 
restrictions that entrenched constitutional neutrality placed on Malta's policy makers. Sec for e.g. 
"Neutrality: more problems than solutions" The Malta Independent. 26 February 1()95. p 46 
4 4 Fenech 1997, p. 161. 
",? Sundav Times of Malta. 12 June 1994. pp. 8-10. -id . . . 
Sundav 77#w»v nfMalla. 26 June 1994. pp. 5-7. 
41 
Redmond describe this situation as undemocratic and totally unacceptable. Sec Redmond i 99 3. p 124 
4 8 Leo Brincal spelled out the foreign policy stance adopted by the Malta Labour Party clearly in a lengthy 
article in 'The Malta Independent entitled "Partnership for Peace and Malta's gco-stratcgic interests". 26 
February 1995, p. 2.1. See also. The 'Times: "Opposition insists neutrality, non-alignment still relevant" 
April 7 1995, p. 8. 
Bin 1995, p. 3. 
5 0 Malta Labour Party 1994. p. 34. 
5 1 Ibid, pp. 37 and 38. 
5 2 Sundav Times of Malta. 19 June 1994. pp. 9-11. 
Malta Labour Party, op. cit. 
5 4 Malta Independent, 18 December 1994. p. 25 
Malta Labour Party, op. cit.. p 9. 
5 6 Ibid., p. 36. 
5 7 See The Sunday Times (Alalia) "How Labour sees Malta's relations with EU", 8 January 1995, p. 37 
5 8 E.g. Bin op. cit. p. 13. 
5 9 Fenech 1997, p. 162. 
6 ( 1 Although Bush is usually recognised as having been the principal proponent of this rubric and other 
commentators and theorists (mainly from the West or at least concerned with serving the West's interests) 
have helped bring it into common usage, it was Carter who originally talked of the "new world". 
President Carter, speaking at Notre Dame University on 22 May 1977 highlighted the relaxation of the 
threat of conflict with the Soviet Union, the moral crisis over the Vietnam War, the economic strains of 
the 1970s. the apparent inability of industrial democracy to provide sustained %vell-being and the passing 
of colonialism and declared that these trends had weakened the foundations of the system which the US 
once predominated. The above deductions led him lo conclude that it was "a new world" and if order was 
lo come from it "a new American foreign policy" was required. See Agnew 1997. p. 98. 
6 1 Bowman 1922. 
6 2 See for e.g. Krauthammer op. cit. and Gaddis op. cit. 
6 3 In truth more than three models were proposed and they were subsumed under many different rubrics. 
I have chosen to put forward the main three and suggested three general and all-encompassing titles: 'The 
model of US global hegemony', 'the model of UN global policing* and 'the model of international 
capitalism'. 
6 4 Of all of the models that have been based on US global hegemony the one elucidated by Camillcri. 
which tbey label the 'Unipolar Security Model', bares the closest resemblance to the one 1 outline here. 
See Camiileri 1993. pp. 84-86. 
6 5 Ibid. p. 85. 
6 6 See for e.g. Krauthammer 1990-1991 and Gaddis, Spring 1991. 
6 7 See Fukuyama, 1989 and 1992. 
6 8 See Smith op. cil. for more on The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. 
6 9 The most comprehensive account of 7he Unipolar Movement was provided by Krauthammer op. cit. 
7 0 Brown 1991, p. 210. 
7 1 Two articles which are presented in the same edition of International Affairs are useful on the 
revamping of America's main alliance, NATO: Sloan 1995 and Borawski 1995. 
7 2 The NPT was signed in 1968 by over 160 states and has since been extended at the 1995 NPT 
Conference. See NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 7 for further details. 
7 3 For discussions on the assumed mutual benefits of a closer relationship between the EIJ and an 
enlarged NATO see Ruhle and Williams 1995, Latter 1995 and Sloan 1995. 
7 4 Camilleri op. cit., p. 84. 
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7 > Krauthammer op. cif. p. 24. 
7 6 Ibid., p. 25. 
7 7 Ibid. p.33. 
7 X Sec for example Licvcn 1995 who highlighted the strength of Russian opposition lo \ • '!'<> expansion. 
He argued that the US was seeking to attain global military supremacy through the expansion of N ATO 
:ind ihn« ibis expansion, if allowed to continue, would, "add the crowning touch to Russia's 
humilialion"(p. 196). Sec also Senghaas 1993 w ho was concerned with how 'global governance" could be 
conceived in the post-Cold War world aDd concluded thai if was too ambitious a concept for the US alone 
to talk in terms of. In addition to this Pclrovsky 1989. whilst Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
USSR, made the point for a 'comprehensive security' based around Ihc UN very persuasively. However, 
perhaps the most eminent of all sceptics of US attempts at global hegemony was Mikhail Gorbachev who 
wrote, "It is not likely thai NATO could replace common European structures and even the UN in solving 
Europe's urgent problems. Such attempts, instead of helping to resolve the issues, could rather lead into a 
dead end and give rise to relapses of suspicion and tensions" (p.252). He then concluded; "I would put it 
this way: at the threshold of the 21st century Homo sapiens should become aware of himself as Homo 
glohalis - the human being of the planet earth" and envisaged that the best way <o cultivate such an 
awareness was through a stronger and more involved UN. 
7 9 The best example of a liberally minded western commentator is Boyle who as early as 1985 was critical 
of the realist or Machiavellian power politics which drove the foreign policies of his native US. He argued 
that such power politics was fundamentally flawed and inevitably doomed lo fail because: "The principal 
(and fatal) defect of modern 'realist' theory is its supposition that Machiavellianism can actually be 
subordinated to the objective of preserving a balance of power system ... By its very nature. Machiavellian 
power politics requires the employment of violence against putativ e adversaries in order to achieve 
ultimate objectives. This dictate traps governments into an interminable cycle of force and 
countcrforce...". He then goes on to argue that ihc US's desire to become a global hegemon through 
"...Machiavellian power politics violently contradicts sev eral of the most fundamental normative 
principles upon which the United States is supposed to be founded: the inalienable rights of the 
individual, the self-determination of peoples, the sovereign equality and independence of states, non-
interventionism, respect for international law and organisations, and the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes..." (Boyle 1985. p. 38). For further and more recent critiques of the US's attempts at 
global military leadership by western commentators sec Russet and Sutterlin 1991 who support a 
permanent (standing) UN military force under Security Council control in order to avoid the kind of 
mullilaterally legitimized unilateralism practised by the US in the Gulf War. See also Cass 1995, who 
questioned the need for NATO, the very pillar of the US's world domineering foreign policies, and 
Mortimer who concluded in 1994 that NATO was in trouble since it had been unable to "resolve its 
identity crisis". 
m The most relevant example here is the article in The Times (Malta) by the Malta Labour Party's deputy 
leader and foreign affairs spokesman, Dr George Vella entitled "The United Nations: Its future as a 
world body". In this article George Vella considered, "the world's need for the United Nations" (p. 16) 
He went on to reason: "Admittedly the much promised 'new world order' never really materialised, but 
there is no arguing the fact that a new world is definitely in the making" (p. 19). And then concluded that 
in order to fulfil the extremely important role the UN was designed to play, "it does not suffice for it (the 
UN) to just tick along and simply exist: it has to be alive, it has to be vibrant, it has to show strength, and 
it has above everything else to be able to command respect from the brotherhood of nations" (p. 19). 
Rhetoric aside, Malta's long-standing commitment to the UN has been backed up by action: As a member 
of the UN, Malta inspired the concept of the common heritage of mankind in so far as the Law of the Sea 
is concerned. Following on from this, when Malta held the presidency of the General Assembly in 1990, 
it advocated the need to revitalize the concept of collective security under the auspices of the UN (Calleya 
1994. p 138). For further advocacy outside Malta of the important role that the UN should play, but has 
long neglected, in overseeing the Security of Small Nations see Wibcrg 1987. 
X 1 Jackson 1992, p. 8. 
K 2 Sec for e.g. Petrovsky op. cit., Voronkov 1994, Russell and Sutterlin op. ciL, and Roberts and 
Kingsbury 1995. 
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" Russett and Suttcrlin 1991. p. 69. 
8 4 Sec UN General Assembly Resolution 44/21. 15 November 1989. 
8 ? See Camillcri op. cil., p. 89 for further delails. 
y" For further discussion on the recent developments and current problems surrounding UN conflict 
resolution and peacekeeping sec James 1994. 
F°r .i comprehc : account of all of these deployments see Parsons 1995 
8 8 These dates were taken from an article in The Economist (30 April 1994). The article quotes the 
annual cost of the peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia as $ 1 2 billion and notes that as 
many as 30.500 UN troops were used at any one time. 
8 9 In the early 1990s the UN acted as mediator between Iran-Iraq and between the opposing parties in 
Namibia, Angola. Afghanistan and El Salvador. Ibid. 
9 0 Camilleri op. cit., pp. 89-90. 
9 1 The level of doubt over the overall potency of the UN in influencing international events has been well 
voiced. For examples sec two articles that appeared in The Economist, both of which were highly critical 
of some of the organizations more recent peace-keeping operations (Economist 20 November 1993 and 30 
April 1994). 
9 2 To represent this increased interdependence Jackson labels his model of international capitalism the 
"Global Village Model", portraying the globe as a buzzing village in which trade enriches relationships 
and ultimately serves to benefit all (Jackson op. cit.. p. 8). 
9 3 Ibid. 
9 4 See Keohanc and Nye 1977. pp. 27-29. 
9 5 Beverly Crawford has provided the best investigation into the differences and similarities between the 
so called economic "doves" and "hawks" (Crawford 1994). 
9 6 Ibid 
9 7 See Ruggie 1992. pp. 561-598. 
9 8 Ibid. 
9 9 Cable 1995. p. 305. 
1 0 0 Rtchardson 1993. p. 39. 
1 0 1 Quoted and discussed in Kindlebcrger 1970 (introduction). 
1 0 2 Huntington 1993. p. 72. 
1 0 3 Although at the time of writing (1998) it is difficult to accredit Japan with having won anything, given 
(he economic turmoil that its fledging economy has triggered off throughout Asia, it is easy lo see why 
Henderson came to this conclusion in the latter years of the Cold War, when the two superpowers were in 
the aftermath of their huge defence spending sprees and Japan's economy was booming. (Original quote, 
see Henderson 1988, p. 5. 
1 0 4 Luttwak 1990. 
1 0 5 Sec for e.g. Moran 1993, p. 76. 
1 0 6 Such a view is particularly apparent in the work of theorists concerned with Mediterranean countries, 
most of whom argue that the end of the Cold War has rendered their specialist area worthy of more 
attention. Sec for e.g. Anderson and Fenech 1994 for more on the shift from East-West military-related 
confrontation lo North-South economically derived tension. In addition to this see Osseiran 1994 who 
talks extensively of the widening economic gap between North and South as a security concern that 
reveals itself in the Mediterranean basin more so than in any other area. As a final example see 
Stanojevic 1994 who is also primarily concerned with Ihe implications thai the end of bipolarism has for 
security in the Mediterranean, which he now believes must be defined in terms of the North-South 
tensions. 
1 0•' Demonstrative of how vehemently Malta pursued the ideal of pan-Mediterranean co-operation is the 
prominent role she has played in institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCM) Malta, together with Cyprus, Spain, Italy and the former Yugoslavia, insisted upon the 
eleventh-hour insertion of the Mediterranean clauses in the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE Final Act 1975 and 
Grech 1993, pp. 45-47). Malta's proposal at the C S C E follow-up meeting in Helsinki, namely that the 
CSCE should declare itself the regional arrangement for peace-keeping in terms of Chapter VTJI of the 
UN's Charter, was endorsed by the Helsinki Summit II, and is another example how strongly Malta felt 
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about the ideal of trans-Mediterranean co-operation and security. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, 
the support Malta has given (o "the Italian-Spanish proposal for the creation ofa Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) is worth citing (Sec Fernandez. Ordonez. 1990). 
1 0 8 Sec Ch. 1 
1 0 9 O'Tuathai! 1997 
1 1 0 The document which spc'kd out Malta's post-Coid War foreign policy uses the increasing North-
South tensions as justification for constitutional non-alignment and neutrality. It stales: "It is worth 
pointing out ihat with the end of the Cold War, more tensions have sprung between North and South. 
These tensions are not felt anywhere else as much as they are fell in the Mediterranean ... Mediating 
between non-aligned states, as well as between them and aligned states is a role that Malta should not and 
cannot afford to give up lightly. It is truly in keeping with Malta's real vocation as well as living up to 
Malta's constitutional role of being a neutral state actively pursuing peace" (Malta Labour Party 1994, pp. 
34, 37 and 38). 
1 1 1 The Malta Labour Party withdrew their country from NATO's PIP within two days of assuming office 
(Fenech 1997. p. 162) and although they have made efforts (o ensure that this move and any of their other 
policy moves for that matter are not construed as efforts to "signify the distancing of Malta away from 
Europe" ('/he Malla Times. 1 November 1996), EU accession has not been a priority of the new 
government. For more on this see two articles from The Times (October 30. 1996) entitled Maltese Cross: 
I low 'Brussels' unsealed a great European moderniser and Alarm at anti-Nato victory in Malta (p. 17 and 
13 respectively). For further background on the events which surrounded the October 26 election see the 
article in The Economist (26 October 1996) under the simple but somewhat poignant title "Malta: 
European 
1 1 2 This resurgence or idealist thinking was triggered by the Labour-spun public reaction to Malta's 
membership of NATO's PfP. The strength of feeling about Malta's cherished ideals of neutrality and non-
alignment was underestimated and played down by the Nationalist administration but undoubtedly 
indicative ofa resurgence in idealist geopolitical thinking about Malta's role in the wider-world. 
1 1 3 Dr. George Vella has clarified his and his party's vision of new world order on numerous occasions 
through speeches, contributions to manifesto documents and various articles in the media and academic 
journals The lengthy article in the Malta Independent (10 April 1994, pp. 16-19) is the most explicit in 
spelling out his stance. In ihis article he considers the world's need for the United Nations and argues that 
"a new world order is definitely in the making". He calls on the UN to lead this new world order, stating 
that: "To be able to do so in the future, it does not suffice for it to just tick along and simply exist: it has 
to be alive, it has to be vibrant, it has to show strength, and it has above everything else to be able to 
command respect from the brotherhood of nalions"(p. 19). Dr. Vella confirmed these views and spelled 
out how dependent his party's policy was on a more potent UN in the interview I conducted with him (12 
April 1995). 
1 1 4 The Malta Labour Party has not been alone in recent years in calling for a regenerated UN. Indeed a 
body of literature has emerged over the last decade which advocates (hat the UN. should adopt a more 
readily protective role when it comes to small states or micro-powers. Sec for e.g. Wiberg 1987, Clarke 
and Payne 1988. ConncI 1988 and McSwecney 1990 all of which arc concerned with the politics, security 
and survival of small stales and neutrals in the 1990s. 
1 1 5 Malla Labour Party 1994, p. 34. 
1 1 6 Sunday Times of Malta, 19 June 1994, p. 10. 
1 1 7 For a thorough investigation into this large question mark which lingers over the continued relevance 
and indeed practicality of neutrality as an instrument of foreign policy in the post-Cold War world see, 
McSwceney 1990 and his examination ofOptions for Neutrals in the 1990s. 
1 , 8 Fenech 1993, p. 52. 
1 1 9 Although some would disagree with this statement, and hold that issues such as Islamic 
fundamentalism in particular constitute the emergence of a kind of bipolar situation (see for e.g. the 
commentary by Leo Brincat of the Labour Party in the Malta Independent on Sunday 17 October 1993, p. 
18), the official Labour Party stance is that Malta is not as yet under any foreseeable threat. 
1 2 0 Three articles in The Economist cover these failures thoroughly (20 November 1993, p. 69; and 30 
April 1994, p. 12 and p. 74) 
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' 2 1 Michael Wood described how this non-existent yet frequently imagined "neat line between law-
abiding and law-breaking states" was (he mam conceptual problem facing the UN and its legal 
representatives. Lecture and interview conducted in the Law Department of Durham University, 10 
February 1995 (Michael Wood was the Legal Adviser to the British Delegation at the UN from 1990-
1994. 
1 2 2 Tliis is the phrase used by AJi Ma/rui ! 976 to describe the West's current dominance in setting the 
priorities of (he international agenda. See also Cox 1990. p. 2 
220 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
R E F E R E N C E S 
Agence Europe" < '"ounci! of Europe Mediterranean, 9 April 1993. 
Agnevv, J.: Political Geography, Arnold. London 1997. 
Anderson, E W. and Fenech, D : New Dimensions in Mediterranean Security: Gillespie 
R (ed.): Mediterranean Politics, Pinter, London 1994, pp 9-22. 
Barzilai, G. (ed.): '/Tie (hiIf crisis and its global aftermath, Routledge, London 1993. 
Batt, J. . East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation, Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, London 1991. 
Baudrillard, J.: Ihe Gulf War did not lake place, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 
1995. 
Beeley, B.W. and Charlton, W.A .: Maltese patterns of dependence: an historical 
perspective: Scottish Geographical Magazine (1 !0) No. 2, 1994, pp. 112-120. 
Bin, A.: Security implications of Malta's membership of the European Union: The 
International Spectator, Vol. 30, No. 3, July/September 1995, 5-26. 
Borawski, J : Partnership for Peace and beyond: International Affairs, Vol 71, No. 2, 
April 1995, pp. 233-246. 
221 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
Bowman, I.: '/he New World: Problems in Political Geography, Harrap, London 1922 
Boyle. F : World Politics and International }.a\\\ Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
New Jersey l Q85 
Brzezinski, Z : The Grand f ailure: Ihe Birth and Death of Communism in the 
Twentieth Century, Scribner's, London 1989. 
Cable, V : What is international security?: International Affairs, Vol 71, No 2, 1995, 
pp. 305-324 
Calleya, S. C : Malta's Post-Cold War Perspective on Mediterranean Security: Gillespie, 
R (ed.): Mediterranean Politics, Pinter, London 1994, pp. 138-149. 
Calleya, S. C : NATO's identity crisis: 'Ihe Sunday Times (Malta), 12 February 1995, p. 
6. 
Camilleri, J. A.: Alliances and the Emerging Post-Cold War Security System: Leaver, R 
and Richardson, J. L . (eds ): Charting the Post-Cold War Order, Westview, Oxford 
1993. 
Cass, F (ed.): Ihe Future of NATO, C A T O Institute, Washington D C 1995 
Constitution of Malta: Article 1 (3) (1987 Amendment) 
Crawford, B.: The new security dilemma under international economic interdependence: 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 25-55. 
222 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
Duncan, W R. and Holman, G. P. (Jr.) (Eds ): Ethnic Nationalism and Regional 
Conflict: The Former Soviet I hiion and Yugoslavia. Westview Press, Oxford 1995 
Economist, The: Making no peace. 20 November 1993, p. 69 
Economist, The: Shamed are the peacekeepers, 30 April 1994, p. 12 
Economist, The: United Nations: Sea of Blue, 30 April 1994, p. 74. 
Economist, The: How many other Chechnyas 'f 14 January 1995, pp. 33-34. 
Economist, The Romania: (jetting nastier, 4 February 1995, pp. 48-50. 
Economist, The: A Survey of Central Europe, 18 November 1995, pp. 22-25. 
Economist, The: Malta: European ? 26 October 1996, p. 62. 
European Commission: The challenge of enlargement, Commission opinion on Malta's 
application for membership: Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement, 
European Commission, Brussels, April 1993. 
European Parliament. Report on Malta and its relationship with the European 
Community [Praq Report] PE 116.319/fin, European Parliament, Brussels 1988. 
Fenech, D.: Neutrality and non-alignment in the Mediterranean: The case of Malta: 
Rejyort of the Colloquium on Neutrality and non-Alignment in the post-Cold War 
223 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
era/Malta 21-22, May 1992, The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies-
Valletta, 1993 
Fenech, D.: Malta's external security: Malta: At the Cross-roads of the Mediterranean. 
Vol. 41, No. 2, February 1997, 153-163. 
Fernandez Ordonez, F.: The Mediterranean: Devising a Security Structure: NA TO 
Review, Vol. 38, October 1990, pp. 1-8. 
Fukuyama, F : The End of History ?: The National Interest, Summer 1989. 
Fukuyama, F.: The End of History and the Ixist Man, Free Press, New York 1992 
Gaddis, J. L . ; Towards the Post Cold War World: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, 
Spring 1991. 
Gorbachev, M S : Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, Collins 
1988. 
Gorbachev, M. S.: At the Threshold of the 21 st Century Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, 
No. 3, September 1994, pp. 247-255. 
Government publication. Malta Structure Plan: Report of survey. Planning Services 
Division, Malta, August 1990, Vol. 1, Sub study 8. 
Government publication: Malta Information, Department of Information, Valletta 1994. 
224 
PHASE 4 R E F E R E N C E S 
Grech, J P. The C S C E Mediterranean Seminar - A Further Attempt ?: Malta Review of 
Foreign Affairs, Vol 3, July 1993, pp. 45-57. 
Gurr, T. R. and Harff, B : Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Westview Press, Oxford 
1994. 
Henderson, H : An interview with Hazel Henderson: Whole Fourth Review, Winter 1988, 
pp. 2-11. 
Hobsbawm, E . : Age of Extremes, Abacus, London 1994. 
Huntington, S.: Why international primacy matters: International Security, Vol. 17, No 
4, Spring 1993, pp. 65-79. 
Jackson, R. J. (ed.): Europe in Transition: The Management of Security After the Cold 
War, Praeger, London 1992 
James, A : UN Peace-keeping: Recent Developments and Current Problems: Paradigms, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 18-49. 
Kaiser, R. J : The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1996. 
Kindleberger, C : Power and money, Macmillan, London 1970. 
Krauthammer, C : The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990-1991. 
225 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
Kunz, D.: Russia sets course for confrontation. The Sunday Times, 24 December 1995. 
Leaver, R and Richardson,.! L (eds ): Charting the Post-Cold War Order, Westview, 
Oxford 1993 
Lieven, A : Russian opposition to NATO expansion: The World Today, Vol. 51, No. 10, 
October 1995, pp. 196-200. 
Luttwak, E . : Disarming the world's economies, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington D C , unpublished C E O Paper 1990. 
Malta Independent: A case of geo-political realpoliiik, 18 December 1994, p. 25 
Malta Labour Part)': Proposals for updating the Foreign Policy of the Malta Labour Part)' 
in the sectors concerning National Security: Report to the Teader of the Opposition, 
Malta Labour Party, Valletta, December 1994. 
Montanaro, A.: Transforrning NATO into a partnership for peace: The Sunday Times 
(hTalta), 9 April 1995, p. 5. 
Moran, T : An economics agenda for neo-realists: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, 
1993, pp. 71-85 
Mortimer, E : NATO: In search of a unifying threat: The Financial Times, 7 December 
1994, p. 21 
226 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance: Chronology of Key Arms Control Treaties and 
Agreements (1963-1'994), Basic Fact Sheet No. 7. NATO Office of Information and Press, 
Brussels. April 1994 
Osseiran, S : Traditional and Emerging Conflicts in the Mediterranean: Possibilities for 
Peace Research and Peace Action. Calleja, i . Wiberg, H., and BusuttiL S. (eds ): The 
Search for Peace in the Mediterranean Region: Problems and Prospects, Mireva, Malta 
1994, pp. 19-30. 
OTuathail, G.: (Critical geopolitics: the politics of writing global space, Routledge, 
London 1997 
Parker, G.: Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century, St. Martin's, New 
York 1985. 
Parsons, A : From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995, Penguin, 
London 1995 
Petrovsky, V.: A comprehensive approach to universal security: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
144, No 11, November 1989. 
Prentice, E . A.: World conflicts on increase, says US pro-military lobby: The Times, 3 
January 1995, p. 12 
Redmond, J.: ITie next Mediterranean enlargement of the European Community: 
Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta ? Dartmouth Publishing, Aldershot 1993 
227 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
Richardson, j . L : The End of Geopolitics?: Leaver. R. and Richardson J L . (eds): 
Charting the Post-Cold War Order, Westview, Oxford 1993, pp. 29-39. 
Roberts. A and Kingsbury, B Roles of the United Nations after the Cold War The 
Oxford International Review _ Vol VI , No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 4-9. 
Roxburgh, A.: llie Second Russian Revolution: 'Ihe Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, 
B B C Publications, London 1991 
Ruble, M. and Williams, R : NATO enlargement and the European Union: '/he World 
Today, Vol. 51, No 5, May 1995, pp 84-88. 
Russett, B. and Sutterlin, J. S.: The UN in a New World Order: Foreign A ffairs, Vol. 
70, No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 69-83. 
Sakwa, R.: Gorbachev and his Reforms, I9H5-PJ90, Philip Alan, London 1990. 
Senghaas, D.: Global Governance: How Could It Be Conceived ?: Security Dialogue, 
Vol. 24, No. 3, September 1993, pp. 247-256. 
Silber, L. and Little, A.: The death of Yugoslavia, Penguin B B C Books, London 1996. 
Sloan, S. R : US perspectives on NATO's future: International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, 
April 1995, pp. 217-231. 
Smith, G. (ed ): Ihe Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, Longman, London 1990 
228 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
Stanojevic, Z : The End of Bipolarism and Security in the Mediterranean: Calleja, J.. 
Wiberg, H , Busuttil, S. (eds ): Hie Search for Peace in the Mediterranean Region: 
Problems and Prospects. Mireva, Malta 1994, pp. 51-72 
Sultana, R.G. and Baldacchino, G : Maltese Society; a sociological inquiry, Mireva 
Publications, Malta 1994. 
Sunday Times of Malta: The Politics of Neutrality-/, 12 June 1994, pp. 5-7. 
Sunday Times of Malta: The Politics ofNeutrality-2, 19 June 1994, pp. 9-11. 
Sunday Times of Malta: The Politics of Neutrality-3, 26 June 1994, pp 8-10. 
Sunday Times of Malta: Labour to opt out o f P f } \ 2 April 1995, p 6. 
Taylor, P. J. . Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality, 
Longman 1989. 
Times, The (British): Alarm at anti-NATO victory in Malta, 30 September 1996, p. 13 
Times, The (British): Maltese Cross: How 'Brussels' unseated a great European 
moderniser, 30 September 1996, p. 17. 
Trevor-Roper, H. (ed ): The Goebbels Diaries: IJte Last Days, Seeker and Warberg, 
London 1978 
United Nations (UN): UN General Assembly Resolution 44/21, 15 November 1989. 
229 
PHASE 4: REFERENCES 
Vella, G : The United Nations. Its future role as a world body: The Malta Independent, 
10 April 1994, pp. 16 and !9 
Voronkov. L : International Peace and Security: New Challenges to the UN: 
Paradigms, Vol. 8, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 1-17. 
Wiberg, H.: The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences: Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 24, No 4, December 1987, pp. 339-365 
230 
PHASE 5 
BACK TO THE FUTURE 2000 -
PHASE 5: BACK TO THE FUTURE 
BACK TO THE FUTURE 2000 - ? 
Thus far. the thesis has attained two of its three original sub-aims. First, an investigation 
into the history of geopolitical thought in Malta was presented in the first three chapters. 
Second, chapter four went on to examine critically current modes of geopolitical thinking 
in Malta from the historical perspective that this original investigation had provided. 
Having put current geopolitical thinking in an historical context, this thesis now turns to 
its third sub-aim, to explore possible bases for future geopolitical thinking in Malta. 
This chapter deals with the forthcoming stage in world political history and examines how 
Malta is likely to fit into it It assumes that, despite what certain commentators have been 
claiming since the end of the Cold War. a credible new world order is unlikely to emerge 
before the fin de siecle. Rather than seek a more traditional global order out of 
geopolitical disarray, international actors and commentators should instead begin to accept 
that the world is into a period of geopolitical transition1. It will not be possible to explain 
this period of transition in terms of one dominant power or dominant trend, but instead 
only through analysis of a whole host of new "interacting trends"2 and "regional 
specifities"^. This is why the global meta-theories, introduced in the previous chapter as 
having done little to further our understanding of the post-Cold War world, will be unable 
to explain the geopolitical transition which is set to dominate at least the early part of the 
twenty-first century. 
In the Mediterranean, Malta's regional environment, the concoction of new and less 
orthodox challenges is potentially as complex and virile as in any other regional theatre in 
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the world Despite this, those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta seem unprepared 
to rise to these new challenges. Their historically-derived interpretations and pre-
occupation with over-simplistic meta-theories of new world order, which have together 
constituted a mini-renaissance in classical geopolitics in Malta, serve only to cloud the 
first-order issues that affect the Maltese. Geopolitical thought in Malta is a microcosm of 
geopolitical thought elsewhere and it follows that, in keeping with the wider developments 
in geopolitical thinking outlined in the introduction, what is required in Malta is a 
rejuvenation of geopolitical thought, not a mini-renaissance. This chapter seeks to pave 
the way for such a rejuvenation. By drawing attention to some of more specific regional 
challenges (or "regional sped fi ties"4) which are concerning the new generation of 
geopolitical theorists, it encourages those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta to 
discard their narrow and out-dated modes of geopolitical thought. In doing so, as the title 
of this chapter suggests, it presents geopolitical thinkers in Malta with a course back to the 
future. 
5.1 REJUVENATING MALTESE GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT 
"The Mediterranean is an absurdly small sea; the length and greatness of its history makes 
us dream it larger than it is."-' 
The Mediterranean is civilisation's uneasy cradle. It has long been the venue for tensions 
and conflicts. The only period in its history devoid of war was the Pax Romana, in which 
the Romans referred to the Mediterranean as mare nostrum (our sea) having conquered 
the entire littoral by defeating amongst others, the Etruscans, Illyrians, Greeks, 
Carthaginians, Numidians and the Celts6. More recently, in the period after the second 
World War this region, which comprises less than six per cent of the world's population, 
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experienced about forty wars and armed conflicts. The Mediterranean basin has witnessed 
the highest number of wars in the history of mankind7. The existing pattern of conflicts 
has been referred to as (he "new arc of crisis"8 and runs through the Mediterranean into 
centra! Europe, covering the Balkans and South Central Asia, via the Persian Gulf. As 
long as the Israeli Likud Party remain in power, the Arab-Israeli dispute continues to be 
the major strategic concern in the Middle East, as too does the continued occupation of 
Lebanon by Israel and Syria. In addition to this, the delicate balance in the Middle East is 
further threatened by the ongoing Kurdish problem, the potential realignment of former 
Soviet republics with either Turkey or Iran and inten entionism by the United States (US). 
In the Balkans, the complex web of disputes knotted into the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia will take many decades to distinguish properly and the potential for conflict in 
Macedonia and Moldova, as well as the existing conflict in Albania, can be readily 
recognised. Then there is also the question of Gibraltar and Cueta and MeliHa9 and the 
tensions between the Greeks and the Turks over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. To the 
south of the basin, conflict continues in Western Sahara and Sudan and the propensity for 
conflict along the Egypt-Sudan border cannot be disregarded Finally, many of the 
developments in the Maghreb since the late 1980s have led to a mounting sense of alarm 
both within and outside the region, most notably the domestic turmoil in Algeria but also 
Libya's unpredictable dictatorship. As the French General George Buis surmised: 
"The Mediterranean remains at the end of the twentieth century a strategic area of major 
importance. It can even find in the twenty-first century the importance that it lost three 
centuries ago However, this space that seems to be at the centre of the planet has the 
potential to produce many conflicts, because the rights of some collide with the rights of 
others."^ 
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As the brief assessment above has shown, the propensity for conflict in the Mediterranean 
is undeniable. One specialist has concluded that: 
"There is no doubt that the Mediterranean region is one of the most conflict-prone areas in 
the world" 1 1 
However, as the previous section pointed out, strategic considerations represent only one 
facet of the current multifaceted geopolitical setting. The new setting, reflected in a shift 
in focus from East-West confrontation to North-South tension, represents a complex 
phenomenon that is expressed at several levels: economic disparities between the North 
and South, high indebtedness, disproportionate trade relations, high unemployment levels 
throughout the region, the population explosion in the South, migrations within the South 
and from the South to the North, widespread underdevelopment, actual and potential 
conflicts within and between countries, religious fundamentalism, aggressive nationalism, 
terrorism, armament proliferation in the South and East, immature democratic institutions, 
authoritarian regimes and transnational crime. These problems create a diverse and 
complicated geopolitical labyrinth They are not confined to the Maghreb, the Levant or 
the Balkans but their effects can also be discerned, albeit to a lesser extent, in most 
southern European countries. Being a micro-state in such a central location it is not 
surprising that Malta is as exposed as any to these problems but, as was discussed in the 
last chapter, the Maltese government is having difficulties coming to terms with them. 
What is required is a more encompassing approach to foreign affairs and foreign policy 
which takes into account the geopolitical and security implications of the diverse range of 
problems in question Theorists concerned with international affairs and such like have 
acknowledged the importance of broadening their spheres of interest for a number of years 
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now. As early as 1975, Henry Kissinger, as US Secretary of State, spoke of "progress in 
dealing with the traditional agenda" as no longer being enough. He reasoned; 
"a new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged The problems of energy, resources, 
environment, population, the issues of space and the seas now rank with the question of 
military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the 
diplomatic agenda" 
Although of some relevance in the Cold War, such reasoning has proven to be especially 
relevant in interpreting the post-Cold War world. After ending the Soviet Union's part in 
the bipolarism which had constituted the Cold War, Gorbachev himself talked of the 
increasing importance of what he referred to as "regional specifities"11 in the new world he 
had helped create. He explained: 
"Signs of crisis are becoming increasingly evident: economic recession, inefficiency of 
political structures, dramatic problems of migration and breakdown of free market 
mechanisms"' ^ 
He also drew attention to the increasing importance of issues such as the more widespread 
"affirmation of human rights and freedoms and democratic institutions" and concluded that 
"economic strength and technological skills, rather than military power, are crucial 
today"15. 
Such reasoning is also mirrored by those that are less directly involved in the process of 
making policies of major global significance. In particular, a great many theorists of 
international relations, political geography and other related fields are now exhibiting 
comparable modes of thinking and advocating a broadening of their spheres of interest so 
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as to cater for the increasingly complex nature of their subject areas16. A number of them 
warn of the dangers of allowing their discourses to get trapped into dealing with only one 
level (i.e. considerations at the national, which in practice normally means state, level) and 
one kind of issue (i.e. military issues). To this end, there has been much talk of a 
reassessment of the dimensions, both horizontal and vertical, of contemporary geopolitical 
discourse 
Numerous problems, notably the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
disparate financial flows and economic inequalities, massive migrations of people, 
transborder pollution, ethnic and nationalist conflict, religious fanaticism, and transnational 
organized crime, are now both sources and consequences of conflict. Such problems have 
obvious implications for the width of geopolitical discourse, which must become more 
encompassing i f it is to contend with such multi-faceted disorder. 
The above problems also call into question the vertical dimensions of geopolitical 
discourse. They all embrace processes that involve participation by large numbers of 
citizens that inherently transgress national boundaries and in this sense reflect the 
increasing interdependence of human affairs. This interdependence derives from processes 
such as the communications revolution, the emerging global economy, the global-reach of 
weapons of mass-destruction and the dissemination of technology and ideas Through 
international institutions, transnational organizations and transnational movements such 
integrative processes increasingly undermine the power of states. In doing so they draw 
attention to the current shortcomings of traditional geopolitical thinking and highlight the 
need for a heightening of geopolitical discourse above state-level. 
To complicate matters further, the forces of integration are not the only ones challenging 
the autonomy of states. I f increasing global interdependence requires a heightening of 
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geopolitical discourse, its antithesis, fragmentation, calls for a deeper geopolitical 
understanding of the processes occurring below state boundaries and between actors 
within separate states. The forces of fragmentation derive from tensions between people 
and states but provoke responses which cut across national boundaries. Nationalism is 
undoubtedly the most important of them. The mutual need to display a consorted front 
had the effect of suppressing nationalist forces on both sides of the 'Iron Curtain' 
throughout the Cold War but since then they have manifested themselves with 
unprecedented strength. In addition to this, economic and religious forces alone, although 
invariably tied in with nationalism, may cause conflicts between people and states. 
A number of theorists see a redefinition of the "essentially contested concept of security"17 
as a fundamental part of the reassessment of geopolitical discourse discussed above. 
Furthermore, theoretical ideas on this matter have filtered into operational circles and been 
heeded by organizations such as NATO and the UN. The newly defined concept of 
security which NATO has adopted in response to the changed constellation of the forces 
in the world has been spelled out in several important documents of recent years18. 
Similarly, the UN reacted to the end of the Cold War period by defining a concept of 
"comprehensive security" and incorporating it in its main policy aims19. Camilleri has 
commented on the redefinition of security that has been taking place: 
"Security, widely regarded as the centrepiece of geopolitical discourse, has been 
traditionally understood in terms of national military defence More recently, theorists and 
practitioners alike have argued for a more encompassing, less state-centric definition of the 
concept, which takes into account non-military threats to security as well as non-military 
responses to both military and non-military threats." 
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Smith and Kettle2'1 are proponents of a more encompassing, less state-centric definition of 
security. They argue that the concept should be redefined in terms of its originally 
intended usage71 and in order to do so they analyse two main semantical problems; the 
subject and object of security77. The crucial question of scope which they raise can also 
be phrased", security for whom7 and, security against what? 
If the subject of security is reconsidered in light of its general usage and the question, 
security for whom7 is asked, a wider array of vulnerabilities are exposed within a given 
society. Below the level of the state, individuals and communities can be vulnerable i f 
their basic values are threatened And beyond this level, there are many threats to regional 
security, emphasising the interdependence of security with others beyond state boundaries. 
Such an approach enables the threats to the values of a community, a state, a region or an 
entire continent to be considered concurrently. 
Having exposed a wider array of vulnerabilities by answering the first question, the path is 
cleared for a consideration of the object of security; security against what? I f the object 
of security is now reconsidered in light of its general usage, together with the wider array 
of'subjects' established in the answer to the first question, a whole new set of threats to a 
multi-dimensional security become apparent. In other words, threats to security below 
and beyond state level that have traditionally been ignored are brought to the fore. A 
range of environmental, economic, social, cultural, demographic and political-based 
threats can therefore be considered on the same plane of significance as traditional strategy 
based threats This, in turn, raises the problem of how to prioritize and order threats to 
security On this, Duke has written: 
"In the Cold War it was clear that the biggest threat was that of a global nuclear exchange 
In the post-Cold War world a good case could be made for arguing that economic and 
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social challenges to societies are as important, or more important, than those of a purely 
military nature when considered in terms of the stability of a given state. The 'invaders' 
crossing borders into various parts of Europe are no longer storm troopers . Instead they 
are refugees stealing across borders."23 
The above semantical discussion was inspired by the work of earlier theorists such as Krell 
(1979), Stephenson (1982) and Buzan (1983) but has been developed since then by 
Wiberg and 0berg (1987), as well as Smith and Kettle (1993). Camilleri has also 
contributed to this discussion by drawing attention to a number of problems that the 
concept of security gives rise to. Referring to the concept of security, he sought to solve a 
number of ambiguities: 
"Is it a condition to be understood primarily in terms of objective conditions, often equated 
with protection from physical threat, or in terms of subjective perceptions which we may 
loosely refer to as the nation's state of mind? It is not possible to entertain security as a 
policy objective without at least implicitly addressing a number of complex questions: 
Who or what is to be defended? From what? By whom? How? At what price? Those 
who find national security a convenient short-hand answer to these questions tend to 
equate security with the defence of national territory, presumably on the assumption that 
the preservation of territorial integrity, that is the exclusion of others from the physical 
space delineated as one's own (national) territory, holds the key to the defence of the 
nation's well-being But the link between defence of territory and preservation of national 
well-being is often assumed rather than demonstrated."^ 
He went on to argue that more issues are involved in the preservation of national well-
being than the mere defence of territory: 
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"Numerous problems, notably international debt, trade rivalries, destabilising financial 
flows, transborder pollution, human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, 
and massive migrations of people, are now both causes and consequences of 
conflict 
He believes that the above issues constitute a "macropolitical agenda"26, the components 
of which spill over boundaries, are beyond the means of any one country to control, and 
typically "exceed the problem-solving capacity of existing institutions"27. The function of 
this new macropoliticaJ agenda is to rejuvenate geopolitical thinking, or as Camilleri puts it 
"increase consciousness of the scale and multi-faceted character of global disorder"2* It 
demands that those engaged in geopolitical thinking expand their spheres of interest and 
concern in order to take onboard the current multi-dimensional nature of their discourses. 
This chapter is tasked with contributing towards a rejuvenation in Maltese geopolitical 
thought. To this end, the remaining section conducts research into four of the non-
military issues, or the "macropolitical threats", that are most likely to undermine the 
preservation of Malta's national well-being in the foreseeable future. These four issues are 
not given the attention they warrant and in many senses are largely overlooked as a result 
of the narrow, out-dated modes of geopolitical thinking outlined in the last chapter which 
prevail in Malta today. Together they can be said to constitute an important part of 
Malta's new "macropolitical agenda" This agenda represents an alternative basis for 
geopolitical thought and presents those engaged in Malta's international affairs with a 
course back to the future. This course back to the future requires that the rigid thinking 
that still prevails in Malta is discarded and replaced with more innovative thinking which is 
receptive to the complex nature of the islands' contemporary geopolitical situation. 
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5.2 MALTA'S NEW MACRO POLITICAL AGENDA 
We have seen so far in this chapter that in terms of orthodox geopolitical conflicts the 
Mediterranean basin exhibits many acute and latent problems. Through a more 
encompassing and less state-centric interpretation of the geopolitical setting, the region 
can be seen to have emerged from the Cold War with arguably more geopolitical flash-
points than any other theatre in the world. Malta's new macropolitical agenda must take 
these burgeoning geopolitical flash-points into account. When doing so it is important 
that neither a solely realist or exclusively idealist mode of interpretation is utilised. This is 
because, strict orthodox approaches such as these fail to acknowledge the diverse nature 
of both the origins and range of influence of the "interacting trends"29 (or as Gorbachev 
prefers, "regional speeifities"30) that currently affect the Mediterranean. 
Clearly, some of the trends evident in the Mediterranean bear down more ominously on 
Malta than other states and for this reason a level of prioritization has to be exercised. In 
terms of imminence and potential ramifications, three issues are immediately identifiable as 
posing the most serious macropolitical threat to the preservation of Malta's national well-
being; mass population movements, international terrorism, transnational crime and 
disputes over maritime boundary delimitations. Although there are undoubtedly other 
issues which warrant a place on Malta's macropolitical agenda, these four main issues have 
been selected for analysis in the remaining paragraphs of this chapter. 
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5.21 Mass population movements. 
Mass population movements are no new problem but in recent years their occurrence has 
taken on a new dimension. Population exoduses within and towards the European side of 
the Mediterranean region are commanding the attention of high level policy makers not 
only on humanitarian grounds, but also because of the serious consequences that mass 
displacements have for national stability and regional security. As D'Abadie has explained: 
"It is not fashionable any more to talk of'threats' but - according to the new vocabulary of 
international security in the post-Cold War - of'challenges' or 'risks'. In this situation 
developments on the periphery of Europe are at least as likely to affect the security of the 
region as those more traditional concerns on the East Events on the southern littoral of 
the Mediterranean represent the chief security preoccupation of those countries on the 
southern flank of Europe The attention of France. Italy and Spain, in particular, is 
focused more on the South than on other parts of the continent and specific concerns over 
population movements from the Maghreb have recently taken on a new importance in the f 
formulation of their respective security equations."-'' 
The extent of the challenge that D'Abadie spells out is glaringly obvious: Barring Israel, 
all countries on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are net migrant 
suppliers; six million Maghrebi32 immigrants already live in the EU, up to half of them in 
France; the vast majority of the estimated 800,000 Africans in Italy, many of whom are 
from the Maghreb, are illegal immigrants33, and more than half a million North African 
immigrants have settled in Spain and the Benelux countries34. Unlike their predecessors, 
these "jet age"35 migrants are no longer confined to their region of origin, but instead 
impinge directly upon the Mediterranean's more developed countries. As disparities in 
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living standards and population growth between the North and South escalate so to do the 
numbers of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. A commonly used dictum states, 
"the Mediterranean is to Europe what the Rio Grande is to the United States"- .^ 
This analogy is illustrated in the following map (figure 7), which also indicates the 
additional pressure that western Europe is coming under as a result of migration flows 
from Turkey and eastern Europe: 
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Anxieties over the phenomenon o f immigration as a future security challenge have not 
arisen from an irrational fear, nor from a political vacuum. Such anxieties are the 
consequence o f a common unease arising from the shared geopolitical situations o f 
France. Italy and Spain 3 7 For these three states, the first consideration is a demographic 
one. It includes national population levels, but more specifically comparative growth rates 
and projected total levels (see figures 8 and 9). 
The second level o f concern centres on global economic development with the wide 
disparities in wealth and opportunities that prevail between the rich industrialised "North' 
and the underdeveloped 'South' Finally, D'Abadie has written that "the disquiet over 
inward migratory flows in southern Europe has found a plausible source in a consideration 
whose origin is quite ancient, an apprehension over the consequences that immigration can 
create for the health o f the body politic and the democratic attributes o f Western 
Europe" 3 8. One o f the causes o f this common unease is the serious reservations the 
governments and authorities in these three countries have about the ability o f arrivals to 
adjust to western lifestyles. In particular, increasing support for Islamic fundamentalist 
movements within host countries has introduced a complicating element to already multi-
cultural societies and in many cases is deemed to represent a security risk. Congruent to 
this, the obscurantist tactics adopted by xenophobic right wing groups which are receiving 
increasing support in France, Italy and Spain may also induce instability. 
This prospect o f regional demographic changes in North Africa presenting a challenge to 
Europe's stability has been fully espoused in a post-Cold War study that addresses the 
ongoing theme o f European Security in the transformed political environment 3 9. The 
extent o f the potential problem can be seen from figures 8 and 9. 
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Figure 8: Population Growth in the EEC and North Africa ( in millions) 
Year EEC N . Africa Ratio 
1960 279.9 51.8 5.4 
1985 321.6 123 2.6 
2000 323.8 175.6 18 
2025 306.4 260.8 12 
Source: Boyer, Y 1901, p.64. 
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It can be seen from figure 8 that by the year 2025 the population of North Africa is 
expected to be almost the same as the population o f the EEC4*' The reason that this 
explosive increase is cause for concern is that it is unlikely to be accompanied by a 
comparable improvement in living standards. Although the figures 8 and 9 highlight the 
differing demographic trends between the South and the North and help explain the 
migration flows that result from these disparities, the fact remains that South-South 
migrations may pose an equally severe macro-political threat The plight o f the 
Palestinians, thrown around the Middle East at a whim for decades is testimony to the 
instability and antipathy that can ensue from South-South migrations 
Given the penchant for conflict in the region the potential forced migrations that may 
result from war must also be considered. As witnessed in the Gulf 1990/91, Algeria 
(1992-present) and the Balkans (1993-present), the vast and unanticipated outflows o f 
people from war zones can proliferate the effects o f conflict and transform detached 
incidents into major regional security concerns. After the Kurdish uprising in March 1991, 
almost two million Kurds took refuge in Turkey and Iran. Following civil wars in Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola and Liberia approaching four million refugees 
fled to neighbouring countries 4 1. Clearly, only a small percentage o f these refugees would 
have had to move to Mediterranean EU countries to undermine economic, social and 
political aspects o f security. 
Wars and other isolated episodes aside, the International Labour Office (LLO) calculated 
that by 2025 the Mediterranean EU states may well receive one hundred and twenty 
million refugees from North Africa and Turkey 4 2 . Furthermore, northern E U states, 
coping with persistent migration from East Europe, are unlikely to be able to help with the 
absorption o f such vast quantities. Critics argue that the E U is failing to address such 
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trends adequately. The exclusionary policies borne out in the Schengen Treaty (1993) and 
the trend towards isolation in the form o f the Single European Market do little to tackle 
the humanitarian and economic roots o f the problem 4 3 Al l considered, the seriousness o f 
the long term threat posed by massive population movements to the Mediterranean can 
not be overstated. 
Monsignor Philip Calleya, Director o f Malta's Emigrants' Commission, is as well placed as 
anyone to comment on the effect that mass population movements in the Mediterranean 
region might have on Malta's stability and security. In an interview he explained that it is 
important to understand and distinguish between three groups o f immigrants in Malta 
(Interview conducted by author 18 Apri l 1995). 
First o f all, there are the legal immigrants which represent a small but growing proportion 
of the immigrant population in Malta. Since they have either been invited into the country 
as guest-workers, granted visas as a result o f their profession or citizenship in view o f 
their assets they pose few problems to national stability (although one worrying exception 
to this generalisation can be identified 4 4). 
Second, there are the legitimate refugees and official asylum seekers who either turned 
themselves in on arrival or have been captured According to Monsignor Calleya this 
group can range between six hundred and one thousand at any one time. In April 1995 it 
was made up primarily o f Iraqis (300), ex-Yugoslavs (100), Algerians (85) and Sudanese 
(67), although there are a number o f Somalis (7), Liberians (6) and Palestinians (35) as 
well. Hence, this group basically comprises persons fleeing persecution or political 
violence elsewhere in the Mediterranean region who have sought temporary protection in 
Malta It is important to note that, "Malta is not and can never be a resettlement 
country" 4 5 and that most o f the refugees would eventually be settled in either the USA, 
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Canada or Australia. To date, the Emigrants Commission in Valletta has been relatively 
successful at assigning refugees to one o f these "third countries". Ironically, their 
successful record may yet prove an enticement to the increasing number o f refugees 
deterred by the more stringent screening o f asylum seekers on the southern European 
mainland -16 At the moment, however, save for the cost o f administering and 
accommodating them, this group o f immigrants pose little threat to national stability and 
security 
The third group of immigrants in Malta is made up o f the refugees and immigrant workers 
who have not formally requested asylum or have not yet been caught by the authorities. 
They are, o f course, the illegal immigrants that have sought to either merge into Maltese 
society permanently or find temporary work before returning home or moving on 
elsewhere Accurate information on a subject as delicate as illegal immigration is hard to 
come by in Malta. It has been suggested that the Government may actually play down the 
size o f the immigrant population in Malta since immigrant workers (both legal and illegal) 
are a necessity on some o f the islands' larger construction projects and to fi l l some o f the 
more menial seasonal posts created by the tourist industry 4 7. Estimates are further 
hindered by the fact that illegal immigrants, o f North African origin in particular, blend 
into Maltese society with moderate ease; English and the Semitic based Maltese language 
posing few problems to them. Nevertheless, Malta's newspapers often contain articles 
detailing the arrests o f illegal immigrants 4 8 and a number o f commentators have expressed 
concern over the potential scale o f this problem. In a recent editorial in the Malta Times 
the issue o f "refugees in Malta" was referred to as "no small problem" 4 9 and in another 
article Joseph Abela wrote o f "thousands o f refugees flocking to Malta" 5 0 . Although 
official figures issued by the Emigrants Commission state that there have never been more 
than one thousand illegal refugees in Malta, it is easy to question such a figure. 
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Retired A F M Major, Marcel Cassar, now heads security operations at Luqa Airport. 
When interviewed, he stated that it was extremely difficult to estimate the number o f 
illegal immigrants in Malta at any one time since the majority of them are either passing 
through on their way to a resettlement location or looking for temporary work before 
returning home 5 ' Nevertheless, he went on to explain that the Coast Guard was vastly 
under funded and undermanned and he suspected that on average for every captured 
illegal immigrant, another reached Malta's shoreline. In addition to this, he mentioned that 
checks on merchant shipping are not carried out with the regularity that is necessary to 
monitor the large number o f ships docking in either Valletta or the Marsa Freeport. In 
conclusion, he asserted that in the current circumstances (time o f interview) there could be 
anything between five hundred and fifteen hundred illegal immigrants in Malta. 
With the help o f Marcel Cassar, I managed to arrange a day with the Malta Coast Guard. 
Unfortunately 1 was unable to witness any boardings or searches but did manage to 
discuss the procedures in detail with a number o f the coast guards 5 2. Their anti-
contraband and illegal immigration routine comprises a circumnavigation o f the islands 
twice per day. There is little variation to either the timing or course o f these 
circumnavigations. In fact, the patrol vessels disembark coast-guards with regularity at 
their home ports as they finish their watches. The boarding parties themselves rarely 
contained more than four sailors and searches below decks were conducted only "now and 
again". For larger vessels at least six sailors are required to conduct a thorough boarding 
and searches below decks are imperative since this is where illegal immigrants are most 
likely to be hidden. In terms o f motivation, there appeared to be few incentives in place 
for the coast guards to maximise arrests; indeed, the majority o f them perceived their 
primary role to lie in fishery protection Clearly, therefore, only a small level o f planning 
would be required by prospective illegal immigrants or their criminal escorts to breach 
Malta's diminutive coastal patrols. Following my experience with the Malta Coast Guard, 
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it is easy to see why Marcel Cassar estimates that so many illegal immigrants escape the 
Coast Guard In fact, it is likely that his estimates o f between five hundred and fifteen 
hundred illegal immigrants in Malta in the current geopolitical circumstances probably err 
on the side o f conservatism 
Having established the extent o f the problem it is important to determine the nature o f the 
threat illegal immigrants pose to Malta's national well-being. Obviously the main threat 
derives from the fact that illegal immigrants are in effect citizens o f a state who are in all 
respects unaccountable Andrew Seychell, Police Superintendent, stated in an interview 5 3 
that, largely because they are unaccountable and no one has any definite idea o f their 
numbers, people find it convenient to blame illegal immigrants the kinds problem, which 
can in turn fuel racism. Certainly, throughout the research period I witnessed a great deal 
of racism; one charity worker even tried to apportion blame for epidemics and disease in 
Malta (including Malta's small AIDS problem) on the islands' population o f illegal 
immigrants 5 4. -Although it is perhaps taking it a step too far to blame immigrants for 
spreading disease, it is easy to understand why people might assume that they are 
responsible for fuelling crime. Andrew Seychell explained how the problems o f illegal 
immigration, domestic and international crime are inextricably linked. Many illegal 
immigrants gain access to Malta through some form o f international criminal group, who 
may also find them illicit work 5 5 . In addition to this, the very fact that they risked the trip 
to Malta in the first place would suggest that they would not be shy o f the further risks 
involved in criminal activity. Andrew Seychell stated that it is important not to exaggerate 
the culpability o f illegal immigrants since there are few examples o f them being involved in 
more serious crimes. He also stated, however, that increases in petty criminal activity 
could be noted following a suspected "influx o f illegal immigrants Despite Andrew 
Seychell's attempts to play down the significance o f the crimes committed by illegal 
immigrants, it is important to note that they are typically desperate people who, although 
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not always especially organized, will stop at nothing in their bid for survival. For this 
reason, a scenario in which a large wave o f illegal immigrants instigates domestic 
instability in Malta is entirely reasonable. 
This section has shown that Malta is affected by most o f the main population flows in the 
Mediterranean region. Furthermore, the demographic, social and political trends in the 
Mediterranean would seem to suggest a strengthening o f these flows in the next three 
decades or so. Clearly, policies and procedures adopted by the EU are a major factor 
affecting these flows By strengthening Europe's external borders, the Schengen Treaty 
has undoubtedly made it more difficult for illegal immigrants to enter the EU. It remains 
to be seen however, whether the lifting o f most o f the EU's internal border controls which 
has also been implemented as a result o f this treaty has offset any o f the benefits that have 
stemmed from the strengthened external borders. 
In so far as Malta is concerned, the scale o f the immigration problem there is modest when 
compared to the extent o f the difficulties encountered by larger Mediterranean countries, 
such as France, Spain or Italy. Malta is not a resettlement country and does not have to 
deal with the usual long-term problems o f integrating large numbers o f immigrants into its 
society. We have seen, however, that the short waves o f illegal immigrants that Malta is 
exposed to pose a threat to the preservation o f Malta's national well being. Whether 
Malta remains a non-member on the outskirts o f a more fortress-like EU, and perhaps then 
a more attractive option to prospective immigrants, or becomes a member o f an 
increasingly borderless EU, and perhaps then a stepping stone onto the mainland, no let up 
in the problem is anticipated. No matter how small the actual figures may seem, given 
Malta's micro-infrastmcture, micro-economy and small population even slight increases in 
illegal immigration, and the criminal activity that may ensue, could be debilitating to the 
islands' internal security and stability. In conclusion, mass population movements in the 
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Mediterranean region undoubtedly pose a macropolitical threat to Malta o f significant 
proportions and therefore warrant further, more detailed appraisal. 
5.22 International terrorism. 
I f the Mediterranean is civilisation's uneasy cradle so is it the birth place and repose o f its 
antithesis - terrorism. Be it Jewish, Christian, Islamic, secular, nationalist or revolutionary, 
the Mediterranean has been terrorised since time immemorial As Paul Wilkinson has 
written: 
"Terrorism is not a recent invention. It was used by the Si corn and Zealots against the 
Roman occupation of Palestine. In the 1 Ith and 12th centuries it was the chosen weapon 
of a radical Islamic sect, the Assasins, in their campaign to overthrow the existing Moslem 
authorities Revolutionaries, nihilists and anarchists used the tactics of bombing and 
assassination in their unsuccessful efforts to destroy autocracy, for example ... in the 
Balkans. And in the 1940s and 1950s terrorism became the primary weapon of 
movements engaged in major anti-colonial struggles, for example by the Jews against the 
British Mandate in Palestine, by EOKA against British colonial rule in Cyprus, by 
FLOSY in Aden, and by the FLN against the French in Algeria" 5 6. 
Following on from the above examples, the explosion o f modem international terrorism 
did not occur until the end o f the 1960s. Incidents o f international terrorism increased 
tenfold between 1968 and 1990 and now directly affect all o f the countries in and around 
the Mediterranean 5 7 (See figure 10). 
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As can be seen from figure 10 the macropolitical threat posed by international terrorism to 
the Mediterranean region is pervasive in nature. On the extent o f the problem, Evvan 
Anderson has written: 
"Virtually every Mediterranean riparian country has witnessed acts of terrorism, whether 
in Southern Europe, die Balkans, the Middle East or North Africa. 
While the major concentration o f active terrorist organizations can be seen to have been in 
the Levant, terrorist activities are also clearly o f major significance in Turkey, Egypt and 
Algeria Even the islands o f Corsica and Sardinia, not normally in the front line o f 
terrorist atrocities, have not been immune 5 9. 
It would appear that the end o f the Cold War has quenched the transitory period o f 
Marxist terrorism in Europe and translated the world's attention to the South and the 
Mediterranean where terrorist violence persists. Rather than examine the roots and causes 
o f various cycles o f terrorism in the Mediterranean or the growth o f specific groups, this 
section focuses on the latest trends and patterns o f activities in the region and the 
implications that they have for Malta's security. It is also best to avoid the interminable 
arguments about what constitutes terrorism. A far-frorn-exhaustive review o f recent 
literature in the field revealed dozens o f definitions. However, for the purposes o f this 
section I shall rely on the definition provided by the US State Department in its latest 
annual report: 
"Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience".^ 
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Since it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that Malta wi l l be subject to any form o f 
national terrorism, this section will focus on international terrorism; that is, terrorism 
involving citizens or territory o f more than one country. It is the growth o f international 
terrorism which John Deutch, the head o f the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , was 
referring to when he stated: 
" I regret that 1 have come to the conclusion there is going to be tremendous growth in 
terrorism over the next decade or so."61 
A number o f ominous trends ensure that international terrorism, as defined above, should 
figure highly in geopolitical thinking and foreign and security policy considerations 
throughout the Mediterranean region: 
Clutterbuck has warned o f the distinct possibility o f a formally organized international 
terrorist league emerging In Islamic Fundamentalism, many o f the terrorist groups in and 
around the Mediterranean share a common motive and there are already many examples o f 
the pooling o f hind-raising, weaponry, resources and specialist skills 6 2 . Few countries in 
the Mediterranean region are without their share o f extreme Islamic groups, however 
marginalized, unrepresentative or alienated they are. The prospect o f multi-lateral co-
operation between these groups is especially daunting since most support the use o f 
violence as a legitimate tactic in their impulsive quest for drastic political solutions to their 
problems. 
Another trend which has become apparent in and around the Mediterranean is the use o f 
terrorist groups as mercenaries by sponsor regimes to conduct terrorist proxy war against 
'enemy states'. The contemporary history o f Kurdish guerrilla groups is demonstrative o f 
this trend 6 1 The various regimes o f the region have supported separatist activities against 
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disliked governments abroad whilst simultaneously opposing peaceful protest for 
separation at home The attack by Iraqi soldiers and an Iraqi backed Kurdish Democratic 
Party (KDP) on the Patriotic Union o f Kurdistan's (PUK) stronghold o f Irbil (31 August 
1996) is the latest in a series o f similar but smaller conflicts. In recent years, Syria, Iran 
and Turkey have all used Kurds as surrogates for their own hostilities 6 4. By doing so, they 
avoid the risks o f open war Furthermore, through the provision o f armaments, training, 
cash and intelligence they vastly increase the 'clout' o f undisciplined and unaccountable 
militants. 
The most dangerous trend in terrorism has been an increase in the lethality o f attacks over 
the last decade or so. Illustrative o f this is the shift from hijacking to the sabotage 
bombing o f jumbo jets, or the escalation from small car bombs to huge truck bombs 6 5. 
Many commentators fear that the next stage may even involve a nuclear, biological or 
chemical attack 6 6 For this reason, the proliferation o f biological and chemical materials 
by certain unstable regimes and the status o f the former Soviet nuclear arsenal warrant 
close scrutiny by counter-terrorist bodies As Margaret Thatcher warned: 
"The Soviet collapse has aggravated the single most awesome threat of modem times the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons, and the ability to develop 
and deliver them, are today acquired by middle income countries with modest populations 
such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria - acquired sometimes from other powers like China and 
North Korea, but most ominously from former Soviet arsenals, or unemployed scientists, 
or from organised criminal rings, all via a growing international black market. Add 
weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, and you have a highly toxic compound. In 
some instances, the potential capabilities at the command of these unpredictable figures is 
either equal to or even more destructive than the Soviet threat to the West in the 1960s It 
is that serious."67 
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Margaret Thatcher spelled out in the above statement why the macropolitical threat posed 
by terrorism should feature highly in geopolitical thinking into the next century. The 
"most awesome threat" is not yet within range of the shores o f the United Kingdom but is 
in fact on the doorstep o f the Maltese islands. Although at present it is difficult to 
envisage a motive for an attack on Malta, terrorist behaviour is notoriously irrational and 
Malta's increasing involvement in the Western security sphere means that the 
macropolitical threat posed by terrorism to Malta is worthy o f closer scrutiny 
The events o f 1985 can be recalled by most Maltese and serve as a constant reminder o f 
their vulnerability to terrorist insurgency. Land based terrorism was no new phenomenon 
to the Mediterranean but within the space o f a month modern terrorists had taken to the 
air and sea. The hijack o f the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October o f that year 
remains a symbol o f terrorism at sea. One month later, Malta became the unwilling host 
to the hijacked Egyptair flight MS 648 which through the amateurism o f Egyptian 
Commandos was transformed into the "world's worst hijack" 6 8 The willingness o f the 
region's extremist groups to terrorise per mare, per terram, per aer is particularly relevant 
to Malta as an island at the cross-roads o f the world's busiest air and sea ways. Malta's 
two major gateways to the Mediterranean, Luqa airport and the Freeport, are therefore 
the most likely terrorist targets or flash-points 
The "hubbing concept" promoted by Air Malta highlights the role Luqa airport plays in 
Mediterranean travel. In an interview, Marcel Cassar gave views on Malta's role in 
Mediterranean air travel and the implications for anti-terrorist security that arise from the 
promotion o f the "hubbing concept" 6 9. He explained that, by virtue o f its location, Luqa 
airport serves as an important hub between Middle Eastern and European airports More 
specifically, the management's strategy aims to target city pair segments between the 
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Middle East and Europe which are not already seized by direct flights. This means that 
those involved in security at Luqa airport are left to deal with a high proportion o f 
passengers and baggage from less security conscious provincial airports. In addition to 
this, and perhaps more significantly, the majority o f their flights link the two mam source 
areas o f international terrorism, Middle East and North Africa, to the main target area, 
Europe. Whilst a detailed analysis o f the security arrangements at Luqa airport is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, it is worth citing the opinion o f one researcher who has looked 
into the matter in some detail. Willram Crenshare has completed a PhD on Terrorism and 
(he ITireat to Civil Aviation and, referring to Malta's Luqa Airport, stated that, "in view o f 
its location there is scope for improved security in the operational area, the hold and cabin 
luggage check-in as well as through increased segregation o f arrivals and departures"70. 
Malta Freeport is essentially a transhipment seaport which is promoted along the same 
lines as Luqa Airport; that is as a regional hub The Freeport is located in Marsaxlokk 
Bay alongside a number o f Malta's other key facilities, including the Delimara power 
station and the island's only gas storage facility, not to mention a major population and 
tourist centre. Such a concentration o f key facilities yields the bay especially vulnerable to 
terrorist attack Unlike the airport, the Freeport receives no mention in the section on 
National Security in "The Structure Plan: Report o f Survey ( I991)" 7 1 . Furthermore, 
when interviewed. Dr. Stefan Micallef o f the "Regional Marine Pollution Emergency 
Response Centre" expressed serious reservations about the authorities' ability to cope with 
an accident in the vicinity o f the Freeport, never mind a deliberate attack 7 2. 
In addition to the airport and Freeport a thorough appraisal o f the threat posed by 
international terrorism to Malta should take into account a number o f other potential 
targets: 
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I f the Maltese government were to offend some of the region's more extreme Islamists in 
some way the government buildings in Valetta would be an obvious target for a reprisal 
attack. However, such a prospect is not foreseeable in the immediate future, although 
moves towards closer association with NATO or even the EU may mean that the 
government has to be a little more cautious when making commenting in public on 
sensitive international matters. 
Large multinationals with strong US connections may also find themselves targeted by 
terrorists i f in their dealings they have exploited or affronted Islamists in some way. The 
most likely victims o f such attacks are the big oil companies, but fortunately Malta does 
not play host to any such companies. SGS Thompson is by far Malta's largest 
multinational company but it is involved mainly in the manufacture o f micro-electronics 
and it is difficult envisage them becoming the target of a terrorist attack. 
In the wake o f the bombings o f the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998), 
Western embassies in Valletta are far more likely terrorist targets. Joseph Paolino, the US 
Ambassador in Malta, was asked in an interview how seriously he and his fellow diplomats 
viewed the terrorist threat. He explained that, although to his knowledge other embassies 
in Valletta were not as wary o f the terrorist threat, 
"as a matter of course the US embassy adopts various states of alertness to the terrorist 
threat which are decided by the federal political analysts in Washington who are 
continually assessing the level of the terrorist threat The highest state of alertness was 
adopted following the US's bombing of Libya and throughout the Gulf War but since then 
only for specific occasions or functions."73 
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As an example, following the recent embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (August 
1998) it is likely that the state o f alertness at the US embassy in Valletta will have once 
again been raised. 
The increasing number o f U N centres being set-up in Malta constitute one final group of 
potential targets 7 4 As a body whose main aim is to promote international peace and 
security the UN and its installations may seem like an unlikely target for terrorists o f any 
type. However, through its increasing involvement in international conflicts in recent 
years, the U N has exposed itself to a great deal o f criticism and earned itself a range o f 
enemies. For instance, by failing to protect the Bosnian Muslims from ethnic cleansing in 
the former Yugoslavia, the U N was the subject o f widespread condemnation in the Islamic 
world. In addition to this instance, both Libya and Iraq are currently suffering UN 
imposed economic sanctions and offices seen to be representing the U N should be wary o f 
the prospect o f reprisal attacks from terrorists sponsored by these countries On this 
point, Joseph Paolino, expressed concern at certain entrepreneurs in Malta who seemed to 
be trying to capitalise on the embargo on Libya by offering services to businessmen who 
were seeking to breach the U N sanctions75. It would seem that even Air Malta is involved 
in this practice by promoting flights connecting Europe with Tunis or Monastir and 
arranging transport on to Libya. 
Clearly then, i f the ominous trends in international terrorism outlined at the beginning o f 
this section are considered alongside the potential targets identified above it is easy to see 
why the terrorist threat to Malta should feature highly in security planning and 
contingency preparedness Since the explosion o f terrorism in the Mediterranean, Malta 
has experienced four aircraft hijackings and has also been implicated in the bombing o f 
Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie 7 6 and two other relatively minor attacks; in strictly 
quantitative terms a minute share o f regional activity 7 7 . Nevertheless, given Malta's heavy 
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dependence on tourism, even the most minuscule o f attacks could have catastrophic 
effects on the economy75* On this note, the aphorism San Tzu used to describe the effects 
o f terrorism two thousand, five hundred years ago is still applicable today, 
"kill one - frighten ten thousand"^ 
As a final thought, the strong anti-Western proclivities o f many extremist Islamist groups 
mean that moves towards closer ties with the E U and particularly N A T O should be 
monitored closely by those concerned with Malta's security in a broad sense80. 
5.23 Mar i t ime boundary delimitation. 
The Mediterranean basin is recognised by theorists as one o f the world's biggest problem 
areas in so far as maritime boundary delimitation is concerned 8 1. As a semi-enclosed sea, 
none of its twenty two states can claim a ful l two hundred nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) without an overlap 8 2. Out o f a potential forty-six maritime 
boundaries only eleven have been either settled or partially settled (approximately 24 per 
cent) 8 3 
Future maritime boundary settlements are primarily hindered by a lack o f support from 
many littoral states for the concepts set out in the Third U N Convention on the Law o f the 
Sea (UNCLOS ILI), which are now in force. The first state ratified the Convention in 
1982 whereas the majority o f Mediterranean states have done so in the last five or so years 
(with Spain and the UK [which affects Gibraltar and the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus] only 
ratifying in 1997) 8 4. Further demonstrative o f this apparent apathy towards UNCLOS I I I 
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Is the fact that six states have yet to ratify it; Albania, Turkey, Syria, Israel, Libya and 
Morocco*" As Blake noted: 
"Altogether the Mediterranean has a higher proportion of non-signatories of the UN 
Convention than any other region"86. 
In addition to this, a number o f other obstacles to Mediterranean boundary delimitation 
arise from the region's political and geographical characteristics. 
Poor political relations threaten to impede agreement over many o f the Mediterranean's 
maritime boundaries. For example, the faltering Middle East peace process prevents Israel 
f rom negotiating its maritime borders 8 7. Croatia has a number o f obvious political 
obstacles to overcome i f it is to settle its new maritime boundaries with Slovenia and 
Serbia/Montenegro Spain and Morocco are unlikely to conclude a maritime boundary 
agreement while Morocco disputes the sovereignty o f the Spanish "Plazas" and Spain 
itself rejects British sovereignty over Gibraltar 8 8 And as the final, and perhaps most 
significant, example, we turn to the Aegean. Although both states belong to NATO, 
Greece and Turkey have been locked in dispute on the question o f sovereignty over the 
Aegean Sea for over twenty years and the dispute, compounded with the Cyprus problem, 
has erupted into numerous bids o f violence and brought them close to armed conflict on a 
number o f occasions over the years 8 9 In accordance with the 1992 U N Convention 
signed by Greece, but not Turkey, every coastal state can claim a territorial sea o f twelve 
nautical miles. The main problem is posed by the fact that i f Greece were to achieve its 
ful l entitlement with respect to this convention it would obtain sovereignty o f over 71 per 
cent o f the Aegean 9 0. Considering the potential presence o f oil in the northern Aegean 
and given the necessity to protect its shipping, Turkey claims the Aegean presents special 
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circumstances and should be divided according to a median line boundary. The problem is 
further complicated by an airspace dispute, which has yet to be fully resolved, and the 
position with regard to the maritime boundaries around Cyprus'-" 
In addition to poor political relationships, geographical characteristics also impede 
maritime boundary' delimitation Specifically, the shape and dimensions o f the basin, the 
existence o f numerous peninsulas and islands and the relative proximity o f a large number 
o f states within a constricted area, all cause particular problems Consummately, the 
geographical configuration o f the basin dictates that the majority o f potential disputes and 
confrontations are between North and South; precisely the axis about which international 
relations are poorest On this point, Langfbrd has pointed out, 
"Nearly 70 per cent of potentially contentious Mediterranean boundaries are between 
opposite States"92. 
Thus, a number o f political and geographical complications have combined with a general 
apathy towards the concepts set out in UNCLOS I I I to constrict delimitation o f the 
Mediterranean Sea. Although, the delimitation o f maritime boundaries in the 
Mediterranean is ultimately a legal problem, it nevertheless presents a number o f 
implications for the long term security o f all riparian states. As has been seen from the 
examples already discussed, failure to reach a satisfactory legal and equitable agreement 
can all too easily bring about dispute and even result in conflict. The following map shows 
the extent o f the possible flash-points that may well emerge in the course o f the process o f 
maritime boundary delimitation in the Mediterranean basin: 
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As can be seen from figure 12, the future security and stability o f the entire region is 
clearly at stake from the process o f maritime boundary delimitation 
The question we are concerned with here is whether Malta's security and stability is likely 
to be threatened as a result o f any disputes which emanate from the delimitation process 
and in turn, therefore, whether this process should be the concern o f those Maltese 
engaged in geopolitical thinking. At first glance, it would appear that the prudent answer 
to this question is most certainly, yes. Not only is Malta's potential area o f offshore 
jurisdiction the central piece in what is planned to be a complex jigsaw o f maritime 
jurisdictions, but Malta is also an archipelagic island group and, as such, the delimitation 
o f her maritime boundaries attracts a great many additional problems 9 1. Furthermore, as 
Blake explained: 
"In some ways Malta has a bigger stake in the Mediterranean than most of the other 
coastal states Malta is clearly one of the Mediterranean's most ocean-dependent 
states"94. 
In addition to this, as Anderson 9 5 and Blake 9 6 have calculated, when land area is measured 
in relation to length o f Mediterranean coastline Malta ranks second only to Monaco This 
measure provides a crude index o f "Mediterranean consciousness" since it implies that a 
high proportion o f the Maltese population five close to the coast 9 7. 
The remainder o f this section investigates the problems o f delimitation which are brought 
about by Malta's geographical configuration and location and assesses whether they are 
likely to become the source o f dispute or even conflict. 
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The quintessential point o f departure for any investigation into Malta's maritime 
jurisdiction must surely be the celebrated speech of Malta's Ambassador to the U N , A n id 
Pardot, to the First Committee o f the UN General Assembly in November 1967. This 
seminal speech lasted three hours and comprised mainly a plea to the coastal states o f the 
world to end their deeply damaging scramble for control o f the oceans. More specifically, 
he argued for; 
"an effective international regime over the seabed and ocean floor beyond a clearly defined 
national jurisdiction"9 8. 
As Blake noted, within six weeks o f this speech, which conceptualised the "Common 
Heritage o f Mankind", an Ad Hoc Committee had been formed to look into the matter 9 9 
In turn, this then led to Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 
Convention 1 0 0 . Despite commendable efforts by successive Maltese governments to enact 
their small but significant part o f Arvid Pardot's vision, figure 13 shows that Malta's 
potentially complex network o f boundaries remains far from complete 
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Through her dispute with Libya, Malta has experienced the high cost and potential 
duration o f arbitration through the International Court o f Justice (ICJ), but also the 
Tensions that the delimitation process can cause1"1. To this backdrop, Maltese authorities 
arc gradually seeking conciliation with Italy and Tunisia as well as pushing for the 
equitable division o f the Ionian Sea ( see figure 13 ). 
Professor David Attard, who is the Director o f the International Maritime Law Institute in 
Msida, Malta, was asked about his views on Malta's undelimited boundaries to her north, 
east and west 1 0 2 . 
Delimitation between Malta and Italy is still unresolved, although there exists a working 
arrangement which grants concessions up to within five hundred metres o f the median line 
between Malta and Sicily. Professor Attard was quick to dismiss the prospect o f any kind 
of hostile dispute resulting from the delimitation o f this boundary. Nevertheless, i f looking 
at worst-case scenarios, which is after all what a great deal o f geopolitical thinking is 
involved with, such a dispute, no matter how mild a form it may take, can not be ruled out 
completely. The Sicilian Channel is thought to be a potentially rich hydrocarbon area 1 0 3 
and the delimitation o f this Channel between Malta and Italy has been described as one o f 
the most "complex issues" in the central Mediterranean area 1 0 4. The most likely cause o f 
tension between Italy and Malta would be an oil strike close to the existing neutral 
corridor (500m strip along the notional median line between Malta and Sicily). Although 
such a strike is unlikely in the immediate future, a fall-out wi th the Italians could have 
serious political implications for Malta and more particularly for her relationship with the 
E U , 0 - \ Given the precariousness in Malta o f the entire European issue, a settlement for 
this boundary should be sought to ensure Malta's well-being and stability into the next 
century. The staunchest o f critics o f Malta's involvement with the E U must foresee the 
damage that could be done by any fall-out with Italy and perhaps then the E U over the 
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matter o f this potential boundary7. The delimitation o f this boundary is, therefore, a matter 
o f some geopolitical significance. 
In recent years relations between Malta and Tunisia have been strained by a dispute over 
the delimitation o f their intervening waters. Once again, oil prospecting has taken place in 
this area and has had the effect o f increasing the stakes Professor Attard believes that 
given Malta's relatively minute coastline it is extremely unlikely that an equidistant 
delimitation' 0 6 will be acceded to by Tunisia. To understand why this is likely to be the 
case we need to analyse the trend in agreements concluded thus far by opposite states and 
the precedents set in recent years by the cases which have passed through the arbitration 
procedure provided by the ICJ. 
In short, the once established doctrine o f equidistance was effectively abandoned after the 
North Sea cases o f 1969. Although there is still an apparent preference amongst lawyers 
and theorists for commencing proceedings with reference to a median l ine ' 0 7 , the ICJ has 
clearly rejected the strict application o f the equidistance/median line rule when it may lead 
to inequitable results. The findings o f two cases, both o f which are particularly close to 
home for the Maltese, are relevant and can be drawn upon here. First o f all, in the Libya-
Tunisia case (1982) 1 0 8 the ICJ ruled: 
"Equidistance is not, ..., either a mandatory legal principle or a method having some 
privileged status in relation to other methods"109. 
Furthermore, it stressed as a central factor the need to reach an equitable result: 
"The delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles and taking 
account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable result" 1 1 0. 
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As a second example o f the adoption o f similar reasoning by the court and the trend away 
from the doctrine o f rigid equidistance, it was held in the Libya-Malta case (judgement: 
June 1985; implementation: November 1986): 
"The delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles and taking 
account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable result"'1 1. 
This means that i f a settlement is to be reached between Malta and Tunisia the relevant 
circumstances referred to above must be taken into account by both parties in their 
negotiations. These wil l include, amongst other things, considerations o f proportionality 
as well as a more detailed appreciation o f the length and configuration o f both coastlines 
To date, however, neither o f the parties appears willing to compromise and their has been 
little push for agreement. It follows that the prospects for agreement are poor and a 
further deterioration bilateral relations cannot be discounted Indeed a report on the front 
page o f The Malta Independent stated: 
"Malta and Tunisia are locked in a bitter dispute over the median line - the delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf - and the Maltese Government is known to have made very strong 
representations about the matter. ... Both sources close to the government say the dispute 
has strained relations between the two countries. ... 'Relations were never so bad,' a well 
placed source said." 1 1 2 
Clearly, therefore, the delimitation o f this boundary is already developing into an issue 
whose resolution should feature highly in Maltese geopolitical thinking. 
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Finally we turn to the east o f Malta where the equitable division o f the Ionian Sea is not 
likely to prove an easy exercise. Professor Attard explained that this area is one o f the 
largest expanses o f water in the Mediterranean and is thus thought by many theorists to be 
one o f the biggest problem areas As can be seen from figure 11, complete delimitation 
will require agreement by states as politically diverse as Libya, Malta, Italy, Greece and 
Albania, and it is perhaps not surprising that few inroads into the delimitation o f this vast 
area to the east o f Malta have yet to be made. The potential complexity o f delimiting the 
Ionian Sea has meant that few countries have been prepared to invest in any oil 
exploration. Jt follows, therefore, that in the immediate future at least an oil strike in this 
area is an unlikely source o f dispute. The fact remains, however, that prospective offshore 
jurisdictions can be exploited in other ways for economic gain and the Ionian's status as 
one o f the deepest and richest fishing grounds in the Mediterranean basin could be 
sufficient in itself to trigger disputes over the competing national interests that exist there. 
As a further consideration, culpability for marine pollution is perhaps harder to assign in 
undelimited waters and this fact should act as a further stimulus for a solution to this 
problem area1 n . fn summary, a number o f potentially serious problems can be expected to 
emanate from the Ionian Sea and for this reason the equitable delimitation o f this area to 
the east o f Malta should also feature highly in current and future geopolitical deliberations 
on Malta. 
In conclusion, this section has shown that the delimitation o f Malta's remaining offshore 
jurisdiction is a matter o f geopolitical significance. According to Blake's rough 
calculations (i.e using equidistance only) Malta stands to control 61 , 000 square 
kilometres o f the Mediterranean 3 1 4. Nevertheless, as an archipelagic island group in the 
centre o f a semi-enclosed sea, Malta epitomises everything which is difficult about 
maritime boundary delimitation. Nevertheless, problematic though the process may be, 
the delimitation o f maritime boundaries has a "regulating effect" on the offshore activities 
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of the parties involved 1 1 5 and, for the sake o f international relations, is therefore worth 
giving high priority. 
The regulation o f oil prospecting has been alluded to already and, because of the large 
sums o f money normally involved, is probably the most important o f these activities. 
However, there are a number of other offshore activities which bring about potential 
geopolitical implications for Malta and are therefore worthy o f closer investigation by 
those concerned with Malta's stability and security. The role o f policing in the 
management o f the various tiers o f Malta's offshore domain has already been alluded to in 
sections 5.21 and 5.24 with reference to illegal immigration and contraband activities, 
respectively. In addition to this, however, the regulation o f any activities which may have 
a damaging effect on Malta's marine environment is also o f paramount importance As 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, much attention in recent years has come to 
be focused on activities that may be damaging to the environment and the increasing 
influence that such activities are exerting on the geopolitical and security considerations o f 
governments. Although a detailed examination o f the whole range o f activities that may 
damage Malta's marine environment is beyond the scope o f this thesis, it suffices to say 
that the main issues in question are potentially significant enough to warrant the attention 
of high-level policy-makers and should, therefore be incorporated into future geopolitical 
thinking on Malta. For example, Malta's vulnerability to large scale pollution which may 
come in the form o f a massive oil leak. This matter was discussed in detail with Dr Stefan 
MicaUef who is the chemical expert at the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency 
Response Centre for the Mediterranean (REMPEC) 1 1 6 . He was o f the opinion that, i f a 
wider definition o f security is used, Malta is undoubtedly threatened by the prospect o f 
any major spillage in the central Mediterranean. Such a conclusion is not surprising given 
the islands' location, sandwiched between the two carriage-ways o f one o f the world's 
busiest tanker routes, and the population's now heavy dependence on desalinisation for 
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most o f its domestic water. Besides rendering the desaiinisation plants unworkable almost 
immediately' 1 7, the longer term knock on effects o f such a spillage for Malta's tourist 
industry and so also her economic stability would be catastrophic. Through the increased 
regulation that delimitation o f maritime boundaries brings about culpability, blame and so 
also responsibility for pollution are all easier to establish1 1 8. This means that, although the 
threat o f such a catastrophe can never realistically be eradicated, the consequences o f such 
pollution can perhaps be controlled or at least tempered. Hence, in this respect also, the 
delimitation o f Malta's offshore jurisdiction is also a desirable new focus for geopolitical 
thinking in Malta 
5.24 Transnational crime. 
Traditionally organized crime has been seen as a predicament o f law and order. In recent 
years, modern transport and communications systems, economic interdependence and the 
emergence o f the global market have all radically permutated the context within which 
organized crime operates Indeed in the post-Cold War era a number o f theorists are 
acknowledging that transnational crime constitutes a security threat per sen9. 
Transnational crime, by definition, violates national borders and thus challenges the most 
fundamental attribute o f security; sovereignty. Similarly transnational criminal 
organizations, through their disregard for law and order undermine a state's authority and 
ultimately its capacity to govern itself And finally, at the international level, attempts to 
establish codes o f conduct and regulate international law are continually challenged by 
transnational crime. As Bearman has summarised: 
"Organised crime has taken advantage of new opportunities provided by globalism to 
become a transnational phenomenon that poses novel challenges to national and 
international security."1 2 0 
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!n recent years new patterns of domestic and international co-operation have spawned 
among criminal organizations Such co-operation connects groups as dispersed as the 
Mexican smuggling gangs, the Colombian cartels, the Hong Kong Chinese Triads, the 
Sicilian Mafia and the Russian and eastern European Organizalsiya. Out of these 
alliances, the partnership between the growing criminal empires of the former Soviet 
Union and the better known Sicilian Mafiosi clans is acknowledged as being the most 
efficacious12'. 
One commentator, Nathan Adams, has stated that the Sicilian-eastern connection is 
nothing new 1 2 2 He has pointed out that there was evidence of eastern involvement, 
primarily Hungarian, in a number of Sicilian drug refineries exposed in the latter years of 
the Cold War' 2 ' . Leo Brincat, the Malta Labour Party's international secretary, confirmed 
the Sicilian-eastern connection in an article in the Malta Independent: 
"At least 15 drug refineries had been discovered over the years in Sicily with evident 
Eastern links."124 
Political dislocation and upheaval in the Soviet Union have broadened the operational 
parameters for the pre-Glasnost collaborators. It is now relatively easy for them to muscle 
in on the irrepressible strain of capitalism in the former Soviet Union and collude with the 
speculators which have emanated from the Mediterranean's mam growth economies. This 
coalition would therefore appear to have concocted the perfect formula. Furthermore, 
political instability in and around the basin completes the perfect formula by providing an 
environment in which they can function with relative impunity. 
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Although illicitness of such activity makes quantitative assessments difficult, the 
involvement of transnational criminal organizations in the trafficking of armaments, drugs, 
money and even people is beyond doubt. 
Criminal involvement in weapons trafficking has become a staple feature of the post-Cold 
War world Such transactions can have significant impact both on local conflicts and on 
the capacity of terrorist groups to create mischief The most likely source of weaponry is 
the former Soviet Union, where the upsurge in organized crime has led one theorist to 
conclude that the communist state is; 
"less likely to be replaced by a democratic state than by a one that is either dominated by 
organised crime or in which there is a symbiotic relationship between government and 
major criminal organisations."125 
In his best-selling and highly believable futuristic novel, Frederick Forsyth spells out his 
idea of what is in store for Russia: 
" . . . a new world - of poverty and luxury, hunger and feast, of politicians, gangsters, private 
armies, prostitutes and priests" ^ 6 
Fiction aside, there are an estimated 5,700 criminal gangs in Russia with a total 
membership of over 100,000 m . Stephen Handleman has conducted a thorough study into 
these gangs and concluded that while many of them are small and disorganised, others are 
more sophisticated and have links to the political and economic elite 1 2 8. What makes all 
this even more disconcerting is that Russia remains a nuclear superpower in possession of 
vast quantities of loosely controlled nuclear material in a wide variety of installations and 
facilities. 
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If the former Soviet Union is the world's major provider, the Mediterranean is likely to be 
the world's mam recipient of illegal armaments Stanojevic has explained that. 
"In recent years about four fifths of the world trade in amis and military equipment ended 
up in developing countries. Of this, half of the entire world trade in arms goes to the Near 
East. Islamic countries are currently the biggest buyers of this merchandise."'29 
The legal stockpiling of armaments in the Mediterranean region, or more specifically the 
trend towards parity between the North and South of the basin, has long been the concern 
of traditional geopolitical theorists. However, a more recent and insidious macropolitical 
threat has been the availability of a whole range of armaments on the black market One 
analyst has referred to this threat as, 
"the most dangerous threat to security in the nineties"'30. 
International drugs trafficking is perhaps the primary vocation of the world's main 
organized criminal groups. Bearman has suggested that: 
"Although estimates of the value of the global drugs trade vary considerably, it may be 
second only to the global trade in oil'3 1". 
In recent years the Mediterranean has assumed a new role in the drugs trade between the 
world's principal zones of production and consumption. Post-Cold War instability in the 
Caucasus region has meant that criminal gangs in Georgia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan have drawn the traditional drug smuggling routes from the "golden 
crescent" down towards the Mediterranean132. In addition to this, heroin and cocaine 
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from the "golden triangle" are increasingly passing through African countries, where there 
is less impediment from corruptible and inexperienced authorities, en route to Europe and 
North America, again bringing the Mediterranean into play 1" It also seems to be the case 
that the drug trafficking and arms trafficking businesses are becoming increasingly 
intertwined, with cases of criminals representing specific ethnic groups becoming involved 
in the drug trade in order to acquire armaments134 
International criminal organizations also pose a macropolitical threat to the region through 
money laundering. They do so by undermining the integrity of the region's financial and 
commercial institutions. Money laundering has become a major business in its own right, 
with criminal organizations taking advantage of bank secrecy laws and offshore tax 
havens, as well as the electronic capabilities that facilitate the rapid transfer of funds 
around the global financial system. Despite the current extent of the problem, most 
commentators agree that the threat to international stability posed by money laundering 
should not be exaggerated. As Bearman has explained: 
"Even though the amount of laundered money is staggering in absolute terms, in relative 
terms it remains a very small percentage of the money circulating in the global financial 
markets."'35 
Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the potentially drastic implications that money 
laundering can have for some of the more vulnerable economies. By laundering their 
money in such an economy the criminals are likely to push up currency values and perhaps 
even stoke inflation to uncontrollable levels. Also, it is conceivable that by moving their 
money out of a particular institution or national economy at a key moment they could 
cause severe problems. Although organized criminals were not involved, the collapse of 
the U K bank Barings in February 1995 highlighted the vulnerability of even venerable 
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financial institutions to the rapid withdrawal of funds, and drew attention to the impact of 
disruptive and unexpected events on the stability of financial markets. A further 
consideration is that measures designed to counter money laundering ordinarily involve 
banking restrictions which in turn would tend to impede economic growth. 
Finally, some of the more enterprising organized criminal groups are latching onto the 
potential of trading in people. This suggests that the commodity they trade in is more or 
less irrelevant so long as it yields high profit and does so at acceptable risk Certainly 
from my experiences whilst serving in Hong Kong, this particular strand of international 
crime is particular horrific especially in terms of the disregard the criminals appear to have 
for their forlorn immigrants. Clearly, the criminals are contributing to the problem of 
illegal immigration but in addition to this there are far more issues at stake here. Not only 
does this phenomenon threaten a basic ingredient of national sovereignty, it also places in 
jeopardy the immigrants themselves, who sometimes end up in poverty-stricken or war-
torn countries rather than their desired destinations. Moreover, the would-be immigrants 
are highly vulnerable during transport, and on arrival are often forced to resort into 
criminal activity or highly undesirable or dangerous work. If the problem intensifies in 
certain areas it may also begin to provoke a backlash against legal immigrants and 
legitimate refugees. 
Given Malta's proximity to Sicily, in geographical, historic and, increasingly, cultural 
terms, it is perhaps with a sense of inevitability we now arrive at the macropolitical threat 
that organized crime poses to Malta. Although as yet there is only limited evidence of 
criminal involvement in illegal immigration into or via Malta, Malta's entanglement in the 
trafficking of arms and drugs as well as the laundering of money in the state's economy are 
all reasonably well recounted. The following paragraphs attempt to establish the nature 
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and extent of the threat that these phenomena pose to Malta's stability and the 
preservation of her national integrity. 
In 1995 Malta was mentioned as one of the main staging points for criminal arms running 
into Bosnia. Xavier Gautier wrote in the French newspaper Le Figaro (15 March 1995); 
"The Croats have bought 10,000 Beretta 92-FS revolvers in Malta, the same amount of 
Heckler, Koch or Glock machine guns made in Austria and 18,000 uniforms for soldiers of 
the Croat-Muslim Federation."136 
The above allegations came to the fore in Malta following a series of articles, responses 
and editorials in the Malta Independent in the middle of my field research 1 1 7. Marcel 
Cassar, gave his views on the allegations138. He stated that in his opinion they were highly 
plausible He even went on to point out the fact that cost in Malta of an American-made 
Beretta had risen from L00ODM to 1,800-DM in the first four months on 1995 and that 
this could well be indicative of the increased demand brought about by the smuggling. 
Maltese Police Superintendent, Andrew Seychell also believed the allegations to have been 
grounded and conceded that it would be relatively straightforward for a well organized 
criminal gang to gather together and smuggle the number of small arms in question out of 
Malta. He did state, however, that it would be unlikely that any larger arm shipments 
would escape the security procedures currently in place and I am inchned to agree with 
him in this respect. The problem with monitoring the movement of smaller arms in Malta 
is that there are vast quantities of firearms and ammunitions in the hands of recreational 
hunters and, in addition to this, Malta has very lax gun laws. Nathalino Fenech of the 
Malta Independent is currently (1998) conducting a PhD on "Bird Hunting in Malta" and 
believes that the number of unregistered firearms in Malta is well in excess of ten 
thousand1 3 9 Although it would seem that to date, Malta's entanglement in the smuggling 
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of armaments to Bosnia was an isolated incident this event is clearly demonstrative of the 
islands' vulnerability to this particular threat. 
Malta's involvement in arms trafficking is a relatively new phenomenon, but for a variety 
of reasons, however, the islands have long been especially disposed to transit traffic in 
drugs 1 4 0. For instance Malta's relatively long shoreline which is indented with numerous 
harbours, inlets and yachting berths, means that smuggling is difficult to control. The 
tourist trade and busy Freeport and airport, both of which have established themselves as 
"hubs" of regional travel and trade, further perplex those involved in counter-smuggling 
efforts. Despite the 1993 amendment to the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance1 4 1 and an 
increase in international co-operation aimed at combating the problem (most notably with 
Italy and Libya 1 4 2 ) , trafficking still creates serious difficulties for the Maltese authorities. 
Hillary Caruana, the research and development executive of "sedqa", which is a Maltese 
governmental "agency against drug and alcohol abuse", and inferred how serious he 
thought the problem was He did so through the use of a software package which he has 
designed to increase awareness of the problem of drug addiction in Malta. The fact that 
he himself is a rehabilitated addict may go some way to explaining why he is extremely 
well-motivated in his work and his heart-felt frustration at the widespread ignorance and 
apathy towards the drug problem in Malta. He explained that in recent years there have 
been between fifty and eighty substantial seizures of narcotics per anum but that this is in 
no way indicative of the true scale of the problem. Malta is at the heart of a number of 
major smuggling routes and he fears that at any one time there are substantial quantities of 
all the major drugs either passing through or in situ in Malta. This leads to the existence 
of what he refers to as "a supply-driven black market" in which drugs are continually being 
pushed onto Malta's youth and even tourists by experienced and professional criminal 
groups. This market is made up mainly of heroin 1 4 3 and cocaine, although seizures of 
ecstasy are on the increase 1 4 4 and cannabis has made a "comeback" in recent years 1 4 5 . On 
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paper, figures may seem relatively small but it is important not to overlook the fact that 
only a few kilograms of one of the harder drugs is sufficient to cause havoc in both 
Malta1-16 and Gozo 1 4 7 
The drug problem in Malta is undoubtedly of significant proportions, but nowhere are the 
Mafiosi-Organizatsiya connections so apparent as in the practise of money laundering 
Money laundering within Malta's banking sector is well documented148 but the main area 
of concern is within the domestic property market 
Whereas it is difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate Italian property 
purchases on the islands, the explosion of Russian acquisitions cannot be mistaken for a 
sudden interest in retirement or holiday villas. There may well have been a few members 
of the Soviet nomenklatura who decided to incorporate Malta into their multinational 
investment portfolios, but the recent upsurge of property purchases by Russians in the 
post-Cold War era leads to a more obvious interpretation. Between 1992 and 1994 
Russian property acquisitions in Malta increased tenfold and in the first month of 1995 
alone twenty six villas were bought by Russian citizens1 4 9. 
The problems are clear. Criminal money laundering is directly pressuring internal demand 
for property and if allowed to continue unchecked will ultimately drive up the value of the 
Maltese Lira, elevating inflation rates. Also, association with organised crime erodes 
Malta's standing in the international business community. Finally, legitimate growth and 
development are hindered through the restrictive measures, set out in the 1994 Money 
Laundering Bill, which are required to constrain the laundering. 
Although often tempered, the macropolitical threat posed by transnational crime to 
Maltese security cannot be overstated and, what is more, accession to the E U may well 
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augment the threat. Although co-ordination through C E L A D 1 5 0 and the Pompidou 
Group 1 5 1 is designed to counter criminal activity in Europe, such illicit dealings are far 
harder to trace within the expanse of the E U Furthermore, an open border with Sicily 
wouid have untold consequences for transnational criminal activity. In summary, Malta's 
vulnerable location within this regional geopolitical environment which is conducive to 
transnational crime has meant that the islands are fast becoming an unwitting cache for the 
Mafiosi-Organizatsiya coalition 
5.3 C O N C L U S I O N 
This chapter has focused on the forthcoming stage in world political history and examined 
how Malta is likely to fit into it It has done so through the analysis of four international 
issues which, despite having previously received only limited attention in Malta, are likely 
to take on geopolitical significance into the next century. These international issues are 
tantamount to the "regional specifities" which Gorbachev referred to 1 5 2 and, to use the 
words of Camilleri, form Malta's very' own "new macropolitical agenda"153 This chapter 
has proposed that further analysis of the nature and extent of the challenges thrown up by 
this macropolitical agenda would surely compel those Maltese engaged in geopolitical 
thought to discard their narrow and out-dated approaches. 
Thus, as it set out to do, this chapter has presented geopolitical thinkers in Malta with a 
course back to the future or an opportunity to look beyond historically-derived 
interpretations of their geopolitical environment. The recent renaissance in Maltese 
geopolitical thought discussed in the introduction to this chapter is a direct derivative of 
such historically-derived interpretations. The three traditional policy responses to wider 
political developments which have emanated from this renaissance (i.e. security through 
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the E U , NATO or strict neutrality) do little to protect Malta from the more stealthy 
macropolitical threats which form a major part of her current security environment. 
Although in no way constitutive of an exhaustive analysis, since there are undoubtedly 
more relevant issues and other macropolitical threats, this chapter has attempted to outline 
the four main macropolitical threats to Maltese security and well-being. Through these 
outlines it has sought to show that, even though they may be too insidious, multifaceted 
and pervasive to be acknowledged as being geopolitical according to traditional theoretical 
convention, taking account of the latest innovative thinking in the field these threats can in 
fact be classed as geopolitical phenomena in their own right 
Hence in a way, this chapter has prescribed a blue-print for the required rejuvenation of 
Maltese geopolitical thought. It has highlighted the importance of considering the less 
conventional geopolitical issues in the contemporary Mediterranean environment and in 
doing so, concurrently drawn attention to the impotence of the current renaissance of 
traditional geopolitical thinking in Malta. The macropolitical agenda presented in this 
chapter can thus feasibly be used as an alternative basis for geopolitical thought and so 
eventually even the making of foreign policy in Malta. The constituent ingredients of this 
alternative basis for future geopolitical thinking in Malta are set out in the following 
chapter, which summarises the findings of the thesis. 
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O V E R A L L CONCLUSIONS: 
T H E EVOLUTION O F M A L T E S E G E O P O L I T I C A L THOUGHT 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has investigated the evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought from its early, 
formative years, when those engaged in geopolitical thinking were probably not even 
aware of it, to its present day maturation, when it features highly in all types of political 
discourse in Malta. This final section draws conclusions that refer to the changes in the 
geopolitical attitudes and outlooks of the Maltese which have characterised this entire 
period of evolution. 
The thesis has shown that the history of geopolitical attitudes and outlooks in Malta has 
been a history of concession to dominant mainstream interpretations of geopolitical 
circumstances and developments. With the possible exception of Phase 3, when Maltese 
geopolitical thinkers generated some of their own ideas on the political space which Malta 
found itself in, geopolitical thinking in Malta has rarely deviated from the course followed 
by mainstream western geopolitical thought. This has been the case regardless of whether 
or not concession to these mainstream interpretations was in Malta's best interest at a 
given time. 
In the first chapter the clear distinction between responsibility for inside and outside issues 
was introduced In short, whilst the Maltese were granted a considerable say in the 
running of their own internal affairs (pp. 55-57), all issues arising off their shores were 
handled by the British. In turn, the British dealt with wider world circumstances and 
developments in the only way they knew how at this stage in history, through a policy 
framework of strict realism. It follows, therefore, that the geopolitical outlook imposed 
on the Maltese at this stage in their history was realist in nature The various petitions and 
disputes between the army and the Church would seem to indicate that, from time to time, 
there were members of Maltese society that objected to their islands being used as a 
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colonial base for power projection by the British. Nevertheless, on the whole there is little 
evidence to suggest that, from their invitation to colonise to the start of the First World 
War, there was anything but acceptance of the mainstream realist interpretation of wider 
world geopolitics. Nor would we expect anything other than such acceptance since, in a 
world in which territorial competition and conflict played such a major role, there were 
after all few alternatives to the realist global outlook. Subordination to a major power 
was expected by the Maltese and whatever downfalls might come with this were accepted 
as a small price to pay for the level of protection they received. So, in terms of 
independent Maltese geopolitical thought at this stage in history there was little, i f any, to 
talk of. However, as the other chapters in the thesis have shown and the remaining 
paragraphs of this section will argue, this phase was in many ways a formative and 
influential phase in the broader evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought. The British-
imposed realist outlook took hold in Maltese mindsets at this early stage in the evolution 
of their geopolitical thought and was not to be uprooted easily. 
In the second chapter, Maltese geopolitical thought, as discerned from policy responses in 
Malta to the two World Wars, was examined It was seen that the realist outlook to the 
geopolitical world that had been imposed on the Maltese throughout the colonial era was 
upheld in its most rigid form throughout this period of global anarchy. The typical 
trademarks of realism such as preoccupation with war and the preparedness for war were, 
even in the more severe forms that they had taken on, justified at this stage in history. 
Above all else, the realist assumption that the British nation-state accurately represented 
and acted in the best interests of all citizens of its empire was more unreservedly accepted 
by the Maltese between 1914 and 1945 than it had been previously. Whereas in colonial 
times the alternative to representation by the British, self rule, was not unarguably 
detrimental to the Maltese, the general consensus in Malta throughout this period of world 
war was that the alternative to representation by the British (i.e. Axis invasion) was most 
313 
definitely not in their best interest. In addition to this, the realist assumption that the 
maintenance of territorial security is the most important of all government tasks, which 
was discernible but not wholly justified in the colonial period, was no longer open to 
question. It would have been difficult to challenge the high priority status that issues of 
security and territoriality had, above all other state and colonial affairs in this period of 
global anarchy. Certainly those Maltese who gave thought to their geopolitical situation 
were under no illusions as to how vital British military support was in safeguarding their 
territorial sovereignty from an Italian or even German encroachment. In the colonial 
world order, which was littered with only a few small scale and transitory conflicts, the 
neglect of social and economic issues in favour of issues of military defence was not 
always easy to justify in the face of criticism In a world re-ordering through anarchy, 
however, pre-occupation with war and military and territorial security was, through 
necessity, not open to dispute or even liable to criticism. As world-wide war took hold 
twice in only three decades there was no alternative for the Maltese but to follow the 
orders of the British military command. It is therefore possible to conclude that the 
prevailing geopolitical outlook of the Maltese at this stage in history, although once again 
imposed on them from outside rather than inspired from thoughts generated within Malta, 
was in many ways more rigid than the realist outlook which characterised the earlier 
colonial era. Realism, and the set of assumptions that tend to go with it, had been further 
instilled in the Maltese psyche as a result of their experiences in the two world wars. 
The third chapter examined the phase in history when Malta's leaders embarked on the 
process of ridding the islands of their long-standing dependency on foreign protection. 
The geopolitical outlook and thought which proved the catalyst to this process was 
characterised by desire for change rather than acceptance of reality. As the main 
protagonists of the Cold War were falling into the downward, realist spiral of arms 
competition, Malta's leaders were acting against this continuity and seeking to alter 
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fundamentally the way their country interacted with the wider-world. The opposite had 
been true in the previous phase; in conceding much of the weight of their authority to the 
military leaders of their colonial rulers throughout both world wars, Malta's leaders had 
rendered themselves mere bystanders who were accepting of the realist continuity and 
unshakeable conflicrual nature of all geopolitical change As explained in the previous 
paragraph, however, there was hardly an alternative to subscribing to British rule 
throughout the two world wars. In contrast, just as the Cold War set in, the idealist vision 
was establishing itself as a viable alternative to the traditional view of the nature of the 
international political scene offered by realism. Chapter three showed that although there 
were economic advantages for Malta in following the idealist route, historical factors 
provided the main motivation for the wide scale adoption of idealist geopolitical thought 
in Malta throughout the Cold War. There was a common desire to ensure that Malta 
should never again become unnecessarily entangled in the conflicts of the world's major 
powers, and idealism provided the perfect course, in both thought and practice, to 
fulfilment of this desire. 
Although phase three represented a significant phase in the evolution of Maltese 
geopolitical thought, its importance should not be overplayed Whilst on the one hand it 
witnessed the discarding of one mainstream approach to geopolitical thought, realism, it 
also saw subscription by the majority of Maltese geopolitical thinkers to the other 
mainstream approach which was emerging, idealism. So although there had been a 
departure from the realism that had dominated ideas throughout Malta's earlier dependent 
history, this departure had merely pointed the dominant geopolitical outlook in Malta 
towards the next trend in geopolitical thinking. Maltese geopolitical thought remained 
under heavy influence from outside with few ideas directly applicable to Malta's unique set 
of circumstances being generated from the inside. 
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Chapter four brought the evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought up to date This 
chapter identified the three modes of geopolitical thinking behind the three main foreign 
policy courses offered by today's political parties to the Maltese electorate It was argued 
that these courses are all derivatives of some of the more antiquated geopolitical outlooks 
which have, over the years, become established in the majority mindset of the Maltese. 
Moreover, it was shown that the thinking behind these outlooks is no longer relevant to 
Malta's contemporary geopolitical situation. In explaining these historical parallels the 
work of an eminent Maltese sociologist, R G. Sultana was drawn on. Sultana has made 
the point that the events the Maltese as a people have been exposed to are bound to 
influence their present-day thinking. More specifically, in his "sociological inquiry" which 
he published in 1994 he introduced the concept of the "welcoming society orientation", 
which he argued was a significant characteristic of Maltese society. He argued that this 
characteristic derived from a gradual erosion of the islanders' self confidence caused by the 
successive colonizers grooming a certain liege mentality. To the rulers, effective control 
depended on the Maltese harbouring positive dispositions towards their occupiers and 
such a mentality was therefore an essential ingredient for a secure fortress. Today, 
however, Sultana argues that this "welcoming society orientation" has the effect of 
exposing Malta's national integrity, internal cohesion and core values to external political 
interference. In making such a deduction Sultana comes close to verifying precisely the 
line of argument being put forward in chapter four; that it is entirely plausible to assume 
that, in terms of geopolitical thinking about Malta, many of the habits of history transpose 
into the rotes of today. 
It is thus easy to see how a history characterised by a succession of foreign overlords 
making decisions for the Maltese has bequeathed certain legacies which are discernible in 
the more realist-related thinking apparent in recent Nationalist Party policy responses. In 
addition to this, the more idealist responses adopted in the last decade by the Labour Party 
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are tantamount to a continuation of past modes of thinking in as much as they were 
designed initially to serve the Maltese throughout the Cold War. It is therefore possible to 
conclude from the examination presented in chapter four that each of the three common 
geopolitical outlooks in Malta today are based on the legacies of the past geopolitical 
thinking. Once again, continuing a theme which had become common throughout the 
evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought, the Maltese were subscribing to outside 
interpretations of their geopolitical situation rather than inspiring independent geopolitical 
thought from within. 
Chapter five turned the thesis away from the past and towards the future by generating a 
number of insights and ideas for the next step in the evolution of geopolitical thinking in 
Malta. Whereas the first three chapters were concerned with the heritage of geopolitical 
thinking in Malta, and the second its renaissance, this chapter was concerned with a 
possible rejuvenation of geopolitical thinking For the first time it drew together four 
issues that are likely to feature in Maltese geopolitical thinking in the next century, which 
have nevertheless been largely overlooked to date. They were referred to as 
macropolitical threats and, coining Camilleri's term, together they can be said to make a 
new "macropolitical agenda" for Malta. In tackling these macropolitical threats, chapter 
five delved beneath the simplistic ideological geopolitical considerations that have 
dominated geopolitical thinking and discourse in Malta throughout the entire course of its 
evolution. Although this chapter provided no hard and fast solutions to the problems 
Malta is Likely to face in the short-term future, it has presented geopolitical thinkers in 
Malta with a course back to the future; an alternative to the narrow and outdated agenda 
that remains the main focus of their attention. 
Considering the above conclusions and thinking back to the original aims of the thesis set 
out in the introduction (p. 4) it can be concluded that they have each been satisfied. The 
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first three chapters presented a thorough investigation into the heritage of geopolitical 
thought in Malta. The fourth chapter utilized this investigation to cast a viable and 
thorough historical perspective on the current modes of thinking which constitute the 
current renaissance of geopolitics in Malta. Finally, by keeping current thinking in its 
historical context, the fifth chapter succeeded in generating a number of insights and ideas 
for future geopolitical thinking in Malta. To complete the overall conclusion we must 
now assess the extent to which the main aim has been satisfied and in order to do this we 
must consider the wider implications of the study. 
n WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF T H E STUDY 
As mentioned in the introduction, the three sub-aims were in a sense contrived to satisfy 
the one overriding main aim, which was, to highlight and substantiate the insights that new 
and alternative research into the history of geopolitical thought can bring about, not at the 
conventional global level of mainstream meta-theorists but instead at the less-grandiose 
and more practicable levels In other words, is there a place or use for studies such as this 
one ? 
Given the fact that I have spent the last four years thinking in some way or another about 
this study, the above question clearly represents a severe test of my intellectual objectivity. 
Nevertheless, I do firmly believe that there is not only a place for more innovative and 
small scale geopolitical studies such as this one but in fact a need for them. What is more, 
I am clearly not alone in this belief. The entire "critical geopolitics" movement, which is 
discussed and referenced in the introduction, arguably arose as an antidote to a perceived 
reverie in geopolitics with global meta-theories and more specifically the realism inherent 
in such meta-theories. In some way or another, geopolitical phenomena affect people and 
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groups of people at a whole range of different levels. It follows that people and groups of 
people at a whole range of different levels from time to time engage themselves in 
geopolitical thinking. Why then should it only be the mainstream thoughts of western 
intellectuals and those in positions of world power that are researched. 
I have no hesitation in concluding that this thesis has succeeded in satisfying its single 
main aim. That is to say, it has undoubtedly made a new and alternative contribution to 
wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking. Obviously the contribution it has made will be 
appreciated by some more than others and so, finally, I touch on the matter of the 
audience I perceive for my work. 
This piece of work is of relevance to anyone who thinks geopolitically about a minor 
power, particularly those minor powers that were once ruled by realist colonial policies or 
those which, through their strategic location, have in the past become entangled in global 
power games. After all, geopolitical thinkers from minor powers such as this are the ones 
most likely to have problems discarding out-dated modes of geopolitical thinking and 
tailoring their new thoughts to suit their specific needs. In addition, this work serves as an 
example of research into one specific history of geopolitical thinking or as a case study of 
the history of non-mainstream geopolitical thinking. Finally, and perhaps most pertinently, 
this thesis will be of value to anyone with particular regard for Malta or, more specifically, 
anyone who is concerned with the context in which important decisions are made on 
behalf of the Maltese. 
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